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The Medina cannot possibly be “Treif” as it provides us with security and thereby enables us to serve Hashem in peace. It may have been against Halacha to intially establish the Medina, but now that the Medina is already established we must show our appreciation for it and help sustain it, since dismantling the Medina is not an option anymore.
Tomim Tihye: “The physical and emotional are intertwined; hence, if one is not sufficiently attracted to the girl, she may not be meeting his emotional needs.”
Yes, I agree they are intertwined; however there is plenty room for flexibility and allowing the physical attraction to take hold and then grow. Physical attraction is not an automatic happening which is either hit or miss by the first/second appearance. Did you have ever hear of the concept a person GROWING appreciation for his/her possessions? Same idea by male/female attraction; it has the natural capability to GROW and be just as exciting as a first hit/Drop dead gorgeous.
Popa: I think your vague answer is just an attempt sidetrack the simple explanation of it all. Women are indeed complex; I think men are very simple, as they do not have an emotionally thinking process like women.
popa: I’m just trying to attain clarity in this phenomena of ‘older guys’. How else do you attempt to explain this seemingly huge challenge for some great normal older guys to get engaged to one of many [hundreds of]wonderful girls [of all types of personality] who they date with over many years??
Medium: I completely agree with you. I think older guys generally don’t last over 2-3 dates with all the girls they date. They are obsessed with a fear of not being sufficiently attracted to the physical appearance of the girl.
PBA: Give me a break. Almost all older single men have only one particular issue which prevents them from getting engaged, and that is them being picky about looks. There is only a small percent of nut cases who have commitment issues, [which is also almost always exclusively the single ‘mens’ issue].
Popa bar abba: Your statement is rediculous. Girls want to be part of the learning which their husbands do. This is only possible when the husband learns after their marriage, since the learning which the husband accomplished before their marriage cannot possibly be considered ‘her’ learning.
Popa bar abba: See Gemara Nidah 13B, which states that boys who marry young girls have made the wrong choice and prevent Moshiach from coming since they cause less Jewish children to be born. The Gemara does not question how this fits together with the Bas Kol.
Popa: “1. There is no defined pool. There are dozens of overlapping pools, with undefined limits.”
I was discussing the natural pool.
“2. Who cares about the natural pool? We only care about the actual pool.”
The natural pool is very relevant to us, since even if we would like to assume that at this given time there are boys from outside the community who migrate into our community and therby balance the
numbers, we can still be never sure that this trend will continue, and in the future we will not run again into an inbalance of numbers due to the mathematical equation. So yes, the numbers of the natural pool of boys and girl is indeed very crucial here.
“Why do I have the burden of proof? I’m merely suggesting that the age gap is not shown to be the cause of there being more girls than boys, if it ever attacked at all, if it indeed was the enemy.”
The age gap theory is a mathematical fact. We don’t need prove that it causes a number decrepency. It’s actually impossible that it doesn’t cause a number decrepency between the natural pool of boy vs. girls in the community.
Popa: According to the mathematics which you agree to, then it’s actually impossible that there are an equal pool of boys corresponding to the natural pool of girls. You would need to prove that these additional boys really exist, unless you can disprove the mathematical equation which the age gap theory is based on.
RSRH: Do you mean to infer that the sages of previous generations have not fulfilled the ultimate “Shleimus” in their lives since they were lacking in their knowledge of the “full truth” which is known in our times?
Yes, God gave the intellectual capability to mankind to discover all the scientific knowledge which has been recently discovered [and I believe it was Divine providence that it be discovered in our times], however God did not state in the Torah that in order for us to reach full “Shleimus” we need to use our minds to discover the full scientific truth of the universe.
RSRH: What is the purpose of knowing the whole truth? The only truth which should matter us is our connection with God; which is in essence the “real” truth, since this materialistic world is considered by Chaza”l as the “Oilam Hasheker”. If the God felt it was important for us to know this “whole truth” which you describe, then He would have revealed it to us [and the previous generations] through the Torah itself.
Sam2: Hataras nedarim of erev rosh hashana definitely has halachic value for all nedarim which one has no recollection of; however, nedarim which one does remember must be specified in the nussach in order to become nullified. A hanhaga tova which was repeated three times does need to be nullified midrabanan; however, I can’t understand how refraining from doing something (as opposed to a positive action) can constitute a neder.
Yitayningwut: Great to hear from you as well. I remember having stimulating debates with you in the past. Shame I can’t get to meet/know you IRL. I hope I’ll disappear from here quickly, as this place is addictive and minimizes my capacity for fulfilling my responsibilities IRL.
Can someone explain to me how refraining from doing something on account of stringency in halacha can be considered a neder?
In the nussach of hataras nedarim it says “shenahagti sholosh pi’amim” which implies that only positive actions which demonstrate a behavior, like wearing tefillin on chol hamoed, is considered a neder. However, the mere act of refraining from doing something even if one’s intentions is because of stringency in halacha is not a “hanhaga” and should only be considered “divorom sh’belev” and not at all binding.
Would someone consider refraining from visiting YW coffee room three times (when you felt an urge) a neder, and it’s prohibited to revisit without hataras nedarim (like has happened to myself right now!)?!
Yitayningwut:
1)Your comparison to the mitzvah of Lulav is way off. Lulav is a mitzvah bain adam l’makom, and we’re discussing bain adam l’chaveiro mitzvos. Rabbi Akiva in the end of Mesechta Yuma clearly separates the essence of bain adam l’chaveiro mitzvos from the essence of bain adam l’makom mitzvos.
2)The reason why they are mitzvos “sichliyos” is because they are mitzvos “hargoshiyos”. Our natural instincts/feelings guide our logical thinking.
3) I will reiterate again, it is not possible to fulfill properly the mitzvos bain adam l’chaveiro of the Torah if we are not good hearted in nature.
Chacham: The Mishna means that the Mitzvos in the Torah have an additional mystical meaning which we do not understand, but the Mishna does not mean to negate c”v the simple meaning of the mitzvos as we know “Ein Mikra Yotzei Midei Pshuto”, and the simple meaning is that we should be compassionate people. We can’t misinterpret these sayings of Chaza”l, and use them as an excuse to let ourselves feel cruelty towards other people.
Yitaynigwut: It’s a ridiculous statment to say that the Torah deosn’t believe in the inherently good nature of “ahava”love over “sinah”/hatred, and “rachamim”/compassion over “achzarious”/cruelty. The Torah in numerous places commands us to love others and not feel any hatred; “Lo Sisna”, “Lo Sachmod”, “Lo Sitor”, “B’tzedek Tishpot”, “Lo Si’ametz Es L’vuvcha”; so to claim that all these commandments don’t infer to our naural understanding that love is inherently “good” and hatred is inherently “evil, is actually absurd.
The Ramban in Chumash explains the reason why Sidom was punished for “Gezel” even though they havn’t received the Torah, is because mitzvos bain adam l’chaveiro are “Mitzvos Sichliyos”/logical mitzvos; so even w/o the Torah a person understands good from evil. This also proves my understanding that the underlying reasoning and purpose of the Torah mitzvos of bain adam l’chaveiro is identical to our natural understanding that love/compassion is good and hatred/cruelty is evil.
Additionally, it is not possible for a human being to be both good hearted and evil hearted; it’s either one or the other. So, since the Torah wants us to be goodhearted in order to fulfill all mitzvos bain adam l’chaveiro, then obviously when the Torah commands in specific circumstances to act cruely, the intention of the Torah is that we should merely “act” cruely but not “feel” cruelty; since if we were to “feel” cruely, than obviously that would mean that we “are” cruelhearted, and then it would be impossible for us to fulfill the mitzvos bain adam l’chaveiro.
Yitayningwut: “Inherently good means absolutely good. Absolutely good means no exceptions.”
I explained that there are in fact no exceptions. When we are commanded to not feel pity on Amaleik/Achzar, this means that we are restricted from feeling the “feelings of pity” on these people, not that the feelings are actually “bad”; the same way we are restricted from feeling emotional love towards a woman other than our wifes. How do you see/prove otherwise?
Hashem is Kaviyochol defined with “Midas Harachamim” which is in essence complete and thoroughly “compassion” as per its translation.
I said the Ramba”m holds that it’s assur to support a gentile who is ‘oveid avoda zara’ through returning his lost object, just like it’s assur to give them a “matnas chinim”. This is similar to the halacha of “Moridin V’ein Ma’alin” which has to with indirectly supporting ‘avoda zara’ in the world, which of course overrides our morality obligations.
So far you haven’t brought even one proof to your warped way of thinking in this matter, claiming the natural goodhearted feelings which Hashem created us with, are in fact “not good”. So, I guess according to you evil/cruel feelings within us are in fact “not bad” either only “neutral” and depending on circumstances? So there is no essence of “tov” or “rah” within us at all?
As per my screen name, I appreciate almost all posters; everyone has something unique to contribute. I’m usually inclined to open a thread when I see the following posters commenting: Popa, Charliehall, Hello99, Dr Pepper, Yitayningwut, SJS and Feif Un.
Msseeker, Shlishi: Thanks for mentioning me. I definitely mostly associate myself with the hard right like you identify yourselves with; however, in some areas I actually disagree with you and associate myself with the left.
Yitayningwut:
1) You didn’t understand my post. I wrote that the commandment of “V’Uhavta L’Reiacha Komocha” is a pure emotional mitzvah, not connected to any circumstances. [This is the literal translation of these words in the Torah. Also, the Gemara says one should not have marital relations with his wife during the day, because he might dislike something and then transgress this commandment; so clearly we see that the actual thought of disliking a Jew is a transgression even though it didn’t lead to any action/circumstance.] So, if an emotion of love [not connected to any circumstance] can be considered a ‘mitzvah’ when felt towards another Jew, then obviously your logic which you stated, that an emotion can’t be considered “good” since it’s in essence self serving, is incorrect. Furthermore, we can also say that ’emotional love’ is generally classified as “good” even though it’s only a ‘mitzvah’ when felt towards another Jew.
The p’shat in Chaza”l “Ma Hu Rachum” definitely refers to an actual characteristic trait, as per its literal translation. Also “Derech” refers to a trait not behavior. The characteristic trait of compassion is an absolute/inherently “good” trait. Even when we are restricted from feeling compassion, like for “Achzarim”/Amaleikim, this does not translate to turning our compassionate emotions into “bad” feelings; but rather it means we are restricted from feeling these “good” emotions of compassion towards an “achzur/cruel person, as I explained in previous posts.
? The simple understanding of the Parsha is that compassion/”Midas Harachamim” does not punish altogether for sins, and the merit of the ten Tzaddikim coupled with Avrohom’s Tefilla can cause a strengthening of “Midas Harachamim” over “Midas Hadin”.
b) The Tanna used the words “Biti, Mu E’es’e”/my daughter, what can I do? In other words, he made a helpless expression, saying that although his sympathy/emotions are with the woman, he’s nevertheless helpless as far as reprimanding her husband since the Torah states a “heter” for this. This is pashut p’shat.
c) I didn’t say it’s wrong c”v; I said I highly doubt any Tanna had actually gone ahead and killed a murderer of his relative. I guess I can’t bring actual prove/source to my logical assumption.
d) “Darchei Sholom” is a moral feeling; sholom/peace is a natural moral feeling. The possuk says “Dover Emes B’Livuvo” which refers to a Jew and Non Jew alike (Geneivas Daas of a Non Jew is Assur Mid’oraysa), so do you honestly think Rabbi Yochanon Ben Zachai and Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai greeted a gentile or returned an ‘aveida’ for the sole purpose of Kiddush Hashem (or your understanding of Darchei Sholom), and have the gentile think that the object was returned out of sincere feelings of the Rabbi? This would constitute ‘Geneivas Daas’ and would be a violation of “V’Dover Emes B’Livuvo”. The meaning of the Gemara obviously is that Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai returned the object out of sincere feelings of morality, coupled with an intention of making a Kiddush Hashem. The Ramba”m is going with the shitta that it’s ‘assur’ to return an ‘aveida’ to a gentile; so only for the purpose of Kiddush Hashem, one should return an ‘aveida’ and not solely on account of his moral feelings.
Lastly, the punishment was given to Rabbeinu Hakodosh for not saving the animal [who pleaded him to have mercy] from being slaughtered.
Yitayningwut: In the Zohar it says that many animals/fish carry ‘gilgulim’ of lost nishomos which need a tikkun; and the way they get a tikkun is through a Tzaddik shechting and eating them. This is how I understand why the Tana’im ate animal meat. Nevertheless we see in the Gemara that Rabbeinu Hakodosh was reprimanded for not showing sufficient compassion for the animal which was being led for slaughter.
Yitayningwut,
1) I was proving from the possuk “V’Uhavta L’Reiacha Komocha” that a natural emotional feeling can be considered “good” even though the essence of emotions is self serving. If the Torah considers natural feelings of love towards another Jew a “Mitzvah”, then kal v’chomer it can be classified in general as “good”. And definitely the pashtus of the possuk means to infer to the actual feelings unrelated to any actions.
Additionally the Derasha of Chaza”l on the possuk “V’Hulachta B’Druchuv”-“Ma Hu Rachum Af Atu Rachum” pashtus means to infer to the actual characteristic trait of “compassion” unrelated to deeds. So the Torah considers the actual characteristic trait of “compassion” not only “good” and a “mitzvah” but even a following of the ways of God.
Yitayningwut:
1) The possuk says “V’Uhavta L’Reiacha Komocha”. The simple/pashtus meaning of this possuk is that the actual feelings of love are a purpose and end to itself. God wants us to have these actual feelings, regardless as to whether these feelings lead to actions or not. The same way the Torah commands us to love Hashem (V’Uhavta Es Hashem Elokecha), since through the actual feelings of love we bind/connect with Hashem; so too the Torah obligates us to love our fellow, since through the actual feelings of love/connection we are doing something which is inherently good.
2) The obvious reason why the Gemara states a negative comment on a Beth Din which gave Missa/capital punishment once in seventy years, is because of our moral feelings not to deliver such severe punishment on a person. So too, it’s understood that proper moral behavior would not commit Bi’ah Shelo Kidarkah even though it is permitted (I’m sure none of the sages in the Gemara had done it). Do you think any of the sages in the Gemara who might have been a Goel Hadam would have killed an accidental murderer? Why did Rabbi Yochanon Ben Zachai greet nicely every Gentile he met in the street; wasn’t it because of his natural moral feelings? Also, Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai who returned lost objects to a gentile even though halachically it’s permitted to keep “Aveidas Nuchri”; wasn’t it because of his moral feelings?
Yitayningwut:
1) There is a concept in Chaza”l of a “Tzaddik” by nature and a “Rasha” by nature. This is what the Baalei Mussar refer to as someone with “Middos Tovos” or “Middos Ra’os”. True, the Torah Sh’Biksav only discusses laws and not character; but Chaza”l in Pirkei Avos discusses character. The Mishna I quoted above is clearly discussing how Avrohom Avinu was defined as a “Tzaddik/Good” in character. Ayin Tov/good eye is a character trait; so is Ruach Nimucha/humble spirit and Nefesh Shefeila. Also the Chaza”l which says “Ma Hu Rachum Af Atu Rachum” is discussing the character trait of compassion. A good hearted/compassionate/loving person is a “Tzaddik” by nature; he may be “Rasha” bain adam l’makom who commits immoral acts, but he is nevertheless a “Tzaddik” bain adam l’chaveiro.
2)I mentioned a few examples in my above post of actions which are permitted by the Torah, but it is nevertheless praiseworthy to refrain from doing on account of our moral feelings. Gezel Ach”um, Capital punishment, Bi’ah Shelo Kidarkah, Goel Hadam are all permitted but Chaza”l say (at least the middle ones) one should try to refrain from doing because of one’s moral feelings. I believe that the Torah is from God, but it doesn’t seem contradictory to me that the Torah halachically permits certain acts even though they run contrary to our moral feelings. On the other hand, we see the Torah constantly commends one for acting kind and compassionate to all the creations of the world, as I quoted above from the Midrash which says that Hashem choose the Avos Hakidoshim and Moshe Rabeinu because of the compassion they showed towards the sheep they shepherded; also the possuk in Tehilim says “V’Rachamuv Al Kol Ma’asuv”- animals included.
Yitayningwut: I don’t see how else you can explain the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos. The Mishna is discussing pure character; not behavior or actions.
There are many things which the Torah permits, but it is nevertheless proper to try to refrain from doing; like Gezel Achu”m (midoraysa), capital punishment (for Beth Din), Bi’ah Shelo Kidarka, Go’el Hadam etc. So, even though the Torah permits Shechita on a regular basis it still may be considered proper to refrain from eating animals [at least during weekdays when it’s not a mitzvah at all].
Yitayningwut: Lev Tov and Ayin Tov are good by definition; this what the Mishna in Pirkei Avos means to imply.
We get an extra mitzvah/reward when refraining from doing an immoral act, since we are listening/connecting to God in the process [besides listening to our own feelings].
Shechting an animal definitely causes it significant pain.
Yitayningwut: 1) The Mishna is Pirkei Avos explains that the characteristic traits of a person [not his actions]
2)The Torah does not say it is a Mitzvah in general to eat animals; rather the Torah says one is “permitted” to eat animals. Only for specific purposes it is a ‘mitzvah’ to shecht animals. Would you say that killing a child is not a moral issue since the Torah commanded Avrohom Avinu to shecht Yitzchok? A specific Mitzvah Bain Adam L’makom does not contradict the validity of our general feelings of Bain Adam L’chaveiro. Also, the Midrash says that Hashem choose Moshe Rabeinu to lead Klal Yisroel precisely because he showed compassion towards the sheep he shepherded.
Yitayningwut: You can’t claim the feelings of emotional love is neither classified as “good” or “bad”, since you do agree that when used for good, these feelings are actually what makes the person be defined as someone “good” in nature; so then obviuosly the essence of these feelings are actually “good”.
Additionally, your comparison of emotional love to one’s desire to eat is not a fair comparison, since the desire to eat is never classified as “good” even when the act of eating is a “mitzvah”; however, emotional love is clasified as “good” when it brings about acts of kindness for others.
Lastly, how do you see from the Gemara you quoted that sympathetic feelings for animals is not genuine “good” feelings; of course I agree when there is a ‘mitzvah’ to eat “busar” we must eat for bain adam l’makom reasons?
Yitayningwut: I don’t see the contradiction in my words. If the essence of these [emotional love] feelings is neutral as you claim, then how can it possibly become converted to either good or bad depending on the circumstances? Obviously these feelings are really in essence classified as “good”, but when the Torah dictates a prohibition on these feelings, these emotions become an ‘aveira’ even though they are in essence “good”. The Gemara says one should feel a desire/lust to eat a ‘chazzir’/hog’ and withhold himself solely because the Torah prohibits it; meaning that the actual desire/lust for a chazzir is not “bad” even though the act of eating will be an ‘aveira’.
Btw, I’m a vegetarian. I believe that sympathetic feelings for animals are actually “good” feelings, even though the Torah permits one to eat them.
Yitayningwut: Of course lust is not good; I was discussing emotions. Emotions, even those which originate from lust, are by nature good/”tov”. When the Torah prohibits feeling certain emotions/acting upon them in specific circumstances, this is because of other considerations [usually bain adam l’makom reasons, but sometimes bain adam l’chaveiro reasons]. But even when the Torah prohibits these feelings, the Torah is still not illegitimating the inherently good nature of these actual feelings.
Yitayningwut: “Because, since they are self serving, one whose values are not in line with the Torah’s or who’s reasoning isn’t up to par will not just be naturally a selfless giver.”
I don’t see your proof here. If the Torah dictates in certain circumstances an act which runs contrary to these natural feelings, how does this prove that the Torah delegitimizes these feelings and does not consider them “tov”/good; maybe the Torah is commanding us to do otherwise because of other considerations which fall under the category of bain adam l’makom, whether we understand the reasoning or not.
When Hashem commanded Avrohom Avinu to sacrifice Yitzchok does that demonstrate delegitimizing Avrohom Avinu’s natural feelings towards his son, or does it just demonstrate that our obligation of bain adam l’makom sould take precedence to our natural tendences towards bain adam l’chaveiro?
Yitayninwut: The motivation/desire for giving and the feelings of satisfaction after giving are all emotions. Without feelings/emotions one would not desire/accomplish anything. So Hashem created us with these feelings in order for us to act upon them and do good deeds; therefore the essence of these feelings are also considered “Tov”/Good since these feelings make someone a kind hearted person who does good deeds for others. It’s irrelevant that the actual physcological essence of these feelings are self serving.
Giving to a person whom you love is also an emotion; it causes you to feel appreciated and loved. When we act upon our instinct to love and we give/care to/for our friend/spouse, we are in essence creating a deeper dimension to our primary instinct feelings of love. So even the most selfless person is actually driven by his inner desire for love.
Yitayningwut: Sorry, we are not connecting. Why does a person love his friend or spouse; isn’t that love genuine?
Mod: With all due respect, I just still can’t understand. Every normal Goy out there will tell you hat we should choose love over hatred, anger and jealousy.
Yitayningwut: Its quiet obvious that people are born with natural moral tendences to love other people. Some may feel insecure and choose to hate rather than love, but that doesn’t take away from the fact that they also were born with instincts to love.
Mod80: The Torah instructs us how to lead every aspect of our lives. Some mitzvos we are instructed with are solely bain adam l’makom and others are a combination of bain adam l’chaveiro and bain adam l’makom. My point is that the essence of bain adam l’chaveiro mitzvos are an expression of our nautural moral feelings which Hashem created us with.
Mods: There are many liberals out there who hate war altogether. Natural human feelings are God’s creation and they are real. This doesn’t contradict our obligation of Bain Adam L’Makom even if they run contrary to our natural feelings of bain adam l’chaveiro. The Pirkei Avos which decribes the character of Avrohom Aveinu vs. Bilam Hrasha seems to infer to natural human feelings.
Mod80: I agree with middle path. Natural moral feelings are real and genuine. The Torah doesn’t deny the validity of these feelings; but rather the Torah obligates us to take other considerations into account; like the sanctity of human life etc. The Germans were thoroughly evil people in nature.
Middlepath: Religion is based on the understanding that God created man so that he should grow and reach a higher spiritual level during his life. God didn’t create people to merely serve other people; since if that were the case, He would not have created man altogether and then nobody would need to be taken care of. Yes, God created us with natural feelings to want to give to others, but the reason why God created us with these natural feelings, was in order for us to reach a higher ‘madreiga’/level through this act of helping others. Our natural feelings of wanting to give to others for the sake of others does not run contradictory to our knowledge that we also become elevated through this act of giving to others and serve purpose for our creation. Chaza”l say “Lo Nivra Ha’adam Elu L’Zulaso”.
Chein: I think we’ve spoken enough about MO in recent days. Maybe now its time for us Chareidim to look inwards into ourselves and try to improve; we have our own issues which should be addressed.
Refuah Shleima
Yitayningwut: Yes, we are good. You were quiet challenging (and that’s a compliment). Too bad that thread was closed (I caused it to get closed by starting to discuss science and Torah).
WIY: Yes, but serious masmidim who learn through Sha”s are accomplishing the ultimate purpose. It’s irrelevant if they end up contributing to the Klal in a practical way or not. This is what the Gemara in Chelek means to imply.
Yitayningwut: We actually agree on something.
I was discussing the mitzvah of Limud Hatorah. The Mesilas Yishorim I quoted above says that Deveikus is the purpose of everything.
I explained in my above post that the literal translation of the word Deveikus means an emotional thing.
“Third, it says that dveikus is impossible, and simply that being attached to a Talmid Chacham satisfies the mitzvah to be attached to Hashem.”
Wrong. The Gemara is explaining that actual Deveikus is really accomplished as it says mifurash in the possuk “V’Atem Hadeveikim B’Hashem Elokeichem Chaim Kulchem Hayom”
Yes, but the Gemara explains this is how we can fulfill the Mitzvah of “L’Ahava Es Hashem U’Liduvku Bo”; so one of the purposes of learning is definitely to be Mikayem this Mitzvah of Deveikus.
I just explained that it is indeed a purpose in learning since this is how we are able fullfill the mitzvah of “Liduvku Bo”.
The Torah uses the same word Dveykus in Parshas Bereishis “V’Duvak B’Ishto”; would you say that also has nothing to do with emotions? The literal translation of the word Devekus means emotional connection. You are the one that has to bring proof that Torah doesn’t mean to infer its literal translation.
RSRH: I wasn’t discussing the Yekkish concept of “Austritt”. I was dicussing the Torah concept of ‘separation’ from Goyim; which we recite every Motzei Shabbos “Hamavdil..Bein Yisroel L’amim”. I’m sure RSRH believed we must create some level of separation from individual Non Jews.
nw13: How do you understand the role of women in Judaism; they do not use their intellect to learn Torah? Also learning disabled people; are they less capable of reaching ‘Shleimus’/fulfillment in Judaism, since they lack intellectual capabilities?
Annoynimus: No Chareidi gadol has ever spoken out against RSRH or the Yekkesh community. However, the Chareidi leaders have constantly spoken out against the MO philosophy. There must be some real difference between these two communities.
Haleivi: I wasn’t discussing Psak Halacha. I was discussing each individual Jew’s relationship with Judaism.
Twisted: Connection with our creater is something real which we experience with our emotions; it’s not just a mere belief in our minds.
Annoynimus: The Yekkesh community is part of the Chareidi world; RSRH was a recognized Chareidi Gadol. “Torah Im Derech Eretz” is not at all a change to the traditional Chareidi philosophy; as many MO CR members pointed out, Jews have always joined the workforce and many even had degrees like the Ramba”m and others.
However, the Modern Orthodox movement made serious changes to the traditional Chareidi Hashkafa, by negating/ignoring centuries old principals of Judaism, like this separation concept which we are now discussing.
Old Man/Annoynimus: All Chareidim believe in the same Dveykus concept; the difference between Litvaks and Chasidim is to whether Limud Hatorah is the only channel to reach the actual Dveikus or not. Also, Chasidim see the intellectual pursuit as a contradiction to one’s pure emotional Dveykus; whereas Litvaks see one’s emotions and intellect interconnecting and benefiting one the other.
Yitayningwut: It’s clear from the Gemara that the purpose of Limud hatorah is to accomplish Dveykus with Hashem.
Kesubos 111B
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Hello99: Dveykus is emotions. The pesukim in the Torah constantly compare our relationship with Hashem to the relationship between man and wife; isn’t the marital relationship emotions?