Charedi kby soldier

On the other hand, it is true that the dor revi’i does say that one should choose to eat the pig flesh instead of the human flesh in a case of mortal danger (I suppose because he thinks that it is so disgusting and immoral to eat the human flesh that it can’t be that that would be preferred, I have yet to see the piece inside, unfortunately), which is seemingly an extremely problematic psak, as we have a klal from brachos 19b, based on the pasuk in mishlay 21,30, that our morals and sensibilities cannot override an issur dioraysa, and indeed, I’ve heard in the name of one of the greatest roshei yeshiva of recent generations that one should eat the human flesh based on this, although I heard a counter argument from another rosh yeshiva that the inyan to mitigate issurim in sakana in yoma 83 is a din dirabbanan, and min hatorah, one could violate anything to save his life and since we are now dealing with an issur dirabbanan to eat the technically more chamur issur, the klal of kavod habreeyos being docheh dirabbanans (brachos 19b) can come into play if it would be so offensive to the dying person to eat the human (as, this rosh yeshiva allegedly argued, it should be), and he’d therefore be allowed to eat the pig instead.

The issur of eating human flesh is subject to a machlokes rishonim. The Rambam in hilchos maachalos asuros, perek 2 halacha 3 says it’s an issur aseh, the magid mishna there quotes the Raavad, Rashba and Ramban as arguing and saying that meat of a living human has no issur mayikar hadin, though the Rosh in ksubos perek 5 siman 19 (daf 60a) says that there would be a maris ayin issue in some circumstances, but he too holds like the Ramban and others, the Ra’ah holds that there’s actually an issur dioraysa (quoted by magid mishna there as well as the ritva and sheeta mikubetzes in ksubos there). The Ramban (quoted by magid mishna) does point out though, that there would be an issur hanaa midioraysa of flesh from a dead person, as learned from a gzaira shava from egla arufa.
So we have a three way machlokes rishonim regarding living human flesh, some hold one violates an aseh, some hold there is only a maris ayin issue and some hold there’s an issur lav dioraysa.

What I meant at the very end about not being sure about whether you’re correct about a greeting was that I’m not sure that the amoraim held it was muttar (but it would lichora still be muttar today) (this post might be redundant, but I just wanted to alleviate confusion that may have occurred due to my ambiguousness at the end of the previous post, I admit it wasn’t well written)

@benignuman, even from a halachic perspective, it isn’t clear that it’s certainly fine, the gmara in kiddushin daf70 says that Ain shoalin bishalom Isha and is quoted in shulchan aruch, even haezer siman 21 sif 6. One could argue based on the tosfos in kiddushin daf 82a deebur hamaschil hakol lishaim shamayim, which is quoted by Rama, siman 21 sif5, that it would be muttar nowadays, see also the Baer haitev there sif katan 9, who has a very interesting kula in the name of maharshal, also the last ritva in kiddushin who seems to say that it’s dependent on the person, one could argue that nowadays no one really has improper thoughts by a simple greeting because it has become the norm and then the ritva could be a blanket heter, but it may be somewhat subjective, which is a halachic consideration, so in conclusion, while perhaps limaase, in most situations you’re correct, if it can lead to something else, it’s assur mayikar hadin (that may be uncommon though) and from the sugya it is not pashut muttar, if going back to the gmara.

@yungerman123, Rav Moshe says in igros Moshe, chailek yoreh daya bet, siman 82 that, while ideally, when riding in a taxi, a married woman should bring her husband, if he is unable to come then she can still ride with a male driver due to the fact that he is busy with his work and wouldn’t want to ruin how reputation, in addition to the fact that mayikar hadin there is no yichud because there are lots of cars on the road.
In chailek even haezer 4 siman 65 sif 3, he says that in a shaas hadchak, like when someone and how female neighbor are going to the same place, or when a woman is hitchhiking on the side of the road, where if he doesn’t let her in she’ll say that he is צר עין ואכזרי, one can give the ride, because the only real issur would be if they go off the road and we’re not really concerned about that.
In both tshuvos, while he does stress that lichatcheela one should avoid the situation, he says that it is muttar mayikar hadin (in the yoreh daya tshuva, he says that issur yichud also would apply even if there’s only a chashash that they’ll violate lo sikrevu, which is lichora a chiddush).
There is also a story that I read about an Adam gadol who was niftar a few years ago, said over by a Talmid, that he was once driving and three girls wanted a ride, he considered the fact that even with three of them there is reason to be machmeer for yichud but ended up being maykil due to the גמילות חסד involved and the fact that Rav Moshe held that it’s muttar mayikar hadin if I remember correctly (the first part is definitely true, I don’t remember for sure that he also used Rav Moshe’s sheeta). Perhaps there’s a chiluk between giving a ride and taking a ride in terms of the considerations needed.