RebYidThinker

I will make only a few points.

1. It seems doubtful that the Talmud entertains shishim ribo in its definition of RHR for the following salient reasons.
a. The Gemara nowhere mentions this explicitly. We’d expect such a central plank of the definition to be mentioned somewhere. This silence is telling.
b. The Gemara states that there were RHR’s in Bavel, and the widespread scholarly consensus is that there were no Iraqi metropolises with 600,000 people in those days. While I am aware that there is a Vatican girsa of the Gemara wherein Ulla insists the opposite, that is not the accepted Gemara and furthermore I know of no legal canon or credible argument that would render Ulla authoritative even presuming the authoritativeness of that girsa.
c. Chazal assurs blowing shofar on Rosh HaShanah and arba minim on Sukkos based on the fear that someone would walk into the public domain. Why would Chazal have undermined core commandments of the Torah if they held of shishim ribo? It is axiomatic that Chazal only enact prohibitions for commonly occurring phenomena, kal vachomer when the prohibition interferes with a countermanding d’oraysa obligation.
d. The definition of RHR, when deployed in the Bava Masechtos, does not include shishim ribo. On what logical basis ought we conclude that there are two uses of RHR in the Gemara identical in all aspects except shishim ribo?

2. The idea that all baal nefesh/chumradic practices are inherently equal is unconvincing. First of all, regardless of the authorities one might adduce that say that, without interpreting what they mean contextually moreover, we only need to look around to notice that the Jewish people practice numerous chumras than were practiced in the past. Insofar as this is the case, it is absolutely legitimate to take upon oneself a chumra that is ancient, spells high stakes, and is backed by an impressive array of Rishonim (including the Rambam and the Rif) and is more textually faithful to the Talmudic text as a whole than the alternative. It is doubtful that any rabbi has ever existed that practiced every chumra. It would seem that the most reasonable way to interpret the stance of the authorities who warn against inconsistency in chumras is the risk that adherence to a single chumra raises the question of the rationale for taking it on such that one would not take on additional chumras. That does not imply one takes on all chumras.

Even if we went with the premise that all or nothing is operative on chumras, the applicable standard should not be all or nothingness regarding practices bearing the label baal nefesh in a halachic sefer, but rather the logical consistency of the chumra adopter in the stringencies he takes on. So, for instance, one who is makpid in kemach yoshon and avoiding chodosh because it is d’oraisa and backed by a sizable number of Rishonim could be consistent in also being makpid on RHR.

3. There is credible support for the idea that Rov Rishonim disregard shishim ribo in the definition of 600,000 even today.

a. The contention here that it was a complete chiddush of the Mishkenos Yaakov that rov Rishonim held against shishim ribo is demonstrably false. He was merely echoing a commonly recurring refrain. SA/Mechabeir do NOT clearly indicate that shishim ribo is the majority shittah insofar as it’s ascribed to a yeish omrim in 345:7. While there are counterarguments regarding 303:18 by Rabbi Willig et al. to the effect that there is no Reshus Harabim zman hazeh, logic dictates that SA is citing rather than endorsing the opinion, which if believed would be tantamount to suggesting that the Shabbos prohibition on which the Gemara spills the most ink is/was totally defunct. Common sense militates against such possibilities. Moreover, the 303:18 discusses a rabbinic prohibition of a woman wearing jewelry, not d’oraysa hotzaah. The Kitzur and Shulchan Aruch HaRav likewise also present rov Rishonim as anti 600,000. So does the Maharshal.

b. Rov Rishonim might not simply be a matter of the raw number of Rishonim who uphold a position, but also the weight of their relative authoritativeness. This point is the operating premise of SA typically. I have yet to see a list of anti-shishim ribo Rishonim that includes Rav Yaakov ben Rav Moshe of Alinsiya, whom the Rosh threatened to place in Cherem for not building a tzuras hapesach eruv in the 13th century.

c. There is a credible concern that rabbis who were lenient on shishim ribo were enunciating a hora’as sha’ah. Back in the shtetlach of Europe, there was one communal cholent oven. Getting things like water, hot food on Shabbos etc. depended on the construction of tzuras hapesach eruvin. In our day, those consequences no longer obtain. One could credibly, on the same grounds of being makpid today on kemoch yoshon despite its rarity in the past, commit to being machmir on RHR today. The fact that shishim ribo is so textually questionable within the Gemara heightens the plausibility that these were not intended to be permanent precedents. Even looking at the Rosh’s responses to Rabbi Yaakov, I would not say that Talmudic arguments are their primary virtue, but rather the bold assertion of the Rosh’s power to control.

d. Even if Rov Rishonim is a game of raw numbers, I would submit that the raw numbers are in at least some doubt because there is at the end of the day a very sizeable swathe of Rishonim explicitly endorse against shishim ribo and the most straightforward sense of SA is to this effect as well. To settle this matter, I’d want to engage in a research project of when the shtetlach and Sefardic towns emerged with sizable Jewish populations, and if and when eruv’s emerged and whether the rabbis who built them used them.

e. MB’s baal nefesh recommendation rests on two contentions. 1. Rov Rishonim are against shishim ribo. 2. There is no basis (i.e. in the text of the Gemara, a point echoed by the Mechabeir in his overview).

Full disclosure – I do not use eruvs. But I do not make myself a menace to those who do use them either and do not presume that they lack learning or mental sophistication. I am satisfied I am doing the right thing for my family and myself and I am aware of the power of the other side of the argument, albeit this post has not largely emphasized such. It is precisely in struggling with the possible ontological correctness of the position opposite to the one I hold to that I base my claim of entitlement to the position I take on. If such makes me ipso facto an am ha’aretz, so be it. It would appear that such is a noble thing to be. I would advise those who do use the eruv to maintain at least the mental flexibility to seriously entertain that there is another side, and that side is not ludicrous.