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August 25, 2014 2:06 pm at 2:06 pm in reply to: Has anyone heard of this supposed quotation? #1030314benignumanParticipant
I think the OP’s question was whether Hitler (or even Goebels) used the metaphor of “deer in the field” and thereby echoed the Gemara.
As an aside, the Nazis didn’t kills us like deer in a field (i.e. shooting us as individuals) they killed us en mass like chicken in a slaughterhouse.
benignumanParticipantmoishepipik,
You are confusing halachic categories. The Rambam holds that B”D is koifeh by a legitimate (i.e. with amasla) maos alai right away. Rashi holds that by maos alai we give them 12 months to work it out, living together, and then are koifeh if they can’t work it out. The Rema and the Mechaber pasken not like the Rambam and Rashi, but rather like Rabbeinu Tam and the Rashba who hold that we are not koifeh by maos alai because “shema nasna ainav b’acher” and if the maos alai was a lie, then the kefiah would be improper and the get posul (note that it is a chashash mamzeirus, not actual mamzeirus). However Rabbeinu Tam holds, and the Rema paskens, that societal pressure is not considered kefiah at all.
There is a separate din that if a husband is no longer living with his wife and no longer supporting her on a regular basis, then we are koifeh. What Sam2 and I were describing is this latter din.
benignumanParticipantmoishepipik,
As Sam2 said, once they have been divorced in secular court and are no longer living together as a married couple, Bais Din will demand a get. Moreover, you are quoting the Tosafos HaRosh, when the Rema paskens that Bais Din and communities can use societal pressure, short of a formal cheirem or beating him up, if they deem her maus alai to be valid.
Most importantly, the question posed by the OP was about what was proper on the part of the husband, not on Bais Din’s power.
benignumanParticipantOnce Bais Din orders the giving of a get it is always assur to withhold it.
benignumanParticipantPAA,
Assuming for the sake of argument that the basis for Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is some sort of inferiority, we would first have to know what aspect of the typical female psyche/mind/soul is inferior, in order to evaluate whether anything changed. Furthermore, one would expect that the onus would be on those claiming that there was a change to demonstrate that it has occurred.
benignumanParticipantPAA,
Nishtanah HaTevah is something that is used to describe clear physical changes from the times of Chazal until now (like vest kavuah or the size of olives/fingers). The problem with minds is that we can’t know what the tevah was in the past, or if any change that has occurred is sufficient to necessitate a change in education policy.
That being said, it is clear from the Rambam and Jewish history, that even in the past there were women of exceptional Torah scholarship who learned kol haTorah kula. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion should therefore be viewed as a general rule, but for the exceptional woman who is highly motivated, she can and should learn (as an ainah metzuva v’osah). Query whether the percentage of exceptional women is higher today than it was in the past.
August 19, 2014 1:17 pm at 1:17 pm in reply to: Intersting questions i have been pondering in my spare time (when i have any) #1028851benignumanParticipantVeltz,
I don’t care if the author’s real is name Gavin Gunhold or Querada Vishnik of the D-Lish Cake Company, the poem is brilliant.
benignumanParticipantDY,
I am pretty sure I saw a teshuvah from Reb Moshe assering in one of the later volumes (? or ?), because our weddings tend to be open to the public. Next time I have a chance I will look it up.
benignumanParticipantI am sure that this has been mentioned already in this thread: The way R’Moshe learns the sugya of mechitza, one is required for a wedding, even for seating, just like one was needed by Simchas Beis Hashoeva and just like one will be needed by levaya of Mashiach ben Yosef.
Others learn the sugya of mechitza as applying only to shuls and therefore opening up the possibility of allowing mixed seating at weddings.
August 14, 2014 6:51 pm at 6:51 pm in reply to: Intersting questions i have been pondering in my spare time (when i have any) #1028847benignumanParticipantI think this is appropos:
Group Therapy
by Gavin Gunhold
When my psychiatrist went insane,
Only six of my multiple personalities
Were cured.
The rest of us want our money back.
benignumanParticipantHaleivi,
You are correct. I was not careful in the way I wrote.
benignumanParticipantGilgulim is interesting because some Rishonim and Acharonim have declared it to be a very important yesod and some have said that it is Avoda Zara. I wonder if it is possible that there is a middle ground (i.e. gilgulim do occur but aren’t that important).
Interestingly reports of gilgulim have been studied pretty extensively and there is substantial evidence that they do occur. A Professor at the University of Virginia, a psychiatrist, extensively researched numerous cases, and published many articles and books on the subject. A colleague of Stevenson published a book called “Life before Life: Children’s Memories of Previous Lives” which summarized the results of their research at the University.
benignumanParticipantTo clarify some issues: There is a difference, according to many, between “the world to come” and “life after death.” The former is the state of the world after techias hameisim in the future, which is the subject of multiple nevuos in Tanach. The latter is the idea that the soul survives death even in the present.
This latter concept of life after death is, I believe, assumed as a fact in the Torah despite no explicit statement that it exists. As Rabbi Avigdor Miller points out, almost every time somebody important dies in Chumash it says “and he was gathered unto his people” a phrase which implies that the newly dead person is joining another group of people, presumably his dead relatives.
The most explicit mention of life after death in Tanach is the story of Shaul seeking counsel from Shmuel HaNavi after Shmuel died.
benignumanParticipantI should clarify that the Toras Hashlamim doesn’t hold that way l’maysah. He holds, if I remember correctly, that this issue is a machlokes Tanaim.
Sam, do you remember which Rambam they read that way?
benignumanParticipantHaLeivi,
I don’t know what Sam meant but there is a shitta, the Toras Hashlamim, that holds that Niddah d’Oraisa, not just harchokos, is only for married women. There is also a Taz that I have seen people misunderstand that way, but I don’t think it is what the Taz means.
benignumanParticipantTo explain what moderator 42 wrote:
The Shulchan Aruch and the Rama both pasken that derivative (i.e. lower-level sins of the same category) sins of the “big three” are also yehoreg v’al yaavor, even though those sins are of lesser severity.
Because the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama also pasken that negiah derech chiba is asur min HaTorah, like the Rambam, from the same posuk that forbids relations with a Nida, it follows that this issur is a derivative of Arayos which would be yehoreg v’al yaavor. The Shulchan Aruch is explicit that negiah derech chiba is yehoreg v’al yaavor by Nida (which is the issur of Arayos that applies to all non-married, adult, Jewish women). And there is no reason to think that negiah would be more meikel with respect to Eishes Ish.
benignumanParticipantSam2,
I know that the posuk you quoted is often interpreted that way but I don’t think that is pashut pshat in posuk. The full posuk is ?????? ?????? ???-????????? ???-?????? ????????? ??????????? ???????? ?????–????? ????.
I think pashut pshat is that the posuk is faulting the Jewish people for not serving Hashem when things were happy and good from the abundance of wealth. Meaning because we didn’t use the material wealth and happiness Hashem afforded us in order to ease our service of him, He will send us in Golus and ??????????? ???-????????? ?????? ?????????????? ?????? ?????, ???????? ????????? ?????????? ????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????? ???-?????????? ??? ??????????? ??????.
benignumanParticipantThe statement comes, I believe, from R’Nachman of Breslov. The best source for such a concept, I believe, is ??????? ??? ??????? ??????????? in Tehillim. Since one is supposed to live their life as an Eved Hashem, and that Avoda is supposed to be B’Simcha, you must be B’Simcha at all times. However, I don’t think that the posuk is saying that all avoda at all time must be b’simcha and I don’t that R’Nachman meant the statement literally either.
benignumanParticipantI think DaasYochid is right.
The Mishna quoted on 17b says ?? ????? ????? (plural). But the Gemara goes on to discuss ????? ?????? (singular). The Ri is understanding the Mishna to be saying do not give it back to his children (plural) because one of the children is ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????. The other (living) brother, however, might be ????? ?????? ??????.
This is somewhat dochek however because the Mishna implies that both brothers were m’gayer with the father. On the other hand, this dochek should not hold us back because anyway the Gemara’s answer requires this dochek because even ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????? cannot be said to be literally ?? ???????? ???? ???.
benignumanParticipantOr “code.”
benignumanParticipantRabbiofberlin,
I went through the teshuvah of the Bais Din that was “mevatel” Rabbi Druckman’s conversions (I think it was posted in another thread, DY?) and they didn’t say that it was because there was no kabolas mitzvos, or because they knew that the individuals weren’t sincere (that would be devarim sh’b’lev). Their reasoning was that there was no kosher Bais Din at the geirus.
benignumanParticipantCharliehall and PAA,
Rabbi Broyde does not dispute that his sources are not the dominant thread in the halacha. His article was a limud z’chus but there is no debate that most major Rishonim and Acharonim hold that there is an unchanging requirement for a married woman to cover, at least, some of her hair and according to many it is d’oraisa.
benignumanParticipantSam2,
Not quite. I remember a case (some friends of mine went to the wedding) where Chacham Ovadia allowed it. The boy, a mamzer, married a previously non-Jewish girl who had been looking to convert. She agreed to become a shifcha to marry him with Chacham Ovadiah’s permission. With the obvious plan of freeing the children when they grew up.
benignumanParticipantThe pashtus is that the din that a married woman must cover her hair is not because of erva, and it is specific to a married woman outside of her home (learned out from Sotah).
There is a separate halacha that hair is erva, meaning that it can provoke hirhur and saying kriya shema in front of it would be a problem.
Why then are people not makpid to avoid davening in front of single girls’ hair? According to the Aruch HaShulchan and R’Moshe Feinstein, when the Gemara in Berachos says “the hair of a woman is erva” that means that “the hair of a woman could be erva.” Meaning, the Gemara had just said tefach b’isha (in areas normally covered) is erva. I might have thought that this only applied to actual skin, k’mashma lan that it applies to hair (and singing) as well.
But this halacha of erva only applies to areas that are normally covered. So in a society where single girls do not cover their hair, their hair will not especially cause hirhur and will not be erva. But married women are required to cover their hair whether or not it has the status of erva.
benignumanParticipantIt could be that the followers of the Tznius avodah zara are misunderstanding the posuk of a HaTznei Holeches im Hashem Elokecha. HaTznei is an adjective not a proper noun!
July 14, 2014 7:32 pm at 7:32 pm in reply to: Why Can't Women Get Modern Smicha and Become Rabbis? #1071653benignumanParticipantPAA,
Understood, but it is important to clarify that there is a difference between Horaah and Dayanus. The Tosafos in Niddah and Midrash (absent the explanation of the Asei Lecha Rav) holds that there can even be Dayanus but most sources are only allowing Horaah.
I don’t know of any source that says that a woman can’t be a morah horaah.
BTW I don’t buy your argument vis-a-vis the Tosafos in Yevamos. If that Tosafos held that a woman could be a dayan, it would have answered that for Devorah because it is the simplest teretz.
July 14, 2014 4:12 pm at 4:12 pm in reply to: Why Can't Women Get Modern Smicha and Become Rabbis? #1071648benignumanParticipantPAA,
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 7:3) writes: ??? ????? ????
It is one thing to follow the first answer in Tosafos when there is only one Tosafos on the subject, but here there are many. Tosafos in Yevamos 45b, says ???? ???? ????? ????.
Tosafos in Shavuos 29b also says that a woman cannot be a judge and both of these Tosafos give a different “first” answer regarding Devorah.
Note, however, that this is only regarding dayanus, where certainly the weight of Halachic authority is that a woman is inelligble. ????? is a different matter (which is why I started this thread in the first place).
benignumanParticipantMark Levin,
I wasn’t referring to the most recent immigration flare up but Obama’s track record over the first 5 plus years of his administration.
After looking into your claim that the Obama administration numbers are inflated, I have to conclude that you are right. I take back what I wrote and apologize for unintentionally misleading anyone.
benignumanParticipantDY,
The “lo sikrivu” forbids only negiah derech chiba, the additional strictures the Shulchan Aruch lists are additional gezeiros that Chazal enacted. B’pashtus the “m’od, m’od” is a introduction to/description of what Chazal did, not an additional statement on top of the list that the Shulchan Aruch is about to list.
benignumanParticipant“one who thinks he has a moral standard higher than Chazal, I think, is an apikores.”
I think this is confusing being wrong with being an apikores.
benignumanParticipantObama has also deported far more illegal aliens than any previous administration. Obama’s policy of deporting them as soon as they commit a crime has been much more efficient than previous approaches and it focuses on those that are a higher priority to deport.
benignumanParticipantOld man,
I like this version of your theory as well. I was just positing that Rabbeinu Yerucham might be the reason the minhag eventually settled on 3.
July 13, 2014 11:20 pm at 11:20 pm in reply to: To: benignuman Re: Extrajudicial death penalty in halacha #1023379benignumanParticipantPBA,
I am saying that it would cause a Chillul Hashem, in sense that the world would say the opposite of ??? ????? ???????? ??????? ????????? ??????, but that isn’t the reason that executing would be assur.
The reason executing would be assur is because there is no Sanhedrin sitting in the lishkas hagazis, and the potential exception of Chillul Hashem certainly doesn’t apply.
If I could edit it, I would go back and insert the words “if anything” (offset by commas) before the words “would cause” in the last sentence of that post.
July 13, 2014 11:04 pm at 11:04 pm in reply to: To: benignuman Re: Extrajudicial death penalty in halacha #1023378benignumanParticipantThe Big One,
1. I don’t know, but it is not my place, or yours (unless you have given him a farher), to presume that he is not. I know nothing about the Rabbi mentioned in the article other than that he is a well known posek and Rosh Yeshiva in the Mizrachi community.
2. You are missing my role in the two positions. With respect to the Jewish murderers I was not giving my own opinion, I was explaining a possible basis for someone else’s opinion. With respect to the Arab murderers I was giving my own opinion. If in fact the Israeli government follows the recommendation of Rabbi Levanon, I would hope they would execute the Arab murderers too.
3. I am going to intersperse my responses. You wrote: “Just as you indicated the punishment could be applied even where it didn’t meet all the technical legal requirements for its implementation, the same principles applies in the crime I used as an example.”
That is just it, the same principles, as I explained above, do not apply to the crime you used as an example.
“I submit, perhaps subconsciously perhaps not, it is due to the current secular societal environmental views of how good or bad each of these two sins are, that leads you to these two different conclusions.”
There is nothing subconscious here. The way the Gentiles will judge us, or not judge us, is a factor in the Chillul Hashem that allows for such executions outside of normal halacha.
“As far as it being a c”H to punish those committing that crime, that is clearly not the case. It cannot be a c”H to enforce Torah Law just because secular society considers it to be a mitzvah something the Torah considers to be of the worst (and a capital) aveiras.”
You are ignoring the fact that Torah forbids us from punishing those that commit that crime. There are two rare exceptions that allow a Jewish government to execute someone even though the Torah forbids it under normal circumstances: (a) Chillul Hashem where the Gentiles say that the Jews are gravely discriminating against non-Jews; and (b) where the leaders are afraid of an aveira getting out of hand and they seek to nip it in the bud by executing someone who committed the aveira in public.
The rationale I was providing in the case Jewish murderers was (a). In response to your question about mishkav zachor was explaining why I believed that neither rationale applied.
“As you well know, the crime I cited is now widespread, a condition traditionally cited in halacha justifying executing beyond the letter of the law.”
The justification is when there is a fear that it will soon be widespread, not that it is already widespread. Fakert, Chazal say that once murder became widespread the Sanhedrin left the lishkas hagazis so as not to have to execute people.
“Furthermore, executing the Jewish teenagers would also not stop murder yet you didn’t let that bother you in not citing that as a reason against executing them.”
Once again, the rationale I was providing in this case is not based on murder being widespread, or even the fear that it might become widespread, but rather to prevent the Chillul Hashem that would result from the Jewish murderers being let off lightly and to creat a Kiddush Hashem showing the world that we treat crimes against non-Jews with the greatest severity.
July 13, 2014 5:56 pm at 5:56 pm in reply to: To: benignuman Re: Extrajudicial death penalty in halacha #1023373benignumanParticipantThe Big One,
I don’t think you understood my point in the comments on that section. My point was not that it was my personal assessment that the Jewish murderers should be executed. Such a psak is way, way above my Torah knowledge and experience.
Rather my point was that people should not be quick to criticize the posek that did take that position because such a concept, of executing Jews for high-profile serious crimes against non-Jews, even when normal halacha would not allow such an execution is found in Chazal.
The case that I pointed to, was the Gemara in Yevamos 79a in which David HaMelech executed the children/grandchildren of Shaul HaMelech for Shaul’s crimes against the Givonim. This was done without eidim and hasra and, more strikingly, in violation of a mefurash pasuk that children cannot be killed for the crimes of their father. Still the Gemara says ???? ????? ???
??? ?? ????? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???????
Rashi says that the Chillul Hashem here is that if David does not punish the children of Shaul the nations of the world will criticize Klal Yisroel for not allowing the Givonim their justice.
This Gemara only provides support for such executions when the alternative is widespread, among the nations of the world, Chillul Hashem. Not for every Chillul Hashem. So yes, the fact that it is “news” informs this position and the fact that the Gentiles will perceive a lack of severe punishment as an indication that Jews discriminate severely against non-Jews.
I think that Israel should pass a law allowing for the death penalty for terrorism. If there is a way under the law on the books to execute the terrorists that murder the three Jewish boys, I would support that as well.
On your last question, are you referring to execution by a Bais Din or the death penalty in secular court? Bais Din cannot judge capital crimes in the absence of the lishkas hagazis and the Sanhedrin. So I would certainly not support such a position as it is in violation of the Torah.
If you are referring to the death penalty in secular court, I would not support that either because such executions would not work to stop mishkav zachor and because doing so would cause, not prevent, a worldwide Chillul Hashem.
benignumanParticipantHaLeivi,
What are you saying? The Sadducees denied the primacy of the Chazal and the Sanhedrin in transmitting Torah Sh’bal Peh. While that is not Conservative, it is apikorsus. Their psak was not valid before Bias HaAretz.
benignumanParticipantOld Man,
M’ikar hadin Ashkenazi Jews only wait an hour (or less). Keeping 6 hours, for Ashkenazim, is a chumra. If it became very inconvenient to keep 6 hours and they wanted to change the minhag, isn’t it reasonable that they would pick 3 hours because of the source in Rabbeinu Yerucham?
In other words, even if Rabbeinu Yerucham is a typo (which I am not convinced of), he could still be the source of the 3 hour minhag.
Alternatively, keeping 6 hours was never an “entrenched minhag” in Germany. They may have kept one hour (or less). Faced with the adoption of 6 hours my other Ashkenazi communities they may have compromised and created 3 hours, once again basing themselves on Rabbeinu Yerucham.
benignumanParticipantYour best bet is to go to Passaic,Brooklyn, or one of the Monsey area communities.
White Plains has a few Yeshivish families and a Yeshivish Rav. Mt. Kisco has an Oberlander shtetl.
benignumanParticipantGetting Angry.
Acupuncture.
The top of the “King” chess piece.
benignumanParticipantnotasheep,
I don’t have access to the book at this time but if I remember correctly (I read the book many years ago) the only source was discussing garments so thin such that they are see through. In such a case the Gemara in Berachos (25b) applies: ????? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ?????.
While many nylon stockings are see through and would be problematic, this should not apply to pants.
benignumanParticipantPeople daven at different paces and some people can speak faster than others. Just because you can’t say something fast doesn’t mean that other people cannot.
benignumanParticipantI have not read through every post in the thread. Has anyone posted a source for the proposition that being able to tell the form of legs is problematic?
benignumanParticipantThis all depends on whether one views the examples of Daas Yehudis mentioned in the Mishna as fixed or as something that can change depending on the tznius standard of frum women in each time and place.
If they are fixed, then Reb Moshe’s disagreement with the Chasam Sofer is limited to what Reb Moshe was specifically mattir. If, however, Daas Yehudis is different depending on the time and place, then once one argues on the Chasam Sofer (who held that every hair must be covered) there is no limiting principle beyond substantial coverage and the norms of the community.
benignumanParticipantNo, you see a nuanced answer being expressed in different ways by different people.
Nisht, I always thought “cruelty” was the best translation of achzorius. Do you have another, better, translation in mind?
benignumanParticipantI am pretty sure that there was another thread on this topic where the sources were discussed.
In short (no pun intended), covering until the knee is a gemara in Brochos and is required regardless of what people do (although a poster last time disputed this). Wearing pants or tights above the knee (and not covering it with a skirt) is a matter of Das Yehudis. This means the tznius standards of the frum women in your community.
benignumanParticipantSam2,
Interesting. When I asked a shaila about this it was a (potentially) very b’dieved situation. I still got the impression, however, that m’ikar hadin it was fine. But that could just be an impression.
My main point however, is that even those that don’t allow it, i.e. the Behag, aren’t arguing on the Gemara. Rather they are understanding the Gemara differently than Rashi (and other Rishonim). The Gemara doesn’t say explicitly that women can be motzie men, it only says that women are obligated in megillah.
benignumanParticipantCharliehall,
I was under the impression, having once asked this as a practical shailia, that the accepted psak is that a woman can lain megillah for a man. That it is normally avoided is a chumrah which is choshesh that a woman only has a chiyuv shmia and not kriah and therefore can only be yotzie a man’s chiyuv shmia and not his chiyuv kriah.
In other words everyone holds that woman can be motzie a man in megillah, the issue is only whether or not it is ideal.
benignumanParticipantcharliehall,
I don’t know of any case where we go against an unopposed Bavli other than situations where we say “circumstances have changed” or “horaas sha.”
benignumanParticipant“Pick something you enjoy and figure out how to make a profit at it.”
That’s nice if you are single and don’t have serious financial responsibilities. Many people need to do what is necessary to support their families whether they enjoy it or not.
benignumanParticipantDon’t listen to Veltz, he is trolling and casting aspersions on fine noble advocates of the legal profession.
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