6 Responses

1. Animals do not behave like these barbarians it’s an insult to animals

2. Right wing BIBI is weak

3. Referring to barbarians as animals is an insult to animals

4. Listening to CBS is infuriating. They keep on talking about the “combined” death toll without one bit of acknowledgement of the atrocities committed by the Arabs. Their other trick is to constantly refer to the hostages without specifying which side is holding hostages and that they are civilians.

5. I haven’t heard even so much as 1 squeak out of Herzog since this entire carnage commenced

   & Where are ben Gvir & Smotrich in all of this?

6. Israel should methodically plan a response and not just rush in. People should not be in a rush. This time they should take their time and plan and have a way to takeover.
   In large scale combat environments in dense urban environments like Gaza , the population usually provides more support to the defender. Historically, DUE defenders extract physical support from urban populations, while the task of rebuilding the city and restoring its society falls to the attacker. Unless the attacker has full surprise, defenders usually have time to integrate civilian manpower into an operational approach that demands social cohesion to “defend our homes.” Defenders often coerce population support through a combination of appeals to a common identity, incentives, and threats of violence. The defender also benefits from a siege’s effect on the city’s economy: with external commerce interrupted, the lack of competing economic activity suppresses the price of labor to, or even below, subsistence levels. Irregular militaries go to great lengths to maintain control of this captive labor market because they rely on civilian population support to provide combat forces with additional capabilities and operational reach. In contrast, professional militaries avoid incorporating population support into their offensive or defensive operational approach because they are usually sustained organically from national support and prefer to evacuate the population in order to use fires with reduced risk of civilian casualties.

   Israel should Invest in resources to mobilize and extract concrete support from the population. Joint doctrine stipulates that one of the fundamentals of urban operations is to “persuade municipal governments, groups, and population segments to cooperate with joint force operations.” Large scale combat operations in DUEs are usually of long-enough duration that commanders should invest resources and establish an expert
   team to convert potential population support into improved operational reach.

   In a friendly country—
   an operational approach could contract civilian labor, recruit local volunteers as human intelligence sources along lines of contact to enhance rear area security, and augment humanitarian assistance for displaced people. Active population participation may prove decisive by improving cohesion, legitimacy, and the likelihood of sustaining the defense long enough for strategic relief. Militaries that choose not to incorporate population support into their operational design leave locals idle and risk their adversary discovering a way to harness the latent population support.
   In my opinion
   that much of this population support is involuntary, yet their physical contribution to Hamas’ war effort is critical to the duration and effectiveness of Hamas’ operational reach.
   Hamas harnessed the millions of civilians in Gazas economic footprint to produce and distribute supplies with minimal manpower, providing an extremely favorable tooth-to-tail ratio that allowed them to project more combat power further than a similar conventionally organized and sustained force. On the opposite side, the same civilian population does comparatively little to enhance idf operations. Once liberated by the idf, civilians escaped to safety and the idf expends resources and combat power to secure and sustain the civilians: soldiers distributed supplies, provided medical care, and constructs shelters, adding to a net reduction in idf operational reach.

   When they say civilians know that in reality, Hamas regular military force consisted almost entirely of light infantry and short-range fires capabilities. All other warfighting functions are performed by civilians—local and foreign—contributing population support within gazas dense urban environment . Mission command is facilitated by civilian couriers who provided assured communications. Intelligence comes from civilian human and open-source intelligence analysis. Civilians dig communications tunnels and trenches, drive bulldozers to build berms, and serve as mobile protection platforms to deter idf strikes. Civilian households distribute all classes of supply to Hamas units and provide medical support, and civilian labor manufactured weapons including precision UAS-IEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs, and suicide vest IEDs from commercial off-the-shelf components.