On the night before October 7, an IDF intelligence unit gathered information indicating that Hamas was preparing to fire rockets at Israel and also observed unusual activity among Hamas’ aerial forces that indicated they were preparing for activity, Ynet reported on Thursday.

These signs were discussed in IDF consultations in the following hours but no officials made a decision to raise alerts over a possible Hamas attack or cancel the Nova party which was being held with thousands of attendants in an open area near the Gaza border.

Contrary to earlier reports, during these consultations, senior IDF officials had seriously considered the possibility that Hamas was about to launch an attack on Israel. Previous reports said that the IDF only considered the possibility that Hamas was preparing for a military exercise.

At 2 a.m., Maj.-Gen. Yaron Finkelman, the commander of the IDF’s Southern Command, who resigned from his position on Tuesday immediately after IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Levi announced his resignation, held a phone consultation with other senior officers, Shin Bet operatives, and an Air Force representative about warnings of “unusual activity” in Gaza. Finkelman said that there were three possibilities, the third being an assault.

A summary of the Southern Command’s consultations was delivered to the head of the IDF Operations Directorate, Gen. Oded Basyuk, who made several phone calls. “After consulting the deputy head of Shin Bet, the commander of the Southern Command, the operations commander, and the intelligence research department chief, there are three possible scenarios,” he wrote. “A Hamas drill, increased preparedness to defend against an Israeli attack, preparations for an operation against Israel in the coming hours including an incursion from the sea or a strike on the gas rig, breaching the border, abductions, shooting attacks, rocket attacks and an incursion from the air.”

He ordered a limited number of actions, including a review of Israel’s aerial defenses around the gas rig but although he understood that there was a risk of a rocket attack or “an unusual terror attack, the conclusion was that there must be careful preparation to protect sensitive sources and coordinate actions with military intelligence.”

Halevi held consultations with Basyuk and Finkelman at 4 a.m. and ordered an aerial intelligence flight over Gaza, saying that if Hamas was conducting a drill, it was an opportunity to gather information. The consultation then ended with the decision that barring significant developments, further consultations will be held in the morning.

All orders issued by Halevi and Finkelman were limited ones that protected intelligence sources and prevented Hamas from realizing Israel was aware of its unusual activities.

An official close to the government said the Southern Command was aware of the Nova festival and had approved it. “If the information, not about the assault but about possible rocket fire, didn’t meet the standard to stop the party, what would have?”

“Protecting sources was prioritized,” a senior officer said, explaining the gap between the indications in the report and the general belief that there was a low probability of an assault. “If someone would have thought that there was really a danger, preventing it would have been prioritized over any of the intelligence sources and that’s why a limited group was involved in the discussions.”

The head of the IDF’s military intelligence and the Commander of the Air Force did not participate in the discussion.

IDF leaders decided to take only limited steps, choosing the avoidance of the exposure of sensitive intelligence sources over readiness. A source who participated in recent consultations called this revelation “a nuclear bomb.”

Even if there were no other warning signs, such as the increase in activity of Hamas aerial forces and the activation of Israeli SIM cards, Hamas’s preparations to fire rockets at Israel alone should have been enough to cancel the Nova party, where the mobile shelters were inadequate to protect thousands of people.

According to the report, this information was included in documents reviewed by senior government and security officials who presented them in their demands for the resignations of Halevi and Finkelman.

(YWN Israel Desk – Jerusalem)