wstntme111

The issue speaks to the crux of social programming in general. In a purely capitalistic meritocracy, social programming wouldn’t exist. Now if the compromise between the right and the left to allow certain social programs is a means of facilitating greater future financial stability, then there would be a long list of people who wouldn’t qualify and wold be left to their own devices, i.e. to completely fend for themselves. I don’t know how anyone could morally allow such a thing to happen, be the people Yidden or not. The other impetus behind social programming would be to simply help the poor manage in their daily lives, i.e. it’s more about keeping them alive then ensuring they have future stability.
In a general sense, Israel is more socialist then America is, and so the tendency would seem to lean towards the latter framework and not the former.
To me, the more astounding social phenomenon is that the very same people who generally argue for the broadening of social programming in the US (among us Yidden, the more left-leaning of us) are the very same ones who argue that it should not be applicable to Chareidim. This is a position I find to be highly hypocritical, and probably does reveal, at least to an extent, a deeper bias driving the conversation….

My father told me that once when he happened to have davened by Rav Soloveitchik on Yom Haatzmaut. He told me that not only did Rav Soloveitchik not say Hallel, rather it was Bahab then and he even said Selichot!

My family uses pineapple

The OPs question is very valid, but it hinges on an assumption. The reason why women are obligated in daled Koisos is because they were also included in the miracle of Mitzrayim. This is also the reason given for women being obligated to hear the Megillah, even though its a time bound Mitzvah.

The question now becomes- is the obligation to drink ad d’lo yoda as a remembrance to the Neis Purim? Or perhaps, even though it was triggered by the Neis Purim, the Mitzvah itself isn’t merely one of remembrance rather it’s a “different beast” so to speak?

I think it could be argued that the actual obligation of Ad d’lo yoda doesn’t really have anything to do with the actual Neis itself. It isn’t a zechira in the classic sense, which would carry the dictum of “af heim hayu b’oiso haneis”. Rather it’s merely a Mitzvah to attempt to see the unseeable, in a day where we’re pressured to peer beyond the veil of physicality to perceive a deeper reality.

If that’s true, then the Mitzvah would carry the same laws of “zman grama” and women wouldn’t be obligated.

I was privileged to grow up in a MO right household and veered towards Yewshiva in my teenage years. When Shidduchim came up, I was pushed by my family to date more “MO” girls who, while being of very fine character, didn’t share the same goals as I did. It didn’t require intense introspection to uncover that the true difference lied in a vastly different perspective.

It would almost be akin to having an ardently vocal Trump supporter attempt to date an ANTIFA member. I don’t mean in the level of extremity of these types of people, rather in their vastly different views and the consistent nature in which those views would arise and cause conflict with one another in daily life.

@rebbetzin- “Is that not the same with those that use cholov akum – how many actually researched the issue (or even looked up Reb Moshe’s teshuva) before they decided that they can be maykil?”

How many learned the halochos of eruv in a metropolitan and examined the eruv of their city before deciding that they can use this eruv?!

Get real: we ALL rely on precedent!”

Using Am Horatzos to excuse precedent is a silly thing to do. The assumption people among the right make is that the precedent set by their Rabbonim is one which abides by Halacha. The precedent held by the MO (and more particularly, the type of MO who wear pants, don’t cover hair, etc…) is used as an excuse not to keep Halacha. To conflate the two perspectives is disingenuous.

(Additionally, the examples you gave aren’t really so much of precedent- when you rely on an Eiruv, your basically relying on those in charge of the Eiruv, i.e., that they know what they’re doing and they have who to hold by. Rav Moshe’s teshuva about cholov hacompanies [which is also dangerously close to the heter used in Eretz Yisrael by tnuva mehadrin under Rav Elyashiv’s shittah] is also not an example of one relying on precedent- rather one relying on a psak. They may not know the in’s and outs of each psak- yet they know it exists….)

There’s quite a discernible difference between relatively small hashkafik differences and hashkafik differences in regards to Halacha. For example, a boy wanting to sit and learn can technically be compatible with a girl who wants her husband to work. That’s something which has the couple has the ability to work around. When the Hashkafik difference is how to approach Halcha, which is probably rooted in a very different outlook on life, the story is completely different. For example, a woman covering her hair is a Halacha. The majority of MO who refuse to do it don’t do so out of a Halachic argument (da’as yehudis v.s. da’as ) rather out of precedent- they know there were some very distinguishable people who’s wives didn’t cover their hair. To that end, resulting from a certain Hashkafik outlook on Halacha, that may be enough to justify not covering one’s hair, but to one with a different outlook that’s an indefensible position. The rest of your example’s are presumably where there are a variety of poskim who are meikil- the conversation is whether or not to be mor emachmir on oneself or not. But in the larger picture of MO and mkore particularly the type of MO who would wear pants aren’t merely parting ways in matters which are solely Hashkafik in nature; they allow those Hashkafos to influence decisions which someone else would view as an actual breach of Halacha