slurpy – right.

You are making a very good point, in that the mekudeshes case the person who is assur does not necessarily know she is, because the person who is assur is a karov and not the actual woman who received the kiddushin. I can hear now that by the case of the yid and the goy it is considered nikkar v’yadua since the individuals involved are all aware of their status, mah she’ein kein by the case of mekudeshes.

This would effectively include women in all relevant halachos of course, and would not contradict anything when it comes to other cases of teisha chanuyos. In those cases where we are not dealing with a human being we obviously need to resort to more basic ways of measuring nikkar v’yadua bimkomo, which we do.

Very nice. I hear.

I still don’t buy it. I don’t think there is any indication we are dealing with Jews who necessarily appear differently than their gentile counterparts. The fact that you can ask is a far stretch to me especially because you can ask the woman who was mekudeshes. It just seems like you are splitting hairs where there is no real chiluk. My ela mai – as balebatish as it sounds – that the difference is the physical difference of bris – seems much more like the pashtus to me when weighed against this pshat.

But then why by horse meat and cow meat do we not say kavua? How are the two less discernible than a yid or a goy?

I am not sure I grasp what you are saying, but let me try to formulate something in my own words which is coming to me from your remarks.

We have a case where a guy was mekadesh a random woman and doesn’t know who. There we do not say kavua. Then we have a case where a guy threw a rock at ten people and we aren’t sure who it hit – the yid or the goy; there we do say kavua.

At first glance it seems that we can differentiate between an inherent difference and an accidental difference. By the rock, the question is if it is a Jew or a non-Jew. There is an inherent difference there, or in other words, the issur and heter are b’etzem two different types. By the woman there is nothing inherently different about a woman who is mekudeshes to you and one who isn’t.

To put it in more yeshivishe terms, when Tosafos says it is nikkar, he means there is a difference b’etzem – la’afukei the kiddushin case where there is only a difference klapei outside factors. The latter case is not called yadua v’nikkar bimkomo, and is therefore subject to bitul.

But what do you do when you come to pieces of meat? You seem to imply that we are only matir meat when it is one piece that we have various tzdadim on. Yet when we have three pieces of meat, two kosher and one not kosher, sitting separately on a table, and we don’t know which is which, the halacha is that it is batel and we do not say kavua. One could be pig’s meat and the other two cow’s meat; it doesn’t matter. This is the Gemara in Chullin 95a and the halacha in Shulchan Aruch YD 109:1. Why is this not comparable to the yid and goy case? Why would this not be called an inherent difference? Or in your words, why is the non-kosher piece a reality?

To put it more simply: what is the difference between three pieces of meat sitting on a table and ten stores in a town? Here I think we are forced to understand Tosafos’s chiluk the old fashioned, simple way I thought originally, and that is that the stores are known in their places and the pieces are not. But if this is pshat then we are back to square one.

It could be I am missing your point. If so please try to explain it again.

How can you say that you can tell which meat store it is? We apply Kal Kavua by Teisha Chanuyos. If you can tell which one it is then there is no Shayla about which one you are in,

This is a mistake. The classic case of kol kavua is where you have a piece of meat in your hand and are not sure which store you bought it from; not that you do not know which store is kosher.

In fact, my personal understanding of the Rashba (although this gets extremely complicated in the acharonim) is that if you truly could not tell which store is which then mid’oraisa bittul would apply; you would only have to contend with the d’rabbanan of davar chashuv.

Ayin heitev b’Toras Habayis.

yekke2 –

Naniach that it isn’t so mistaver. I know it’s not an ideal answer, but it’s better than anything else I’ve got. True, no one mentions it, but that is not the end of the world because ???? ????? ????? so to speak. If you have a better solution then by all means, share it!

Ela mai you have bad eyesight.

yekke2 – Ein hochi nami, if the difference is bris than the halacha will not apply to B’nei Ketura/Yishmael, but only to goyim in general.