NeutiquamErro

People find it far easier to forgive others for being wrong than being right.

Albus Dumbledore

Zahavasdad:

Lovely sentiments, but that’s objectively hilarious for a number of reasons.

Ally Pally. Regents Park. Hampstead Heath. Hyde Park. Primrose Hill. All nice green spaces in London.

You could always get around on a Boris Bike, if that helps.

ROB: I’d rather not get into an extended discussion, since your earlier posts appear too nonsensical for me to even try understand, and that’s without requesting you punctuate your posts in manner that might make them at least partially legible. But I’ll happily respond to this one point, despite having already made this distinction several times extremely clearly.

A person committing an aveiro is not therefore irreligious. People slip from time to time. However, if a person is acting based on an ideology, and wilfully sinning as a result of this ideology, in an extreme example, somebody who is living and continues to live in a relationship with a goy (if that ‘extreme’ example is suitable to you), then certainly that person cannot be considered a practising Jew, even if they still keep many other mitzvos perfectly. Because they aren’t just sinning, they are rejecting the Torah ideologically and practically, and there is a world of difference between the two.

The State, too, by, for example, actively tolerating and promoting toeiva, is guilty of not just erring, but of actively rejecting Hashem and His laws. A few token motions do not negate this. And I’ve already made this clear.

Okay, Mods, kudos, I must concede that’s legitimately hilarious.

I’ve answered your point about the State partially keeping halacha on the other thread, but for the sake of consistency will post it here too.

There is a clear distinction between a person who occasionally sins and the failure of the State to adhere to halacha fully. Firstly, with regard to virtually all religious Jews, we try to keep the rules, and occasionally fail. These failings do not define us, as long as we acknowledge they are failings and endeavour not to repeat them. Were a person to say that he chooses not to keep certain halachos due to ideological reasons, then that person cannot be considered religious.

For a State, however, it’s views are as defined in it’s constitution, will of the people, and governance. For a State to have a law on it’s statute books promoting toeiva, and you know perfectly well what I’m referring to, is to diverge from the Torah entirely. A State cannot claim to have failed momentarily as a person might. It’s guiding ideals must be in the right place, and they clearly aren’t.

Seriously? How is this not simply trolling? I’m sure it was initially hilarious, but I fail to see the purpose of ruining this thread, which is probably the finest I’ve seen in my time here. I welcome any explanation.

Comlink-X:

You’ve answered your own question. Cedric Diggory was murdered on the orders of Lord Voldemort, and therefore ‘by’ refers to his instigating the action. Perhaps the strictly literal meaning causes confusion, but in common usage, i.e. informal dialogue, this is a commonplace manner of speaking. Were a political killing carried out on the orders of, say, Vladimir Putin, you would say the victim was killed by Putin, even if he didn’t actually pull the trigger.

AviK:

Okay, I tried to make sense of that, I really did, but it doesn’t seem to answer any of my above points. You seem to make a distinction between the aspects of the State I picked out, and the State as a whole, even though this makes no material difference to my point, as far as rebuttals are concerned. So I’ll clarify once again, even though I’m sure you understood me perfectly the first time. You have stated that the State, as an entity, and the physical land of Eretz Yisroel are one and the same. Kindly explain this notion, rather than stating it as fact, and please try to be direct.

And you, once again, seem to ignore the question of halacha when posed directly. And this is convenient, as to support your case that the State is part and parcel of the land of Eretz Yisroel, for as of yet unexplained reasons, the State in question would at least have to be a State that abides by the Torah (Although, even if it did, perfectly, it would not legitimise it, but that’s an argument for another time, I’d like to avoid getting sidetracked). But it clearly, blatantly and obviously doesn’t. That undermines your entire argument, which is why you try to focus on minutiae and repeatedly avoid the wider picture. So kindly answer the question that has been posed to you by multiple posters, multiple times:

How can you claim that the State of Israel adheres to Halacha when this is clearly not the case? Please explain. And furthermore, do you truly believe it does? Answer Yes or No, and please show your working if you so choose.

Avi K:

I apologise for not seeing your response earlier, and yekke2, and myself on your other thread, have addressed it, but since I’d like a direct further response from yourself (I find in this kind of discussion, failing to request one invariably means you don’t get one, so no personal slight implied), I’ll make my point here clearly.

You try to quibble with the definition and application of the literal Shulchan Aruch, so, as a Torah Jew, which I assume you are, I’ll use the wider blanket term Halacha. This includes the various laws that we, as Torah Jews, adhere to on a daily basis, be it Shabbos, gneiva, toeivah, thins which have a clearer general consensus. Not that your distinction is a valid one, merely that it’s not the central issue here.

The State of Israel, as you acknowledged, does not keep to all of these. As you said, ‘Not yet’. So the honest answer to the question is No. I specifically requested a Yes/No answer in my previous posts, and suggested that if you then had to clarify, you could do so after your clear Yes/No answer, because I foresaw this kind of disingenuous response, but never mind that.

Furthermore, you wouldn’t consider a Jew who substantially kept Halacha a practising Torah Jew, you would rightly expect full adherence, which is what ‘keeping to Halacha’ means. You either do or you don’t. And you have admitted that they don’t.

And all that is even accepting that they ‘substantially’ keep to Halacha, and that they are moving in the right direction. Neither point is true. Substance is defined as a significant level, and if the Israeli Government is actively supporting toeivah and chilul Shabbos, there is obviously no substance, as it is not having a significant effect on the way the country is run. And recent moves by the Israeli Government with regard to Shabbos and conversion plainly show it is not moving in the right direction. And I haven’t even begun to address the often militantly secular nature of the State, from it’s inception through to it’s current prevailing attitudes, mainly because I don’t need to, my above points suffice.

Eagerly awaiting your response.

The Queen:

Certainly, I anticipated this question, and am happy to clarify my earlier statement. In that post, I noted at how, by appearing to avoid the question, despite being prompted, Avi K seemed to be acting in an evasive manner, something he has done before during this discussion. He has at times acted disingenuous, and by so doing he was acting in a manner similar to a particular type of poster, a type I described as waffling, indirect and evasive. I was not, however, saying he perfectly fitted the profile, merely that he was in danger of doing so. I think he deserves slightly more credit than that, as he has, at times, been reasonably fair and thorough, if occasionally being frustratingly evasive and indirect. For example, in his answer to Brisker’s question, he seemed to be point-by-point and fairly logical, not that I’ve examined it closely. That’s why I didn’t accuse him of ‘specifically’ possessing those traits, as hasn’t, as of yet, been all that bad. I think he just holds a very difficult viewpoint to defend, which is a difficult task to do.

Avi K:

That’s pretty disingenuous. Allow me to make it clearer: His most recent question, the one asking you directly whether you honestly believed the State of Israel adheres to the Shulchan Aruch. I was following the discussion up until that point, and was disappointed, if unsurprised, to see that this simple, direct question didn’t receive an answer promptly, out of character with the prompt manner in which you’ve addressed most of your dissenters.

Perhaps answering a question which requires a simply Yes or No answer, especially when we all know the honest answer is one that would contradict the main thrust of your argument, is less agreeable to you than posting highly questionable meandering diatribes that rarely adress any issue head on. This is an issue I have come across often in my relatively short time on the CR, which is that there is a certain kind of poster whos’s views clearly contradict yiddishkeit, halacha or common sense, who waffle for an intermediate period of time before, when addressed with these kinds of easy-to-answer queries, the ones that require an unambiguous straight answer, either waffle around the topic, ignore the question, or cease posting. This perhaps may go some way to explaining why solid, controversial yet fair discussions have become a rarity on this forum. Not that I’m specifically accusing you of possessing these traits.

But I’ve made this a lot more long-winded than it had to be, so if I may. Kindly begin your answer with a yes or no, and then feel free to qualify that answer in the ensuing paragraphs. You seem like an intelligent chap, so this shouldn’t be too difficult:

As Yekke2 asked, do you honestly believe that the State of Israel adheres to the Shulchan Aruch? Yes or No?

If I may interject, I think most of us would agree that for younger children, up until teens, their reading choices should be checked by their parents. This might mean supervising them to the library, getting books for them, or simply requiring the child to bring all books to the parent for screening, as the parent sees fit.

After a certain age, children become far harder to supervise, seeing as they can travel independently, and generally become more able to make their own choices. At which age this occurs depends on each individual child. For these children, rules can only do so much, as there is little a parent can do if the child conceals things from them, which is not particularly difficult for most teens. For them, building barriers within is arguably more important than creating external barriers, and this is true for many issues apart from reading material.

That’s not to say a parent couldn’t and shouldn’t do both. And seeing as each case is different, a single rule doesn’t suffice for all. Stronger parenting, as encourage by The Queen, is generally a good idea, certainly stronger parenting than that practised by many nowadays, but not every child responds to strength. For some, this will make them more, not less likely to rebel. Again, it is for the parent to make that judgement, not anonymous judgemental keyboard warriors.

And I’d like to point out that I’m not downplaying the potential dangers, which I believe are even more significant than acknowledged above, but suggesting ways to address that problem. No child should be exposed to inappropriate material, and libraries, particularly now that they are often used as propaganda tools as much as centres of knowledge, are a major source of such material.

Avi K:

I’ll try leave it to those already involved in this discussion to argue with you on the general topic, as they’ve done a pretty good job of putting forward a case so far. Generally, if I have nothing to add, usually because what I wish to say has already been said, I simply follow the discussion with interest.

Which leads me to my question. Could you please answer Yekke2’s earlier question? I’ve been waiting eagerly to hear your reply.

Thanks, LF, this saves me the trouble of attempting to reinvigorate the KTCRIM.

Not that I’m disagreeing with any of Akuperma’s points, but I wouldn’t worry too much about the provenance of the OP, seeing that they use the words Tanach, Pesach and are called ‘Bekitzur’. The use of the phrase Old Testament was probably to exclude films depicting events from the ‘New Testament’. But I’m sure they can defend themselves.

And as to the numerous points about modesty, with regard to this topic, that almost goes without saying. Virtually all non-Jewish media, particularly movies, fail miserably in this regard, and I doubt there are many who would disagree with that fact. But something tells me that wouldn’t satisfy the one who posed the original question.

As I said, incredibly suspect. The part about his daughter in concerning, to say the least. Still, what do I know?

Whilst I sympathise with the understandable shock and upset of LF, what I must take issue with are the blanket proclamations he made off the back off it. This incident, whilst disturbing, does not necessarily mean that this bochur gained nothing from their time in Israel, or that the system is failing to deal with this issue sufficiently.

Firstly, it is entirely possible that, faced with a screen and all the content it offers, and a long flight, he slipped and watched something he shouldn’t have, but that generally he takes more care in these matters. It could be that this bochur is weak in this particular area, or has a larger issue with his yiras shomayim. The fact that he was dressed in chassidishe clothing means next to nothing, as nowadays it says very little about the wearers status. I personally have seen far worse from people dressed that way, and have come to disregard it as an indicator of the wearer’s beliefs.

Perhaps what was said in this lecture has some basis, I don’t know, but from the way you describe it, it sounds incredibly suspect.

With apologies, I have not the wherewithal to trawl through the above two pages of back-and-forth, and nor do I possess requisite knowledge of the relevant economic calculations to counter a truly informed dissent.

Therefore, I will take the coward’s way out (although also an honest one) by saying that there is far more nuance in this debate than is generally acknowledged above.

In instances, raising the minimum wage can raise the price of consumer goods, with the simple rationale that in order to fund their workers’ wages, they have to raise prices, which leaves everybody back at square one. This is entirely possible, and logical.

However, this would be the case in a perfect economy where everybody is employed and everybody is paid at a reasonable rate. Then the relatively simple logic outlined in the opening post takes effect. But if there is a sound case to make that the workforce is being exploited, then that logic falters somewhat.

This, for instance, would involve a case where the power lies in the hands of the employers, for example, if there are more qualified candidates available than needed. The employer can then, in a completely open, capitalist economy, offer far lower wages then are fair, and keep the change. This might affect the demand, but would be unlikely to lower it to the extent this margin disappears, because that capital is still in the economy, only concentrated in fewer hands. If this is the case, then the rationale for a fair minimum wage becomes far stronger. Of course, even in this case there will still be some negative effects, such as moderate price rises and a strain on some small businesses, and it would be for those making the judgement, hopefully utilising some economic expertise in the process, to evaluate the pros and cons, and adjudge if the measure would have a net positive effect on the economy. And sometimes it does, and sometimes it doesn’t, depending on the balance of that particular instance.

And in the case where it should be enacted, this is not forced wealth distribution. Forced wealth distribution is extortionate inheritance or property tax, or penalising wealth by taxing at unfair rate. This involves enacting a law that says that an hours work is worth a particular minimum amount, and paying less then that amount is simply extortion. People understand this in the case of monopolies and cartels, so why not in employment law?

Of course, this measure would only be just if the workforce is being exploited. If it is simply a crude wealth distribution measure, and not necessary to protect employees, then it is entirely unjustified. A similar argument can be made with regard to unions.

This may be far more long winded and less dramatic than most of what has been said, but it at least acknowledges that these issues are not as cut and dried as the OP and some others appear to think.

I’m not even going to get started on the Gashmius/Ruchnius debate, as so far, what I’ve seen above concerning this inyan is pointless at best, and fallacious at worst.

There are several reasonably simple reasons why these clothing stores are expensive, some, all or none of which may apply in any given case.

The first is the above-mentioned principle of economies of scale. In cases of clothes specifically catering mainly to the frum community, there is only really demand for a limited amount of articles, meaning the cost of having them commissioned and produced is not as thinly spread, and as such leads to higher prices. Or, put more simply, making more of something means lower costs, and lower prices for the consumer, and the same is true for the reverse.

Another, similar but slightly different, factor is that many of these shops are small, high street shops. This is largely due to the fact, also mentioned above, that there are not enough customers to support a large clothing shop, which are generally on cheaper, out-of-town premises. Therefore, overheads such as rent and staff are comparatively higher. in order to turn a profit, prices are higher, and since there are fewer items sold than in large retailers, the profit on each one must be larger.

So essentially, the key reason is economies of scale, from the development and production stage right down to the store selling them.

Personally, I think the fact that there is little competition with regard to some products, like hats, streimels, sheitels, and similar niche frum products, lead to certain sellers taking advantage. Some of the markups on these products are clearly massive, for example Borsalino, where the profit margin can only be enormous. The fact that the frum consumer tends to be less discerning, and be affected by outside factors such as peer pressure, compounds this. This is especially true of the above example, but can easily be applied to other products geared towards the frum market.

However, in time, a growing community and greater recognition of some of the above issues may hopefully mitigate or indeed eradicate this.

OurTORAH:

If what you’e saying is that we should accept people and not judge them, I fullg agree. But what you seem to be saying is that we should accept this is their way of serving Hashem, and not necessarily wrong, then, if some of the above assertions are correct, and I’m not saying they are, then I can’t really agree with that. When you were performing that wonderful example of chessed in the hospital, you accepted them as people and didn’t judge them for their level of observance. But, as a frum yid, I believe that whilst I accept them, the fact is their level of observance is not just different, it is wrong. That’s not to say I judge them for it, of course. For example, if they had a Reform Rabbi they whose judgement they follow, accepting them would not translate to agreeing with that Rabbi, or even accepting that their’s is simply another way of serving Hashem. The mehalech is simply wrong, even if elements are right.

Now I’m not saying this applies to MO, I’m saying that if some of the above posters are correct, there are aspects of MO that are problematic and not the correct way to serve Hashem. Feel free to say that they are wrong, or that we should accept people nonetheless. But I cannot agree with the answer that this is simply another, acceptable way of serving Hashem despite these supposed shortcomings. Perhaps the shortcomings are less severe than claimed, or nonexistent, in which case of course the movement is fine, and should be accepted. but my perception is this is not the case.

OurTORAH: Yekke2 has pretty much said what I was planning to, plus a significant amount more.

And I particularly agree with the distinction he made between judging and justifying. As you kindly acknowledged, I was careful above to be none-judgemental. But not judging does not mean justifying behaviour one does not agree with.

Another important distinction was also made several times in the above discussion to what extent ‘Chareidim’ keep not just pure halacha, but ‘chumra’, and that practices one would consider problematic from a ‘Chareidi’ viewpoint is actually not as contrary to halacha as one might seem. But to label all areas where MO differ from ‘typical orthodox’ as ‘chumros’ would be no more true than labelling them all unforgiveable aveiros. A fair number of the issues cited above are certainly not ‘chumros’.

And, OurTORAH, reading your admirably worded and touching post, I again feel the need to reiterate that this is not a matter of judging. I fully accept your point about your family loving Torah, and loving yiddishkeit. And I also understand that much of what is written here could be hurtful, and I hope nobody is upset by this. But accepting people, their love of yiddishkeit and their individual mesiras nefesh and devotion to Torah, does not translate into accepting an entire movement who’s central ethos may contain aspects that some might consider very problematic. Perhaps my perception is misguided, and actually there is no matter of concern there. But, based on past experience and my limited knowledge, and I am genuinely sorry to say this, there are issues with the general movement. And whilst this shouldn’t be the central message of this thread, which should be about accepting people and finding common ground, it is an unfortunate reality.