58 Responses

1. Just out of curiosity – isn’t Lubicom a marketing consultant? What is being marketed here?
   KT

2. This is a worthwhile endeavor and statement, but Rav Daniel Eidensohn has raised many concerns regarding the activities of EJF itself improperly promoting conversions of non-Jewish spouses.

3. #1 (joelirich):
   Great point! EJF is trying to market itself and resurrect its reputation after having been found to be improperly promoting conversions (especially for non-Jewish spouses.)

4. Lubicom does PR for whoever hires them.

5. to #4 to go without sheitel is assur d’oireise, ktubos 72a bottom, aven hueazer 115,seuf 4 .. not a chreidi thing (whatever that means) or mihak, and if modern ortodox go mixed swimming, wear pants its still ausser d’oireise(dont know if they do ,just moshel according to what you say). to eat kitnious or not is a minhak and does not affect geiros in any shape or form ,like eating or not eating gebrockts on pesach…to have a tv IS A SERIOUS ISSUR, but if it affects a gayuros dont know. can you elaborate what you mean “chareidi practices”? is it that the arba chelkai shulchen urech are binding as opposed to?? if one wants to be megayer but doesnt want to accept even one din in shulchen urech he is not accepted…

6. if one wants to be megayer but doesnt want to accept even one din in shulchen urech he is not accepted…
   ==============================
   I suggest you might want to modify this statement a bit, there are a number of dinim in S”A and Rama which are not practiced lmaaseh today by anyone due to changes instituted by later authorities.

   KT

7. #4 “Lesschumras,”
   while your first point may be valid, your second begs to be explained. How can you compare halachos with minhagim or siyagim. Covering one’s hair IS Halacha (no matter what type of Jew you claim to be), not eating kitniyos is a minhag accepted by Ashkenazic Jews. I don’t believe that Ashkenazim view Sephardim as being over any issurim by eating kitniyos on Pesach. And while gedolim strongly discourage having TVs in our homes, I doubt that they make it a prerequisite for geirus. (Though, I understand that it is a prerequisite for some yeshivos!)

   While it is clear by your screen name that you detest chumros, let’s not confuse chumros and minhagim with actual halacha and issurei d’oraysa! Being mekabel ol malchus shamayim should be required of any ger tzeddek regardless of labels and affiliations as dictated by halacha!

8. #1 and #6 – you 100 percent hit the nail on the head.E.J.F. has weakened this very concept of “kabalos mitzvos” that they are stressing today. The use of a marketing firm is similiar to their convention being held in Washington,what’s wrong with Boro Park? True Torah and marketing just don’t mix.

9. When a woman becomes a Ger, she is always (by definition) UNMARRIED. So she does not have to cover her hair immediately.

   Obviously she must agree prior to geirus to cover her hair IMMEDIATELY AFTER her post-geirus marriage (whenever that should occur.)

10. If a potential Ger says he or she will 100% keep 612 mitzvos, but there is only ONE mitzvah they cannot maintain, they are unacceptable for conversion.

    And any purported conversion of such an individual is false and retroactively null and void without ever being considered effective.

11. B”h

    #8–Actually, those who wear sheitels are breaking the law according to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.

    Most women look better in a wig than they do without it, especially those who cut their hair so the wig will fit. They are expressly breaking the law, as they should look their best in private with their husband. They should not look good for some Joe on the street!

    In addition, those women are probably leading men on, as many sheitels look very real and a man seeing her may not know she is married and speak to her, and flirt with her.

    In addition, it is expressly forbidden for a woman to wear a sheitel outside an eruv on Shabbat–and some P’skm rule even with an eruv they are not permitted.

    I know they have become very popular (the red sports-car of the “frum” set), but sheitels are very problematic at best, assur at worst–and DEFINITELY NOT REQUIRED.

12. To my best knowledge, as simple as it is, Most botei dinim fully expect a prospective ger or gieres, to be fully shomer shabbos to the best of his/her understanding, to keep the laws of kashrus and taharas hamishpacha, to educate their children in orthodox yeshivas, and to be open to keeping all the rest of the CHIYUVIM in the Torah and Shulchan Aruch.

    While one beis din may be makpid on wearing a teechel, another may accept a shaitel, while another may accept a snood, and another may even accept a scarf.

    Even the most Chareidi botei dinim usually still accept a ger or gieres who only uses a scarf, as long as she is fully shomer shabbos, etc.

    However, they all understand that any ger is still rather ignorant, and will make mistake after mistake.

    What is most important is the “WILLINGNESS” TO KEEP THE TORAH AND MITZVOS. If that is not there, if the ger or gieres will eat a cheeseburger out of the house, all agree, whether Chassidim, Yeshivhish, Mod Orth, that the giyur was never official, and her kids are NOT Jews.
    This is clear in the Shailos and Teshuvos of many gedolim. If we find out that a ger had thoughts of not accepting the Ohl Torah, there was no giyur. This is spelled out: If a giyeres is discovered to never having intentions to follow halachos, she and her children, even those born following the “giyur” are not Jewish.

    We are not talking about the shiyur for an amah, or whether to say Nikadesh or Nakdishach…. we are talking about ohl Torah.

13. Yael (#15):

    Many Chasidim are similarly opposed to sheitels as are the Sefardim. Nevertheless, both the Sefardim and the Chasidim agree that it is always imperative that a married woman fully cover her hair — albeit with something other than a sheitel.

    Additionally, men and woman should not flirt or unnecessarily speak even if both are unmarried.

    rabbiofberlin (#16) – Accepting the “principle” of all 613 mitzvos, means accepting doing all 613 mitzvos as outlined in shulchan orach the minute he becomes a Ger. Rambam does NOT exempt a new Ger from even ONE mitzvah the moment he becomes a Yid.

14. Absolutely. Klal Yisroel is very tolerant of lack of knowledge on a new Ger, but expects the Ger to learn the mitzvos to fully observe all of them. He can’t expect to not follow even one mitzvah.

15. #20, for how long do you monitor a newly minted Ger? Say if after 20 years,s/he suffers some existential crisis and abandons religious observance, is that conversion retroactively nullified? Say it happens one year after the conversion? What about six months? Where do you draw the line and why? What happens if the convert observes mitzvot, but does not adhere to conditions laid down by the Beth Din? For example, many batei din want a get to never participate in holiday celebrations with their genetic family. What if this convert just can’t bring him/herself to do that and just goes over to his/her family to wish them well and exchange a few hugs and kisses and may pose for a few pictures? Perhaps s/he thought she could stay away and sincerely intended to at the time of conversion, but later finds him/herself missing the good times that can be had only in the loving embrace of those who have known someone since birth? Will you throw this person out of klal Yisrael? What if the person never intended to follow those super Halachik requirements? (On a related note, what about a putative convert who intends to rely on R. Heinemann’s Yom Tov mode oven?)What if a convert rejects the concept of Da’as Torah? Where and for what reason does the scrutiny end?

16. #21 – It ONLY depends on intent at the time of conversion. IF the convert at the time of conversion FULLY intended to keep all 613 mitzvos (per Shulchan Orach, etc.) 100%, what happens afterward is entirely irrelevant.

    Extraneous conditions required by Beis Din SHOULD be maintained. But if the convert failed to keep those (such as keeping away from blood relatives, etc.), that alone would not bring their conversion into question assuming they fully maintain the 613 mitzvos.

    BUT what we have been witnessing from certain quarters (that needn’t be named), is so-called “Orthodox conversions” where the convert did not keep (known) mitzvos FROM DAY ONE. This obviously indicates they LACKED INTENT to keep (at least) some mitzvos at the time of “conversion”, hence making a mockery of the process and clearly indicating they were NEVER JEWS.

17. When a woman becomes a Ger, she is always (by definition) UNMARRIED.

    Comment by Joseph — June 11, 2008 @ 3:08 pm

    Joseph,
    How about if a gentile woman is married to an unaffiliated Jew who later becomes a baal teshuva, they have a good marriage with kids and now she sincerely wants to convert. Does such a woman upon her conversion but prior to the chuppah have to cover her hair?

18. In a somehwta combined response to both #22 and #23, I am well aware of the reasons for the detractors from the Beit Din l’Inyanei Giyur. Indeed, if the system did not work, then it should be shut down or changed prospectively. My problem is with the blanket retroactive nullification of all its conversions. After all it should be clear conversion is something to be dealt with on a case by case basis. While I personally believe that the issur of oppressing a convert probably bars anyone from initiating an inquiry into the bona fides of the conversion (beyond looking at the certificate), I know others feel otherwise for myriad reasons, some of them legitimate.

    As to sincerety, we never really know if someone is sincere or not. All we know is that which the putative ger affirms before the Beth Din. I wonder how much weight we can give to a post conversion statement that a convert never intended to observe the commandments. But I would imagine that somewhere the teshuvot addres things like “devarim shebalev einam devarim” or “ein adam meisim atzmo rasha” as applied to geirut.

    I have other questions about this whole imbroglio as well. It ought to be clear that the problem this conversion court sought to address was an extreme case, dealing with thousands of people who the chiloni population would be very willing to intermarry with even without conversions. The laws of geirut are mainly d’rabbanan. Indeed the entire concept of kabbalat ohl mitzvot is derived m’divrei kabbalah (Since Ruth did it, obviously it must have been required). Intermarriage however is d’Oraita. On some level the choice was between relaxing d’rabanan’s (and lets not forget that the current stringency in this process is relatively recent, based on the view of the Beit Yitzchak. Prior to his teshuva on the subject, things were different. Moreoever, the Beit Yitzchak did not have to deal with the problem of mass Russian Aliyah after seventy years of religious oppression) and trasngressing d’Oraitot. It’s a tough choice to make. Perhaps it’s easier when one lives and seeks to propogate his insular enclave and removes himself as much as possible from the secular society. But for those who try to straddle both worlds, the situation is far harder. The complete lack of empathy for R. Druckman on the part of his detractors is troubling.

19. cherryhillbilly (24) –

    Very good question. But the answer is that despite having been “married” to a Jew prior to converting, halacha does not recognize non-Jewish marriages insofar as we are concerned. (It recognizes it for the purposes of the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach, insofar as the gentiles are concerned between themselves.) So regardless if the convert was “married” to a Jew or gentile prior to conversion, it is irrelevant and null and void.

    So the moment the convert becomes a Yid, they are considered a brand new person in a sense, with no relation to their former gentile blood family or marriages.

    Now the Beis Din may have such a woman cover her hair nonetheless (perhaps for maris ayin). But strictly al pi halacha, she is not required to cover her hair until she gets married AFTER her geirus.

20. No, I did not imply that a woman who went to a Mod Orth or similar rov, and was not told she had to cover her hair, that her giyur was not chal. I was only talking about the fact that there is a wide variation between customs, from a scarf to a shaved head with a teechel, and that one still respects the giyur of the other.

    I did emphasize that Shabbos, Kashrus, & Taharas Hamishpacha were the ikarim.

    But, if the prospective ger or giyeres goes to a more Chareidi rov and beis din, and is told this is the way to do things, and she refuses, there may be a problem with that. I would certainly not rule on that. Not my place.

    As far as “Find out” …. I am talking about its becoming revealed that the ger/giyeres never really accepted a certain CHIYUV type of mitzvah. Maybe that he/she had a kosher home, or so said, but was seen in McDonalds eating a cheeseburger.

    Now, if it can be established that he/she WAS practicing fully what he/she understood upon giyur, but later strayed, that does not undo the giyur. He/she is just a Yid doing an avairo. However, if it is clear that he/she NEVER accepted a mitzvah/halacha which is an undisputed CHIYUV, whether MiD’Oyreisa or D’Rabbonon, the giyur IS botul l’mafraya.

    That is why the Rov and Beis Din are undertaking a giant responsibility to do a giyur.

    I was in the room, when a young mother of two children listened to her giyeres mother tell her rabbi, “When I was m’gayair 25 years ago, I never really intended to stop eating treif. I just wanted to marry my fiance, and lied to the rabbis. I told them what they wanted to hear. I am a little better now, but still don’t do all the mitzvos. In fact, often I tell my husband I was at the mikvah, when I did not go. It is just silly superstition, Rabbi, isn’t it?”

    The daughter, herself a mother of two yeshiva boys, lost it. She basically had just learned that she and her kids were not Jewish, since it was clear that her mother’s giyur was never chal!

    She had to be megayer as did her kids!

    Bottom line, it is vital that a beis din be as sure as a human can be that a prospective Ger or Giyeres is for real, and fully intends to follow Torah U’Mitzvos.

21. #30, the question you ask about acceptability of these geirim can be just as appropriately asked on those who reject them. Should they not perhaps, remain silent on this issue for the sake of consensus? Let’s not forget, stricter isn’t necessarily “righter.”

22. #33 – Should Poiskim who pasken someone is defined as a mamzer remain silent for the sake of consensus, since the lowest common denominator Rabbi says otherwise? And let a potential mamzer marry into Klal Yisroel?

23. Actually #34, I once heard in a shiur from R. Mordechai Willig that in Europe the way people dealt with a mamzer was to send him to a distant city and instruct him to KEEP HIS MOUTH SHUT!!! As to your argument about pandering to the lowest common denominator, I fear you assume that kulot are less valuable than are chumrot. Additionally, why should meikil rabbanim acquiesce to the demands of machmir rabbis? The tyranny of any scenario is odious. Rather, true consensus is built upon compromise. I know that meikil rabbis are prepared to go along with some chumra for the sake of consensus (i.e. the recnet RCA deal with the Chief Rabbinate on geirut). I’ve never seen more machmir rabbis willing to bend a little for the sake of consensus.

24. rabbiofberlin –

    Who said anything about a “sofek” mamzer? If a poisek says someone is a mamzer gamur, should he back down and unleash mamzeirus on Klal Yisroel, because the lowest common denominator Rabbi states that he thinks the person is not a mamzer?

25. #37 –

    Uch un vay upon Klal Yisroel if a known mamzer is advised as such, to unlease his mamzeirus on Klal Yisroel by “KEEPING HIS MOUTH SHUT!”

26. rabbiofberlin: “At worse, it is a question of possibly non-Jews being incorporated into Klal Yisroel. Something to be avoided, for sure, but it is not as “chomur” as bringing any pesul into the family mainstream.”

    NON-JEWS being incorporated into Klal Yisroel is something MERELY “to be avoided” but “is not bringing pesul into the family”?!
    What have you been smoking my dear?

27. rabbiofberlin:

    The problem is that those “great ones” don’t want to handle these situations and rule by “Kol Koreh”,not exactly the right way to make a Psak.

    Where do YOU come around with azus and tell our Gedolim they are wrong and YOU know how to handle “the problem”!?

    non-jewish people marrying into Klal Yisroel but there is no permanent Psul.

    So a SHIKSA married a kusher Yid and there is no permanent psul? Aside from being oiver a mdoiraisa, the children and ALL FUTURE GENERATIONS of such marriage, are pure GOYIM.

    BTW Hagoen Rav Hutner ZTV’L was opposed to the famous case of Rav Goren and YES the famous positions of Rav Kook vis-a-vis Zionism. Have you read Pachad Yitzchok lately?

28. My comments, necessarily, come across very strongly. Nevertheless they are meant lsheim shmayim, and should be taken in that context. The gravity of the issues sometimes necessitates the serious language.

29. My comments, necessarily, come across very strongly. Nevertheless they are meant lsheim shmayim, and should be taken in that context. The gravity of the issues sometimes necessitates the serious language.
    .

30. #39, precisely the rabbi who thinks this person is a mamzer should defer to the “lowest common denominator rabbi” who would declare him a kosher yid. Why? Because this is an issue of mamzeirut. And to be matir mamzer we employ every kula in the book; even those that might not survive the laugh test; even those that we would reject in every other circumstance. And that is why R. Goren was correct in his p’sak in the Langer case.

31. #47 –

    Yes, but if AFTER employing every Kula the Rabbonim say there is no way beating around the bush, he unfortunately is a mamzer. But some elsewhere Rabbi declares otherwise. The Rabbonim unfortunately cannot lower halacha to the lowest common denominator, EVEN by mamzeirus.

    Which is why the Rabbonim couldn’t lower halacha to accommodate Rabbi Goren.

32. #48, if you then reject R. Goren’s p’sak in the Langer case, which involved a convert who continued to worship in a church after his conversion, how do you reconcile that rejection to the Ashdod case? Why is Borochovsky (Mrs. Langer’s first husband) a Jew, despite there being clear evidence he never oberved Torah u’Mitzvot, and this women from Ashdod not a Jewess? I can reconcile the two since Langer involved a heter mamzerim, for which we do anything possible, while Ashdod is not an issue of mamzeirut. (Perhaps there might be equally compelling reasons to uphold the Ashdod conversion, and that seems to be part of the crux of the dispute between the various sides). But since you rejct the notion of using what might be called flimsy evidence and even dubious heterim to free a mamzer, how do you then reconcile the two cases? And please spare me some blanket reference to the wisdom of the Gedolim accompanied by a condemnation of my azut panim in daring to ask such a question. I expect (and believe I am enritled) to a substantive answer.

33. #49, the deal you mention might be “common knowledge” among R. Goren’s detractors, but it certainly not so among those who hold him in higher esteem. While indeed that “deal” has been bandied about for years, no one ever provided any evidence for it. Moreover, since (apparently) no one was prepared to issue a heter to the suffering Langer twins, R. Goren too could have played it safe. given his record in the military, he was the front runner for Cheif Rabbi anyway. No, I think he honestly believed he was correct in his p’sak. I’m not familiar with the Dayan matter, so I can’t comment on it.

34. rabbiofberlin – You attempted to utilize Hagoen Rav Hutner in your fallacious misrepresentation of this Gadol Hador, and despite using his name in vain in your response you never responded to the point. And as far as Rav Kook, yes Hagoen Rav Hutner was close to him — on a personal level. But disagreed with him vociferously on a halachic level.

    Counting on geirus to “fix” marriage to a sheigets — especially a shiksa, is a complete corruption of halacha and geirus.

    Give the Gedolim more credit than being mere stooges to “Biryonim”, “Kannoim”, or whatever your favorite adjective may be.

35. rabbiofberlin — You are mistaken once again. Even in generations past, when a local Poisek came across a hefty issue that required the response of the Gedolim of the times, even if that involved a lengthy and uncertain postal or courier system.

    Relying on a geirus as “a way out of the predicament” of their being a non-Jew is halachacially AND practically absurd. The likelihood is they will not honestly and fully accept the 613. Additionally, it in no way is retroactively “a way out of the predicament” of the lav midaraisa of marrying a goy.

    This business of using geirus as some kind of retroactive tool to correct past actions, reaches the heights of halachic absurdity.

36. Dearest rabbiofberlin — The Rabbonim knowingly and happily subjected their views to the Gedolim of far, when appropriate, in a case of hefty consequence.

    As far as the Ethiopian example, that itself is a major controversy and is far from being universally accepted that the Ethiopians are Jewish.

    And please spare the justification of marrying a shaigetz or shiksa as “be-shogeg” or “be-ones.” Such descriptions are laughable.

37. Can someone please answer my basic question which is how do peopel reconclie the apparent inconsistency between the Asdod case and the Langer case? Why did the chareidim insist that Borchovsky has to be a Jew, despite his going to church after his conversion, and the woman from Ashdod cannot be a Jew because she did not keep Shabbat and other mitzvot after her conversion? Boht cases involved an appearence before a proper Beth Din with the right words being said. This question segues into my next question. People on the side of nullifying all the Conversion Court’s conversions make a point of saying that politics has nothing to do with the decision and that it is purly a matter of Halacha. Those people tend to the chareidi side of issues. I’m curious though, has there ever been an instance where the chareidim adopted the view of a non-chareidi authority over that of a chareidi authority? I know of none, and it makes me wonder.

38. cantoresq – The Ashdod case by Rabbi Sherman was made by a religious Zionist beis din, as Rabbi Sherman is a religous Zionist, not by a Chareidi.

39. Joseph (#63), thank you for your input. Perhaps you might wish to address my questions?

40. I think you should best address it to someone very familiar with the intricacies of the Ashdod case.

    Since the Ashdod beis din is a religious zionist one, perhaps they can best answer it. It seems to me the inconsistency you refer to between Ashdod and Langer is a religious zionist inconsistency (not a chareidi one) as both cases (Ashdod and Langer) are religious zionist decisions.

    Perhaps you can explain this religious zionist inconsistency?

41. cantoresq –

    I did some quick research on Langer/Borkovsky. R. Goren did a so-called annulment on Langer’s first marriage based upon “afke’inehu”. So he claimed he retroactively annulled the first marriage.

    His second ploy was to annul the first husbands geirus (ger shechozar lesuro) based upon the claim — a claim that notably came from the wifes statement to a Tel Aviv social worker, and obviously she had an interest in getting him declared non-Jewish — that the first husband reverted to Xtianity.

    (Which is quite interesting. Then the religious Zionist — R. Goren — claimed he could undo a Geirus! How do you answer THAT based upon the R. Druckman situation?)

    In fact R. Goren disregarded the testimony of a gabai beis knesses in Tel Aviv near Borkovsky’s home who said he came to the beis knesses for davening and acted like a Yid in every way.

    If R. Goren considered Borkovsky a goy rather than a ger, how could he have earlier converted Helen Zaidman, who lived on a kibbutz in a non- religious environment?

    R. Goren claimed Borkovsky was a goy since he did not keep mitzvos, yet several acknowledged practices of his that were on record that indicated Borkovsky was not as far from Yiddishkeit as R. Goren suggested: he sent his children to Jewish religious schools although secular schools were not lacking in his area; when he wanted to remarry, unlike his first wife he went to a beis din to have a get prepared; he attended a beis knesses regularly and held a bar mitzvah for his son there.

    After disproving claims that Borkovsky went to church, R. Goren was asked how Borkovsky was any less Jewish than Zaidman, who had been living with a kohen at the time Goren performed her so-called conversion and moreover since the conversion the two had remained together on the kibbutz.

42. In Ashdod, as I understand it, the beis din determined the so-called convert NEVER practiced the Torah and never had any such intent.

43. In response to Joseph’s three posts about Ashdod vis-a-vis Langer, I can very well reconcile the onsistency since Langer dealt with a Heter Mamazer. And as I’ve said before poskim in such cases will use literally any evidence, even if it means suspending reality or intellectual deception to avoid declaring someone a mamzer. (At least, real poskm used to do that). But such cases have absolutely no value as precedent. But since the Olam HaTorah seems to now reject the notion of doinging even the seemingly laughable to assist a possible mamzer, the inconsistency remains. As to the factual allegations in post #66, I am very interested in seeing the source for them, since my information about Langer is rather limited. Joseph if you would be kind enough to provide a source?

44. I believe I found an artice online from Deiah v’Dibbur, upon which Joseph relied for post #66. At least he seems to quote from it almost verbatim. Deiah v’Dibbur, like all newspapers has an editorial bent, and like all good advocates of a specific POV will present facts in a way desinged to “prove” its point of view correct. There is nothing wrong with that, but we must not fool ourselves into believing that Deiah v’Dibbur, like the New York Times, is dispassionate or even balanced. As such, I took that article with a grain of salt. Does anyone know of a scholarly analysis of the Langer case?

45. P.P.S. cantoresq and rabbiofberlin, How do you reconcile the inconsistency of R. Goren purporting to retroactively annul Borkovsky geirus, with the religious zionists now saying that Rabbi Sherman could NOT declare the Ashdod woman’s conversion invalid?

    P.P.P.S. rabbiofberlin, Rabbi Sherman, of Ashdod fame, whose decision in Ashdod declared the woman’s conversion invalid, IS a religious zionist.

46. cantoresq –

    Indeed that is one of my sources. The other is Jonathan Rosenblum. In fact I put the link in a comment prior to your #70 response, but YW disallows links, so my apologies that it wasn’t approved. (Also note that any discussion of this issue, even a purported “scholarly” one, will almost surely have a discernable opinion on the issue, one way or another.)

    I’ll repost my original comment, minus the links, here:
    _______________________

    cantoresq: My information was rather limited as well until you made your post #64 🙂 But the quick research I referred to above produced some articles regarding the situation.

    rabbiofbelin: If a “convert” undergoes tevialh and bris without ever having any intent of maintaining the Torah (i.e. lack of intent at the time of conversion), the tevialh and bris are as good as any swimming pool and surgical operation. A Ger it does not make.

    P.S. All my comments are intended lsheim shmayim.

47. Also, the facts of the case I quoted from the article, are just that — facts. The interpretation may differ amongst men, but the history of events is the same. So what I presented are mainly historical events, whether you agree with the “proofs” or not.

48. As I’ve said before the Langer case, in which R. Goren annulled Borkovsky’s conversion, involved a heter mamzer, which is an exceptional case.

49. cantoresq/rabbiofberlin — But as you see, R. Goren accepted the concept of annulling a Geirus retroactively based upon that the purported Ger never intending to keep the Torah, or as in R. Goren’s case he was even willing to literally “reverse” the geirus if the Ger “went back” after having actually practiced the Torah [albeit R. Goren based it on incorrect facts in that case.]

    Yes, it was in a case of mamzeirus, but you must agree that the concept itself had to have a degree of legitimacy for him to even purport to use it (correctly or not.)

    rabbiofberlin – If the beis din says she doesn’t need a get due to her lack of Jewishness, then she cannot marry a Yid, so there is no issue of future mamzeirus with her.

    As far as Ashdod, what the beis din is saying is that they are NOT retroactively reversing ANYTHING. They are paskening that effectively there was NEVER a conversion in the first place.

50. rabbiofberlin – I look forward to getting the mareh mekomos from you, but I am confident (yet as always stand to be corrected) that if the beis din conclusively determines that the purported convert never intended to accept the mitzvos — even if he falsely made a statement that he does accept the mitzvos, the conversion was null and void and without any effect from the outset.

    i.e. If the Church put up a churchman as a spy to infiltrate the Jewish people as a “Ger”, and he puts up a good show and unfortunately the Rabbi performing the conversion was fooled, and later the rouse was uncovered (say when he returns to the Church with all his information, as was his intent from the outset), the geirus will be declared to have never been effective despite the fact that the churchman “declared” his allegiance to accept the mitzvos, was toivel, had a bris, and did whatever else was necessary to be “accepted” as a convert.

    Assuming for the purposes of our conversation that my example occurred, would you accept that churchman as a kosher Jew?

51. ## 72 and 73 I don’t doubt that the articles upon which you rely contain “facts.” But I question if they contain all the facts, or if there was a selection of “facts” in their writing.

    #76, all that can be derived from R. Goren’s p’sak in the Langer case is that a conversion can be retroactively nullified in order to be matir mamzer. There is no other implication to be derived.

52. #79, And what about his retroactively ”annuling” the first marriage by Langer? (Referred to in first line of #66.) Do you limit that applicability to mamzeirim as well, or do you agree to its usage in other areas i.e. R. Rackman’s using it by ”agunahs”?

    And what is your thoughts on the questioned I asked in example #78?

53. rabbiofberlin – Just to understand your position on my example in #78, you are saying the churchman is a kosher Jew, correct?

    You believe there is no basis for annulling any geirus retroactively, but you agree R. Goren can use something with no basis (i.e. annulling a geirus retroactively, even though you are saying there is no basis to annul a geirus) in order to annul a mamzeirus?

    (Yes, R. Goren used another reasoning as well, namely annulling the first marriage retroactively, but annulling the geirus WAS also one of his two basis’.)

    Which brings another question, do you contend that R. Goren’s retroactively annulling a marriage (as in Langer) can be utilized (as in “agunah” cases as utilized by R. Rackman)? And please explain if you believe R. Goren could use it, but others cannot.

    Please clarify what you mean they were not “mekarev”. Also looking forward to the mekoros in the Shulchan Aruch from you.

54. Regarding R. Rackman’s nullification of marriages, while controversial, it is no chiddush. After Kol d’Mikadeish ada’atah d’Rabbanan mekadeish is codified in the way we execute marriages. Indeed in unpublicized instances, it was a very typical way to free an agunah. As I understand it, it was R. Moshe Feinstein’s preferred method of freeing an agunah, while other poskim looked for ways to decalre a missing husband dead. R. Rackman’s idea, while interesting and compelling, but sadly not accepted by most poskim (for indescernible reasons), was to extend the concept to the very core of a woman’s intent to marry, that she would not have ever married this man had she known about what R. Rackman termed “latent defects” in his psyche/persona. As such, lacking intent to marry, there is no marriage. While the R. Rackman idea is purly academic, havng heen rejected by poskim, it sounds alot like what R. Sherman did in the Ashdod case.

55. cantoresq — What is your take on the example in #78, regarding the Jewish status of the churchman?

    And re: #83, why must it have been only in “unpublicized instances”? Is that how you fit R. Goren’s marriage annulment for Langer’s husband #1? And do you limit its practical applicability bzman hazeh to mamzerim cases?

    So you then reject R. Rackman’s beis din purporting to actually annul marriages today?

56. Here is a good comparative analysis between Langer and Ashdod, I found:
    ____

    In the Langer affair, those who took sharp issue with R. Goren did NOT question the notion of retroactive undoing of a gerus. They challenged R. Goren’s evidence that Berokovsky had never accepted mitzvos in the first place. His (ex-)wife maintained that he had never accepted mitzvos; he disputed this. (At one point, he tearfully appeared before a rally in Bnei Brak and proclaimed that he lived as a Jew, and would die like one.) He had a chazakah of being Jewish, having been assumed as such for many years by neighbors. Contradictory claims would have to be seen in the context of such a chazakah.

    In the Ashdod case, R Attiyah said that the evidence all pointed in a single direction, and that it upheld the previous chazakah of the woman prior to her conversion, which was non-Jewish. Those attacking R Attiyah and R Sherman are arguing that gerus can NEVER be invalidated, because we can never be sure that the candidate was insincere for the single moment it takes to submit to the immersion in a mikvah. This position would make Berokovski Jewish regardless of which evidence was accepted, and leave the Langer twins mamzerim. There, lies the real contradiction.

57. Joseph forgive me for being colloquial in my response to your churchman example. If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck. I do not dispute the theoritical validity of retroactively nullifying a conversion based on evidence that a convert never accepted mitzvot. I do however question the practical application of doing so (Halacha v’ein morin kein) except in instances of Sha’at hadechak like a mamzeirut issue. As to when to apply such extreme mechanisms I leave that to the shikul Hada’at of the posek. But as rabbiofberlin writes, one of the pressing issues in klal Yisrael is the fear of poskim to doa anything out of the ordinary, since they are afraid of the slings and arrows that pass over theor right shoulders. It is that need for shikul hada’at that provides the reasons for heterei agunah to be unpublicized. The mechanism of hafka’at kiddushin or bittul geirut are dangerous weapons in the hands of the inexperienced novice posek, but are pwerful tools in the hands of the master.

58. rabbiofberlin – In Ashdod, as the analysis I quoted says, the Dayonim determined that ALL the evidence pointed in a single direction.