By Rabbi Yair Hoffman for 5TJT.com
This week, former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin was handcuffed and taken into custody after a jury had found him guilty of murder on two counts and manslaughter on one count in the death of George Floyd. Assuming that Chauvin was sitting with his knee on the neck or chest of Mr. Floyd for a prolonged period of time, and was clearly endangering his life – there is a question that we must ask oursleves. There were other officers and other bystanders around that witnessed it all. Should they have done something? What would you have done – if it was your own son or daughter chalilah, and you perceived that the officer was endangering life? What would be the halacha?
PLEASE HELP A WONDERFUL BAALEI TESHUVAH COUPLE GET MARRIED. WHATEVER YOU CAN GIVE WILL HELP. PRUTI PRUTI MITZTAREF.
https://thechesedfund.com/zechornilah/weddingoftwobaaleiteshuva
What follows is a general recommendation as to what to do and then the halachic discussion about it.
WHAT THEY SHOULD HAVE DONE
Bystanders should perhaps have divided up into three groups.
- Some should have approached the officer and declared, “Sir, you are under citizen’s arrest. You are killing this man. You must cease and desist immediately. We are not assaulting you. We are placing you under citizen’s arrest because you are not listening to us in stopping the attempted murder of this person.”
- Others should have approached the other officers and said, “Officers we are placing this police officer under citizen’s arrest. Please help us. We are not assaulting him and you know deep in your hearts that what he is doing is wrong. Please assist us. It is your duty.”
- A third group should have called other officers by phone to the scene – a senior officer.
- The first group of bystanders should then have physically removed the police officer from Floyd.
THE READER’S REACTION
It is anticipated that the reader’s reaction might be, “Never have I seen such naivete. The officer will draw his gun and shoot you down. You are foolish.”
Perhaps. But wouldn’t you do this to save your own child or brother? Wouldn’t you place yourself at somewhat of a risk to save someone else?
THE YERUSHALMI
The Talmud Yerushalmi in Meseches Trumos (8:4) records the following incident:
Rabbi Ami was kidnapped by robbers. Rabbi Yochanan said: “All we can do is prepare his burial shrouds.” Rabbi Shimon Ben Lakish said, “Either I will kill or be killed. I will go and rescue him with force.” He went and convinced the kidnappers to release him.
According to this Yerushalmi, there appears to be a debate upon the idea between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Shimon Ben Lakish as to whether or not there is an obligation to risk one’s life in order to save the life of another.
TWO VIEWS
It is also possible, however, that Rabbi Shimon Ben Lakish was just reaching for a higher moral standard – but one that is not obligatory. Let us now look at two different views or understandings of this Yerushalmi. The first one which seems to understand that it is obligatory is that of the HaGaos Maimonides, Rav Karo, and a Tosfos in Niddah. The second view which seems to understand that it is not obligatory (and perhaps even forbidden) is that of the Radbaz.
THE HAGAOS MAIMONIUS’ VIEW
Rabbi Meir Ben Yekusiel HaKohain, a 13th century Rishon who was a student of the Maharam of Rothenberg, writes (Hagaos Maimonius, Hilchos Rotzayach 1:14):
“He is in violation of do not stand idly by your brother’s blood. The Yerushalmi concludes that one is obligated to save another – even if one must place himself in possible danger.”
Rav Yoseph Karo in his commentary on the Tur (Bais Yoseph, CM 426) writes that the reasoning of the Hagaos Maimonius is that this one will surely die, while the other is only a safaik (a doubt), and “whomsoever saves one life etc., it is as if he has saved an entire world (See Sanhedrin 37a).” The implication of Rav Karo’s view is that even if the risk involved amounted to fifty percent – there would still be an obligation to save the other.
A PROOF FROM TOSFOS
The Netziv in his He’Emek Sh’ailah (129:4) cites a fascinating Tosfos in Niddah (61a d”h “Atmarichnu”):
There were residents of the Galil in northern Eretz Yisroel, where rumors went out that they had killed someone. These residents came before Rabbi Tarfon. They requested that he hide them, because they were afraid of the authorities. Rabbi Tarfon explained to them (according to Rashi’s explanation) that if he refused to hide them, they would be caught and exiled. But if he does hide them, perhaps the rumors are true and it would be forbidden to help you. Tosfos points out that even if there is no personal danger, Rashi’s view seems to be that one must always be concerned for the truth of rumors. Tosfos seem to dismiss Rashi’s interpretation and adopt the explanation of the Sheiltos D’Rav Achai that Rabbi Tarfon’s concern was that if it was true that they killed someone and that he had hid them then he might lose his head to the Caesar.
The fact that the clause of “if it was true that they killed someone” was added indicates that if it were not true – then there would be an obligation to save them regardless of the risk.
THE RADBAZ’S VIEW
On the other hand, Rabbi Dovid Ben Zimra, also known as the Radbaz, was asked (Responsa Vol. V #218 or Vol. III #627) about an evil king who captured a relative of one of his financial advisors who was bad-mouthed by his anti-Semitic peers. The financial advisor had escaped but got word that the king will kill his relative if he does not agree to sacrifice his own limb. The Radbaz responded that one is not halachically required to make such a sacrifice but that doing so would be a midas chassidus – an act of piety. He further writes that the principle of darcheha darchei noam – her ways are ways of pleasantness’ could not obligate one to forfeit a limb. The Radbaz continues that if giving up his limb endangers his life – he is a chassid shoteh – a holy fool.
We see that the Radbaz’s view is that if there is [at least a significant percentage of] an element of risk – then one should not do it. This is in contrast with the view of the Hagaos Maimonius.
THE MINCHAS CHINUCH’S QUESTION ON THE YERUSHALMI
The author of the Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 296:32) poses the following question: The entire obligation of saving the life of the other is based upon the principle of “Lo Saamod al dam rayacha – do not stand idly by your brother’s blood.” If so, when there is a chance of danger, this is considered safaik pikuach nefesh, and one is exempt from fulfilling the Mitzvah! How is this any different than any of the other Mitzvs in the Torah, where a life and death danger sets that Mitzvah aside? Clearly, the Minchas Chinuch is siding with the view that there is no obligation to save when there is a danger.
RAV SHMUEL ROZOVSKY’S ANSWER
Rav Shmuel Rozovsky zt”l (1913–1979), a Rosh Yeshiva in Ponovech, a leading Gadol HaDor, a talmid of Rav Shimon Shkop in Grodno and rebbe of both Rav Gershon Edelstein and Rav Asher Arielli gives the following answer (Zichron Shmuel 65:22) to the Minchas Chinuch’s question: The Gemorah in Bava Metziah 62b discusses the case of two people walking in the desert with one of them possessing enough water for the survival of only one of them. Ben Petora darshened: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other. Until Rabbi Akiva came along and taught: “And your brother shall live with you,” – your life takes precedence over the life of the other.
Rabbi Rozovsky explains that this means “your certain life” takes precedence, but not “a possible danger to your life. Rav Rozovsky answers the question on the Yerushalmi, but this does not mean that he holds that this is the final view.
CONCLUSION
So what is the final answer? Is there an obligation to place oneself in certain danger in order to save the life of another? No less an authority than the Mishna Brurah (OC 329:19) writes citing the Pischei Teshuvah (CM 426) that although one is not obligated to place his life in danger – if one is overly concerned then he himself will end up in such a life danger himself! [One wonders whether Martin Neimoller was aware of this Pischei Teshuvah].
Rav Shmuel Vosner zt”l in his Shaivet HaLevi (Vol. VIII #87) writes that when there is a clear majority of a percentage that he will end up saving the life of the other and not dying– then he, in fact, is obligated to do so.
It is this author’s view that if one embarks upon the three or four steps listed in the beginning of this article – the vast majority of the time, one will not lose his life. Avoiding this action would possibly fall under the idea of being “overly concerned” mentioned by the Pischei Teshuvah – and the bystanders should have intervened in the manner mentioned above. May Hashem yisborach bring us peace in this country and across the world.
PLEASE HELP A WONDERFUL BAALEI TESHUVAH COUPLE GET MARRIED!
https://thechesedfund.com/zechornilah/weddingoftwobaaleiteshuva
The author can be reached at [email protected]
Join the official YWN WhatsApp status
11 Responses
You are grossly underestimating the violence a police officer is capable of and ready to do. I would not place the cop under citizen’s arrest, as I value my well-being.
Elephant in the room: Rish Lakish (R’ Shimon ben Lakish) had a prior life as a commander of armed bandits. It’s possible he was most qualified to handle the situation based on his unique skillset. It’s highly likely he understood the danger and knew he would not be risking his life. Just my $0.02.
a bad guy died and a police officer who was taught to do a precise lock did what he was trained to do……the problem is the public…bad guys die……sadly so do good guys
What a load of dangerous lies. Chauvin had every right to restrain Floyd, who had violently resisted arrest and fought the police. He was bigger and stronger than any of the policemen, which is why it took four of them to bring him down. And once Chauvin had him under control he could not risk letting him up in case he came up and started fighting again. He was also concerned that Floyd was in excited delirium, and had to be restrained until the ambulance came, for his own good; if he’d been moved and woken up he could do himself a serious injury. Finally, his knee was NOT on Floyd’s neck but on his shoulder, where it belonged.
The conviction is a travesty, a real rish’us. The jurors were afraid that if they voted to acquit their names would be published and they would be harmed. Their families would be harmed. Their houses would be burned. So they sacrificed an innocent man. That is against the law and against the Torah.
Whether or not he was kneeling on his neck or his back shoulder blade depends on which camera angle one views the scene from. From the other police officers body-cam it appears that he was kneeling on his back shoulder blade and NOT his neck (as came out in the trial).
Whether or not he died from the officers actions or overdosed on drugs depends on which medical examination you hold by.
Whether or not the officers actions were accessive depends on whether or not one understand the various dangers that face officers, suspects (and bystanders) — as noted by one of the defenses witnesses.
A citizen watching from the sideline is in general not capable of making all of these assessments. Most citizens are not aware of the dangers and difficulties involved in apprehending a suspect who is not cooperative, high and potentially dangerous.
Now, it may very well be that Officer Chauvin acted excessively and directly caused or contributed to Floyd’s death. But the case is not as cut and dry as the simple (and often biased) media reports present it. And, unfortunately, in today’s political and cultural environment we don’t take the time to seriously anaylze situations and try to get to fair, honest and insightful opinions.
Of course it should be STRESSED that all the above is in the case of סכנה ליהודי שומר תורה ומצות……….!!!!!!
The police officer in Minnesota was duly authorized to arrest the criminal who resisted and failed to comply and exhibited classic symptoms of excited delirium thus putting officers and bystanders at risk. The culpability for the death of the known and again accused criminal is not comparable. Rabbi Ami was not kidnapped by law enforcement officers, but rather by the criminals. This article does discuss the degree of obligation to put oneself at risk but to compare to the Minnesota situation is fallacious.
I have no idea if he should be considered guilty or not, but everyone knows one thing: There was no way ANY jury is going to be fair in this case. Imagine if someone asks you if you can be a jury for a case that if you find the defendant guilty then all’s well, and if you don’t, you’ll be cancelled and lynched, and most of the country will be burned down, would you take up the offer? And if you were forced by law to be part of the jury, will you have even the slightest option to find him not-guilty?
The author tends to write up a bunch of personal opinions and then label his articles as “holochik analysis”
Resh Lokish had been a highwayman before doing Teshuva. You have to speculate that skill set affected his actions.
I would certainly not put my life on the line for a criminal and drug addict who overdosed and which was the primary cause of his own death. Inhaling a large quantity of fentanyl was the primary cause of his breathing issues. He kept screaming that he can’t breathe while sitting in the police vehicle before he was placed on the ground. If he was being choked when Chauvin’s neck was on his back he would not be able to scream. Not that I agree that Chauvin should’ve put his knee on Floyd’s back, that was utter stupidity because Floyd was already shackled and on his stomach; was no need to control him at that point.