Over four months after the October 7th attack, the military censor cleared for publication additional details about the magnitude of the IDF’s failure to thwart the attack.
At midnight, hours before the massacre in which over 1,200 people were brutally murdered, Israeli intelligence authorities became aware that hundreds of Nukba terrorists simultanously activated Israeli SIM cards in their phones. Nevertheless, no decision was made to bolster security on the border.
This was one of the intelligence findings that led to two consultations of senior IDF officials the night before the attack. The telephone consultations were held due to the many warning signs of a possible invasion from Gaza but ultimately the only decision that was made was to hold another consultation in the morning.
According to a Ynet report, this information was revealed a few days after the war but the military censor blocked the information.
Following the report, the IDF stated that the report is false, stating that “there were several signs, including, among other things, the activation of only dozens of SIM cards, which were activated in previous events.”
The IDF added: “As has been published, signs were received on the night of October 7th and situational assessments were held and operative decisions were made in accordance. The signs were based on various tools and capabilities, including technological tools whose method of operation cannot be detailed.”
(YWN Israel Desk – Jerusalem)
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8 Responses
בושה וחרפה על ממשלת פושע ישראל
that alone should have set up a super major flag. They could at any time triangulate a cell reception anywhere and the initial SIM registration takes even longe multi-way handshake supplying more info.
Further proving (id we need that at all!) that only HKB”H is in charge and if he wanted a Milchama to break out, it will happen to the wisest and strongest army in the world!
אם ה’ לא ישמר עיר שוא שקד שומר
I’m no intelligence expert but these type of stories only make a lot of sense after the fact. At the time however the thought of Hamas doing a mass invasion was so unthinkable and so unlikely to have been successful even if tried (that remans true in even in retrospect) that if I were working in Israeli intelligence and received this piece of information there is no way I would have connected to it to a suspicion of a mass invasion coming six hours later.
You could say the same about 9/11 or any terror attack.
It is very easy for us to talk after the fact.
And the stupid left who knows there’s blames it on bibi
what one should take out from this
This was one of the intelligence findings that led to two consultations of senior IDF officials the night before the attack. The telephone consultations were held due to the many warning signs of a possible invasion from Gaza but ultimately the only decision that was made was to hold another consultation in the morning.
is.. im hashem lo yishmar ihr shov shakad shomer
This report reminds me of an old Yiddish song about the people of Chelm who held meetings about a certain issue. At the end of each meeting they always reached the same conclusion, and that was to have another meeting. The chorus of the song is “Iz gebliben men zol machen an asifah.” When Hashem wants to, he can turn the best army and intelligence in the world, into just another Chelm.