RSRH

um . . . ein gozrin gezeira al gezeira? Perhaps, depending on the circumstances, partying with non-Jews may be a bad idea, but thats a highly individualized and fact-specific decision, and in any case “violation” (even of the spirit of the gezeira) would be the wrong word to use.

While I think the author of the piece expressed his idea rather poorly, his point is a good one, and could actually help us better understand the Holocaust, its importance, and the ways we can try to prevent it from happening again.

All he is saying (in between all the controversy-inducing language and hyperbole) is that we should stop thinking about the Holocaust as an historical anomaly, something unprecedented, unnatural, and inexplicable, and start thinking about it the same way we think about other historical events. American do not only morn the losses of the Civil War, they study them as an historical reality to better understand their causes, effects and continuing implications. The same is true for Pearl Harbor, or the way the Japanese think about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the way Russians think about the Second World War (let’s not forget they lost over 25 million people in the war). These events are not looked at as one-time events, they or their equivalents happened before, and will happen again, and understanding them as historical processes enables us to deal with them, and address potential repetitions.

We have not dealt with the Holocaust in this reasoned way. We have treated it as something unnatural, and inexplicable, and as a result we don’t understand it as well as we might. We have an emotional connection to the Holocaust, and it is understandable that as a result, our thoughts about the subject are highly reactionary. But that does not mean we cannot think about the Holocaust as an historical event, and analyze and understand it as such.

In addition to understanding the religious implications of the Churban, for example, we can also understand the historical processes that led up to, culminated in, and followed events like the destruction of the Second Temple, the defeat of the Bar Kochba Revolt, the Crusades, the Inquisition, Tach V’Tat, and the Holocaust.

Again, the author expressed his ideas using some very poorly chosen words, turns of phrase, and arguments. His underlying point, however, is well-taken.

Dare I say, the very fact that reactions to the piece have been so caustic and reactionary indicates that he may well have a point: We simply seem unable to get past our deep emotional connection to what happened in 1933-1945 so as to be able to think logically about what happened, why it happened, and what it has done.

Anyone who thinks that our generation is the worst yet in terms of zima has very little sense or knowledge of history.

Anyone who thinks that the problems of the dor hamabul can be summed up by saying “toeiva” and “gezeilah,” or that the problems of Sodom were similar to those of the dor hamabul has an overly simplistic appreciation for Torah.

Anyone who thinks that the state of “our generation” can be extrapolated from what one sees in their own city, on the internet headlines, and by focusing on the worst people/things among us has a very simplistic awareness of the world.

Sushe: Why would it cause one to forget learning (by wearing the yarmulka flipped inside out)?

For the same reason it relieves your headaches.

Poppa,

I think that how these kinds of movements turn out depends on how there 2nd and 3rd generations of adherents handle them. We never know how they will turn out until years later when they actually do turn out. We didn’t know how Moses Mendelshon’s inherently legitimate approach would turn out until his students and his student’s students turned his views into the reform movement; we didn’t know how JTS would turn out until the 1930s; and we didn’t know how chassidism would turn out until the late 1700s. We can speculate, but we won’t know how YCT or Open Orthdoxy, or JOFA or whatever will turn out for quite some time.

Don’t get me wrong, a lot of it doesn’t sit well with me – mostly hashkafic reasons (which I can mostly brush off), but sometimes for halachic reasons (which are a lot harder to be complacent about). That’s why I think that healthy criticism of these developments is appropriate – discussion of hashkafic objections, and very strong disputation (framed in halachic terms, not unilateral “kol korei’s”)in halachic matters. What I think is not appropriate at this point is blanket and strident condemnation – calling them reform, apikursim, ect. That sort of thing is not called for until we know how they turn out. Not being neviim, we really can’t know yet. Will this be another chassidic/TIDE/TuM change or will this be a reform/conservative type change. Time will tell. Until it does, I think we should keep the lines of communication and reasoned halachic and hashkafic discourse and disagreement open and active.

“Nor is the color of our shoelaces (nowadays) a religious issue.”

Perhaps not to you. To others, particularly the RWMO who live in the wider world in full compliance of halacha, EVERTHING is a religious issue, and NOTHING is a religious issue.

Some people here tend to discredit my credentials as a follower of R. Hirsh’s TIDE because my views do not fit into the dumbed-down version of TIDE indicated by the Artscroll biography of R. Hirsch. So allow me to give over a small bit of R. Hirsch’s Torah:

Judaism is not a religion in the conventional sense of the word. There are no “religious rituals” there are no “religious” issues and “secular” issues. There is just life – in all its variations – and halacha, the laws we must adhere to and guide our conduct by. RSRH regularly condemned the Reform movement precisely because they viewed Judaism as a religious, and its practices as rituals. Eating pizza is a halachic issue (is it kosher, do i need to wash and bench, is it yoshon, is it overpriced and a violation of ona’ah, ect.); choosing shoelaces is a halchic issue; davening is a halachic issue; using the bathroom is a halachic issue; getting an education is a halachic issue; running a business is a halachic issue.

To say that something is a halachic issue, however, is not to say that the halacha dictates a particular course of conduct. Some things are divrei halacha – where we wear our tefilin, how we heat up food on shabbos, what bracha to make on chocolate covered strawberries. other things are divrei reshus – what color shoelaces to wear; whether to be a doctor, lawyers, teacher, or janitor, what color suit to wear; what to eat on friday night; what kind of car to buy, ect. The fact that these things are not devarim shebireshus does not mean they are not halachic issues – it just means that the halacha allows for discretion in deciding how to act, to each according to his or her own nature and preference and abilities.

So, to say that making a simchas bas is problematic because it is creating a new ritual is really to mistate the misframe the issue. The question is not about arbitraily categorizing some things we do as “religious” and others as not religious. The question is how does the halacha view this practice. Is this the kind of thing where the halacha dictates a particular course of conduct (i.e., it is assur to make a simchas bas), or is this a situation where we have discretion to act as we see fit, each guided by their own hashkafa, and their own understanding of broad Torah principles? If the latter, everyone can do as they see fit. Some people tend to be more traditional, tend to need traditional and mesorah to maintain there halachic lifestyle (chasidim are a prime example of this), and for those people, a simchas bas would be distasteful and unnecessary. They can certainly refrain from doing it. Others are more independent and feel the need to express their individuality (within halachic bounds, of course). Some may even be inclined towards contemporary feminism to some extent (*gasp*). They might need a simchas bas as a basic part of bringing Torah into every aspect of their lives, and that’s fine for them.

The fact that they are motivated by feminism is no worse than other people’s being motivated by traditionalism or conservatism or other “isms” that influence how we make decisions within the bounds of halachic discretion. The problems arise when certain ideologies are expressed in actions that violate halacha, whether that means feminists say barchu at a women’s minyan, or chassidim cheat on their taxes, or MO fail to follow basic tznius and negiah rules. In any case, yesh din v’yeish dayan. God is more than capable of judging people’s motivations, if He so chooses. We cannot fully understand anyone’s complex motivations for acting a certain way; we are not in their shoes. We can judge only based on the actions we can externally observe, and then only by objective standards of halacha – not by imposing our own standards of how to act in devarim shebirishus.

Oh Sam2, you just don’t get it. There is a mesorah on how parents can and cannot be happy upon the birth of a daughter. Clearly this is a break with the mesorah; it has no sanction from the gedolim; it is just a radical – practically conservative – innovation driven by radical feminist agendas. The mesorah dictates that good frumma yidden make a kiddush to celebrate the birht of a daughter. They don’t make a party – just a kiddush – they don’t say tehillim or other teffilos to express their gratitude to God, and they most certainly do not make a bracha to mentally dedicate themselves to the important task of raising their new child in the proper derech.

For Shame!

(sorry, couldn’t resist).

You know, Skiaddict, just because someone writes something in a book doesn’t mean its actually true. Especially when the thing he’s writing would require some kind of nevuah or ruach hakodesh.

Lomed: OR, if God wanted to do a chessed for us by obligating us to know His full Truth, he would have given us the ability to use our intellectual and creative powers to discover that Truth (and become better people in the process), and would have given us the Torah to show us how to discover the Truth in the world around us, and how to distinguish between Truth and falsehood.

Oh wait, that’s exactly what He did.

Josh31: Well said. As a law student, I can only say that my ability to diligently learn Torah has only been enhanced by the realization that the typical law student can go 4-6 weeks studying without any real breaks for 10-20 hours a day, without weekend breaks. That’s hasmada!

“I guarantee the Rambam did not learn American history.”

Nonsense. How could you say such a thing? The holy tzadik, the Rambam, didn’t know American history? The Rambam was a baki in kol haTorah kuloh, he knew all of Torah backwards and forwards. And just as Chazal must have known correct history, medicine, biology, astronomy, physiscs, philosophy, zoology, jurisprudence, and child psychology because they were beki’im in Torah and had a masorah from Sinai, so too the Rambam must have known American history from his intensive study of Torah. After all, EVERYTHING is in the text of the Torah, is it not?

I’ll stop now. My tongue is virtually bursting through my cheek.

mik5: Your rav was probably referring to the vast majority of non-frum Jews, who are adjudges tinokos shenishbu. basically, this means they cannot be held responsible for their failure to observe the Torah, and the fact that they don’t follow halacha does not impact their personal status (i.e., they are not ajudged mumarim l’hachis).

The concept of tinok shenisha originally refers to a young Jewish child captured at a young age and held in captivity by non-Jews for an extended period. The influence of being raised without a Torah education and outside a Torah environment is considered an excuse (not a justification) for why the grown up child fails to follow halacha.

In the contemporary context, it refers to all those that have been raised by secularized or non-observant parents, who are excused for their non-observance of halacha because of their being raised in an environment and culture in which Torah-observance is so foreign a concept, that they cannot be expected to have any regard for it.

passfan: The RCA condemned the practice; they did not expel R. Weiss (of the Rabbi who wrote the article about “sheasani isha”) from the organization. They voiced their halachic disagreement and disapproval with these positions, but they did not conclude that these action were beyond the pale or that they placed those who made these decisions outside the camp.

Indeed, many MO think the RCA should have condemned the Rabba issue more explicitly than it did, but again, very few of them advocated for R. Weiss’s expulsion.

Again I think your missing the point. The point is that MO is more inclusive and has no need to really brand LWMO as conservative. Either the movement will die, or it will move even further left until there is no doubt about what they are, or they will succeed in influencing the rest of the Jewish world and will be legitimized. The final verdict will have to wait until the result is clear, and until then, many in the MO world would prefer cautious inclusion and halachic debate to expulsion, charamim, kol koreis, and more divisiveness.

yitayningwut:

I am so enjoying this thread. it’s a shame there aren’t more people interested in getting into this, but thank you for a stimulating exchange.

You said, “Tolerance is not relevant here.” I think we may be talking past each other, since, as I see it, tolerance is exactly the crux of the issue. Or to put it more precisely, halachic monism vs. halachic pluralism is the keystone to the discussion.

I take from you last post that you think that there is a single “right” answer to halachic questions (you refer to accepting the legitimacy of more meikil psakim as “compromising on the truth”). On reflection, I think you would have to agree that this is not the case. Every halachic question has many possible correct answers; “shivim panim l’Torah” does not only apply to hashkafa. This does not mean that WE or I need to accapt every legitimate psak halacha; I do not. What I and what we all need to do is accept that every psak halacha properly grounded in sources and appropriate halachic reasoning, and arrived at with appropriate yiraas horaah and recognition of the ol malchus shamayim is a legitimate halachic approach, even if we, I and all of klal yisrael reject it in practice.

Electricity on shabbos and yom tov is a prime example. We all know that in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the question of whether it is assur to use electricity on shabbos is assur or not was a major issue. Very prominent poskim, poskim who’s views we have come to accept on other matters, held that it was muttar to use electricity on yom tov. We (all of kal yisrael that recognizes an obligation to follow halacha) ultimately rejected that approach; we do not use electricity on shabbos or yom tov, and indeed, for some, refraining from electricity has become the hallmark of shabbos and yom tov observance. The fact that after the dust of the debate settled one view was rejected in practice does not mean it was beyond the pale or outside the camp at the time, or even that those who followed it while the debate raged were not orthodox (I hate that word – use instead, Torah-observant). The view that electricity could be used on yom tov was legitimate – it was grounded in sources and proper halachic reasoning, and was forwarded by people who recognized their obligation to the Torah. Nevertheless it was ultimately rejected, and the mere suggestion that it may be okay to use electricity on shabbos or yom tov would immediately condemn the speaker as conservative (or worse).

The point of that illustration is this: For the MO (the knowledgeable MO who learn and know Torah and take their obligation to follow halacha seriously – I’m not talking about the MO lite, that are culturally orthodox, but really pick and choose things like swimming on shabbos, yichud, shomer negiah,covering hair, eating in vegetarian restaurants without hechsheirim, ect.), tolerance of competing halachic views is key. MO can accept that some poskim issue non-mainstream rulings fot their communities, even if those same MO would never do or rule the same for their own kehillos, and even though those same MO will write articles and teshuvos arguing against the appropriateness of such psakim. Some MO rabbanim – grounded in halachic sources and reasoning – that women may have their own minyanim (that do not say devarim shebikidusha); that women may receive a heter horaah; that women should say sheasani isha; and many other changes that the rest of the Torah-obsevrant world may find distateful and outrageous. But for the MO, tolerance and pluralism is the order of the day. As the MO see it, these matter are not settled yet; the issues of feminism and current social and cultural realities are just now emerging and how they are to be dealt with halachicly has not yet been debated and decided by the klal one way or the other. Since these things are still “up in the air,” so to speak, these LWMO “innovations” are not outside the camp; they legitimate (albeit perhaps wrong)halachic positions; they are one side of a debate in halacha – a debate that must be had, and a debate in which both sides must battle within the “daled amos of halacha.”

I think this in part explains the conservative issue that you seem so bothered by. You are correct to point out that if the MO are so willing to be accepting of different positions as long as those positions have a halachic basis, why not be tolerant of the rulings of the CJLS whose rulings, as you point out, are always also grounded in the sources. The answer I think is as follows: That ship has sailed. The conservatives tore down the mechitzas backed by halachic sources, but they did so after the matter had been settled in the early to mid 1800s. The debate over mechitzas had already taken place and had been resolved, obviously, in favor of the mechitza being an essential element to a Torah-observant shul. The CJLS could not revisit the issue and rule against what the Torah-observant world had determined was to be the accepted halachic approach. So to with driving on shabbos, and other issues. Once the CJLS tainted itself with these rulings that were beyond the pale, as well as other rulings doing away with elements of kashrus, ect., even there otherwise halachicly grounded decisions are “outside the camp;” they are not legitimate because they stem from a source that has already lost its halachic legitimacy.

This is not the case with the LWMO. Yet, at least. The halachic debate over women’s issues is not yet fully engaged, and certainly not resolved. Until it is, the MO will accept the legitimacy (though not the correctness) of halachic views properly grounded in sources and reasoning and which stem from people who, aside from these innovative psakim, are certainly within the camp.

I apologize for the length; this is just a complex philosophy to work out and explain, and I am SO enjoying the conversation.

yitayningwut: Unfortunately, this is an ongoing, unavoidable problem for people like R. Broyde (and myself) who believe that the Torah provides us with wide boundaries to apply the halacha in light of local conditions and circumstances, and that someone on the left or right’s paskining differently than we would like does not take them out of the orthodox camp. Why are we less accommodating to some halachic developments (i.e., the traditional conservative rulings from the first half of the 1900s) and more tolerant (though not approving) of others (like current movements to make things more accommodating to women)? Ultimately, I think it comes down to each rav/posek’s judgement. R. Broyde feels as though psak X is legitimate (though not ideal) while psak Y is completely unacceptable; other poskim feel differently (the “she’asani isha” issue is one such point – I have heard several prominent MO poskim call this the beginnings of a new conservative movement, while others are merely uncomfortable with it, but understand its halachic basis).

I think a lot can be explained by the MO world’s general aversion to labeling in the way the chareidi world does. For the MO, people’s commitment to Torah falls somewhere on a sliding scale spectrum – you are more or less observant of halacha, but just because you wear pants, don’t cover your hair, or play ball on shabbos doesn’t make you “non-orthodox”; you are simply less than perfectly observant of halacha. To be sure, there are limits; shmiras shabbos, kashrus, and taharas hamishpacha may set the boundaries of orthodoxy, but the decision to say sheasani isha or to allow a woman to paskin shailos and to give her a title signifying that fact (all backed by halachic reasoning, even if not mainstream) do not go to the core of whether or not a person recognizes the ol malchuis shamayim.

Labels are far more important to the chareidim. And for good reason: The chareidim reject integration with the wider world, and chareidi hashkafa therefore depends largely on insular cohesive uniform communities. Black pants and white shirts; hats and jackets; different streimels for different chassidim; adherence to Daas Torah on matter other than halacha; ect. Conformity is important, and so it is also important for chareidim to have bright-line determinations of who is and is not “in the camp.” You can’t be a less-observant-chareidi (like you can be a less-observant-MO), you are simply no longer chareidi, and as the deviation from the charedi norm becomes more pronounced you are outside orthodoxy and are now conservative or reform.

These distinctions between camps are much less important to the MO. You observe halacha or you don’t; you observe more or you observe less. As long as the MO poskim feel that your innovations or changes are merely troublesome and misguided, but are not a complete rejection of the ol malchus shamayim, there is no need to remove you from the camp (which exists only in some hazy sketch anyway).

Ultimately, the point is that time, hashgacha pratis, and successive generations of poskim will tell whether like the conservatives of the early 1900s, the LWMO will reject God’s Torah in favor of their own creation, or whether other groups will accept some or all of their ideas as legitimate and they will be incorporated into the mainstream.

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I have a list, I’ll try to get it for you later. But for a great summary, go through the aguna entry in the encyclopedia talmudis and make sure to read the footnotes!

This is assinine. Netzavim is one of the most powerful parshios, especially before the Yomim Noraim; it is empowering and humbling at the same time. Since the first time I really read through it preparing for a high school weekly chumash and rashi test, I shudder when I hear the words.

Ein Od, I’m confused, your talking about custom and Marshalls in the same sentence? Are you looking for quality, but custom is just a bit too pricey, or are you looking to go inexpensive, regardless of the quality?

Metro: Quite right. I was talking in terms of the OP borrowing the money from the pushka because if he did that there would be more room to be meikil in deciding whether or not he can consider himself an ani at that time. Always good to be mitztareif the snifim l’kula and cover as many bases as possible. But yes, if he did take the money as pure tzedaka, certainly he would have no obligation to return it.

Health: Learning as much Torah as possible undoubtably makes you a better rabbi, but that doesn’t mean having a broader knowledge of related matters does not. Perhaps if your a maggid shiur or stam a “talmid chacham” you have little need for formal advanced secular education, but a Rav, a rabbi does. A rav must paskin shailos, and so must understand the economic, psychological, political, and other issues that his congregants are dealing with and which relate to reaching a good psak. A rav must be able to lead his kehilla, not just give a drasha on chumash on shabbos morning and a daf yomi during the week. Practical, real world work requires practical, real-world knowledge, and if you want to do it right, you learn from the experts and get yourself certified to be sure you really understand the things you claim to know.

Charlie: To be fair, Reagan did do a passable job at Governor of California for 8 years, so his resume was a bit more well-padded than, say, our current President. Otherwise, spot on!

I daven at Sharrey, which was filled pretty much like regular for shachris, mincha, and maariv on shabbos. They also had minyanim this morning as usual. I heard the White Shul was closed after 1 PM on shabbos afternoon, but on shabbos morning it was business as usual. I can’t speak to other shuls in Far Rockaway, especially those closer to Seagirt Blvd, but I did see people closing up the Sulitzer Bais Midrash at around 9 PM on motzai shabbos, so I assume they had minyanim as well.

Brach’s is open, as are some of the stores on Central Ave. The neighborhood is a bit dirty and there is an occasional tree blocking a lane here and there but really not as bad as that tornado last year or the storm we had that motzai shabbos in March.

Simple answer: Many (maybe most) people just do not understand how to deal with these situations properly – they have never gone through them themselves or worked closely to help those who have; they react impulsively without thinking things through. This goes for friends, neighbors, and yes, even people in positions of authority like rabbeim and roshei yeshiva (though generally rabbonim of a kehilla are far better at this since they must deal with their congregants as a whole – they don’t get to send them home after seder and let them be their parents’ problem). Simply put, oftentimes people do stupid things. It seems as though you have been subjected to this, and most unfortunately it came from those who you should be able to trust and work with.

I don’t know where you live, or whether your looking for some support and help, but I have quite a bit of experience in these metters, and if you’d like to contact the mods and get in contact with me, please please do so.

Kol tuv, and the best of luck to you! You are a wonderful person trying hard to do what’s right, and don’t let anyone tell you otherwise – only you know how difficult your struggles are and how hard your trying; most everyone else is just looking at the outside.

It could be. But a machmir must always understand that their churos do not only affect them, and when it is appropriate to keep them, and when not. For example, while I may be makpid, k’daas hamachmirim, to NEVER EVER eat food containing liquid that is heated up on shabbos, no matter how the heating is done, I would not keep that chumra if i accepted an invitation to eat at someones house who heated up such food (in a way that is legitimately muttar, even a daas yachid). I may not accept an invitation from them again in the future, but once i did so, my personal chumra is no excuse to disregard the proper kavod i must show to my host. similarly, i would not likely keep my chumra in a situation where for whatever only food with liquid is available for my own shabbos meal. perhaps I wou;ld not eat it myself, but my chumra cannot be an excuse to tell my wife and children to eat a cold lunch when a warm one is available al pi hadin.

To out it VERY briefly, I think R’ Aharon and R’ Schwalb had different problems with TuM.

For R’ Aharon, the problem is MO in general, regardless of what particular MO philosophy one follows (TuM, TIDE, YCT, ect.). All are problematic as per the Chassam Sofer’s famous rallying cry of “Chadash Asur Min HaTorah – Anything New or Innovative is Prohibited by the Torah.” The Chassasm Sofer applied this maxim to combat Reform, but it has been extended to include any changes – even minor ones – from the way things were done in Eastern and Central Europe in the late 1700s and early 1800s.

For R’ Schwalb, I think, the problem is not with MO per se, but with TuM as a philosophy. TuM in many ways is inconsistent with the central tenets of TIDE. Whereas TIDE embraces “secular” knowledge, it considers such knowledge inherently valuable only to the extent that it is not inconsistent with Torah; it synthesizes Torah and rest of the real world, with Torah always controlling which aspects of the larger world are considered acceptable. TuM (as per R’ Solevetchick) on the other hand, rejects this idea of synthesis. In TuM philosophy, both Torah and Maadah are inherently valuable. While Torah is of course the more important and always must control our actions, non-Torah ideas (philosophic, artistic, political, scientific, ect.) are also inherently valuable and are also to be fully embraced. For TuM there is no synthesis – Torah and Maadah are at times at odds; Torah must control our conduct, but we can still be fully immersed in the Maadah world. That is what R’ Schwalb was taking about when he criticized having a Yeshiva on the first floor and studying apikursus on the third floor (for those who saw that quote in the other thread). R’ Schwalb was alos criticizing MO (TuM) rejection of the austritt principle, which is so central to TIDE.