Forum Replies Created
-
Posts
-
You can, however, see things in the parsha that support positions you already hold (and dismiss the things that are contrary to your positions).
Haha
jewishfeminist,
ASPCA provides food and shelter for strays for a week or two and then, if nobody adopts them, the ASPCA kills the dogs.
I should also point out that the Torah forbids neutering a pet (or any other animal).
PBA is trolling. Obama did not go to Harvard Law School at 9 years old.
Benjamin Harrison is the last President to sport a beard.
writersoul,
Whoops. I should have read more carefully.
The ASPCA are hypocrites.
They ask you to bring in stray dogs so they don’t die on the street. Instead half of them are killed by the ASPCA itself.
I think given the choice of living on the streets or dieing in a shelter, most dogs would choose the former.
writersoul,
I probably shouldn’t speak for oomis, but McKinley was widely viewed as a mensch. He was devoted to his wife even though she was sickly and needy. He was a moderate man who steered the country successfully through a booming economy and war. He probably would have been viewed as a much greater President if not for the incredible Teddy Roosevelt succeeding him.
charliehall,
FDR was the Commander in Chief, he certainly could have ordered Eisenhower to bomb the railways to Auschwitz and other camps.
FDR also refused to meet with the Rabbis that marched on Washington to request the US create a task force to rescue the remaining Jews in Europe.
yytz,
Bestiality can be consensual too. In fact it can be initiated by the animal (there is a Gemara in Kesubos that describes such an occurence and my understanding is that this is not uncommon [relatively speaking of course]).
That being said, I can see a distinction between the two. However, I do not believe that distinction (the greater potential for abuse) is the reason why we treat the two differently. The real reason is that we find it perverse, disgusting and morally deplorable.
Biology,
I think so, yes. But I haven’t had time to look up the Ran yet.
Nobody knows what causes homosexuality.
The following is a quote from the American Psychological Association on the topic:
“There is no consensus among scientists about the exact reasons that an individual develops a heterosexual, bisexual, gay, or lesbian orientation. Although much research has examined the possible genetic, hormonal, developmental, social, and cultural influences on sexual orientation, no findings have emerged that permit scientists to conclude that sexual orientation is determined by any particular factor or factors. Many think that nature and nurture both play complex roles; most people experience little or no sense of choice about their sexual orientation.”
“Research over several decades has demonstrated that sexual orientation ranges along a continuum.”
There is a myth out there that science has demonstrated homosexuality to be “genetic” or biologically “hardwired” and that orientation is like a switch either on or off. Neither are true.
I agree that Kennedy is very vague in Windsor. But leaving Windsor aside, he did categorize the issue as being about moral disapproval in Lawrence:
“For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”
Kennedy also expressly adopted the following statement originaly written by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Bowers: “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”
Lawrence overturned Bowers on exactly those grounds. Bowers held that moral disapproval was a valid basis for a law restricting liberty and the Lawrence held it was not a valid basis.
Under Lawrence bestiality laws should be unconstitutional.
yytz,
The Court in Romer, Lawrence and Windsor never described itself as using strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny. They are all rational basis cases. Windsor didn’t explain that it was applying heightened scrutiny, because it wasn’t. I would guess that Kennedy was leaving himself an opening (by not declaring it a fundamental right or homosexuals a protected group) to leave the decision up to the States in a future case (hence the federalism dicta).
My broad description of these cases actually comes from an interview with Justice Kagan who explained them as being based on this idea that moral disapproval or animus cannot be the primary basis of legislation.
Left unsaid, but I think obvious, is that the legislation would only be problematic if it infringed on somebody’s rights. But those rights need not be “fundamental” (in the classical sense) and, therefore, almost all prohibitions qualify.
“Unpopular group” has not been a legal designation under the Court’s precedents. Anyhow, it is hard to imagine a more unpopular group that practioners of bestiality.
Agav, Windsor is really a 5th Amendment Due Process case, applying the “equal protection aspects” of that clause.
Teddy Roosevelt. Read “The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt” and its sequel “Theodore Rex” to find out why.
Incredible man.
yytz,
Although the Supreme Court normally uses the rational basis/intermediate/strict scrutiny framework it has not done so in Lawrence and Windsor. It has never held that homosexuals are protected group warranting special protection and it has never held that sodomy was a fundamental right. Rather Justice Kennedy has eschewed the normal framework for an inquiry focused on the motivation behind the law. If that motivation is soley or even primarily moral disapproval or animus then the law is invalid.
Alternatively put, moral disapproval is deemed by the Court not to be a “rational basis” and if that is the primary basis, the motivating factor, of a law that restricts people’s freedom then that law would be unconstitutional.
It is true that most prohibition express some moral disapproval, but those prohibitions will primarily motivated by other grounds, i.e. to prevent some harm that will come to someone or to create some efficiency.
Sam2 and HaLeivi,
A more modern version of this machlokes (on the very extremes) is between the Malbim and the Doros HaRishonim.
I think that the truth lies somewhere in between. One can go through Shas and find instances that support one side or the other. The most likely conclusion is that both are true.
There are times where the Mishna says a stam halacha and the Amoraim argue about the makor (with nafka minas) but there is no machlokes about the stam din in the Mishna. There are further times were the “proto-mishna” says a stam din and later Tannaim argue about its application/meaning/makor. I think that in those instances it is clear that there is a mesorah as to the din and the machlokes is where that din can be derived in the Torah ShebiKsav.
In other cases it seems pretty clear that the Tannaim and Amoraim are deriving new dinnim or arguing on previously held shittos on the basis of drashos.
Yitay,
I used that example because it is one of the examples of a pirush that is halacha l’Moshe miSinai used in the Rambam in his hakdoma to Pirush HaMishnayos.
I personally think that although it is not explicit, it is implied from the Gemara (which is trying to explain a makor for the stam din in a Mishna) that this was a tradition and that if there is a the machlokes is where the smach to this tradition is in Torah (which is why everyone agrees that it means money despite not agreeing on a makor in the posuk).
It is possible that someone might disagree with the Rambam as to the status of this din, and rather holds it was derived in an honest attempt to derive the meaning of the Torah. I don’t think that would be apikorsus. But saying that the Torah was meant literally and the Sages changed the law because they didn’t like it and then lied and said it was what the Torah really meant, is apikorsus.
yytz,
Just saying something is absurd without explaining why is conclusory and pointless.
The only mildly valid (relevant) distinction I have ever heard is animal cruelty (as if hunting for sport was fun and games for the animals). While that distinction holds up in some cases, it doesn’t hold up in the cases I mentioned above. Which is why far left “moral philosophers” like Peter Singer have said that bestiality is morally sound in those cases.
Peter Singer is merely being consistent and willing to admit that bestiality does not always harm the animals involved.
I agree that comparing the two sounds absurd but that is only because people are comparing them on a macro level (the same way they used to compared heterosexual relationships to homosexuality). If one drills down to the legal basis for the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lawrence and Windsor, the distinction shrinks away.
I don’t think these rulings will lead to bestiality becoming legal (because, boruch Hashem, there are very few practitioners), but if we take take the position that moral disapproval cannot serve as the basis for laws, then outlawing all forms of bestiality is hypocritical.
GAW,
Is there really animal cruelty in all bestiality situations? What if the animal is during heat? What if it is a male animal that is advancing on a femal human (this has happened with baboons)?
There are plenty of situations where there would be no cruelty, but it is still illegal and taboo in our society.
heretohelp,
You wrote: “Only if A and B are similar. Nobody reasonable thinks that marrying a dog is similar to marrying a person, even if the person is a toievanik.”
The issue is not whether A and B are similar in an absolute, compare every aspect sense. The issue is whether they are similar in the important sense used as a basis for arguing the acceptance of A in the first place.
The Supreme Court struck down anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas because such laws were based primarily on moral disapproval, and moral disapproval, where there is no actual injury to society, is not sufficient basis for telling someone they cannot do something they wish to do.
In that sense, which is the important sense in this case, sodomy and bestiality are very similar.
heretohelp,
It depends on how you use the “slipperly slope” argument. Arguing because we allowed A we will allow B is unconvincing.
Arguing that just as you agree we can prohibit B, we can also prohibit A is a convincing argument.
If, as the Supreme Court held, moral disapproval is not a valid basis for prohibiting something, then it is very hard to justify why bestiality, poygamy and incest (where both parties are adults) can be prohibited. The other reasons given for prohibiting those acts, like those regarding mishkav zachor, do not hold up to an serious scrutiny.
Sam2,
I agree. I used that example because it would be valid according to everyone.
Biology,
In answer to your first question. If the person admits that a takanos Chazal are binding but argues that he/she will not do it because he/she finds it offensive. That would not be apikorsus or meenus.
I have never heard of the Ran you are referring to so I cannot really comment. But it is true that the Rambam clearly holds that bizui Talmidei Chachamim is not apikorsus.
I also don’t know if bizui talmidei chachamim is limited to living talmidei chachamim or includes the non-living as well. I would have a hard time imagining imagining that not listening to talmidei chachamim, in and of itself, would constitute bizui.
Sam2 and Yitay,
The example I gave would be apikorsus even according to the Rambam. It is in the category of Pirush that is Halacha L’Moshe MiSinai, like pri etz hadar being an Esrog.
In other words, Chazal are saying that “eye for an eye” always meant money, it was never meant, or practiced, literally. To say Chazal were lying, and they didn’t really get it from Moshe mipi HaGevurah but instead made it up, is to deny the Torah Sh’bal Peh as being min hashamayim.
“Because marriage is an equal partnership.”
So the issue with man-dog is that it doesn’t meet the traditional definition of marriage?
Why are you so limiting the definition? I would define marriage as a person committing to a loving relationship with a being he loves.
Frankly, from what I have seen when bestiality, incest and polygamy are brought up, the pro-gay-marriage position has been to get huffy and offended that you would compare them to these obviously perverse and problematic relationships.
Biology, I posted an answer that never went through.
Denial of the validity of Torah Sh’Bal Peh is apikorsus. So if someone says, chas v’shalom, that really “an eye for an eye” was literal and Chazal lied and pretended that it means money. That is apikorsus (or meenus).
Criticism of Chazal’s gezeiros and takanos, even attributing to them biases is not apikorsus because it does not deny that those geizeros or takanos are binding. Such criticism does not deny the validity of Torah Sh’Bal Peh.
Biology,
That is not apikorsus. It’s is idiotic and halachically problematic but not apikorsus.
I should point out that the answers on that website are coming from Rabbi Abadi’s sons. Except where they specifically write “I asked my father” you cannot necessarily trust that Rabbi Abadi holds that way as well.
I recall when the “bugs in NY water” issue arose, one of the sons said it wasn’t a problem and then the other son asked Rabbi Abadi and Rabbi Abadi wrote a teshuva saying it was a problem.
Rabbi Abadi’s distinction is between cheeses that have some kind of rennet (even non-animal rennet) and those that do not. Cheeses that require rennet were subject to the Gezeira and cheeses that do not require rennet were not subject to the Gezeira.
Rav Moshe holds like this as well and I believe (but would like confirmation) this is the shita followed by the OU.
I believe Rabbi Abadi used to be machmir and held that all cheeses were subject to the gezeira of gevinas akum and he only recently (past 8 years or so) changed his mind and to hold like Rav Moshe.
dafbiyun,
We teach children not to use some words, not because the words are themselves vulgar but because children will use them in an improper context. I did not hear the shiur you are discussing, but I have listened to shiurim on hilchos nidda before. Where the crowd is not knowledgeable enough to understand the Talmudic terms (and especially out of town) the Rabbi will use the correct English terms even though a child using the same terms would have had his mouth washed out with soap in our schools
No that does not make him an apikorus.
Health,
You appear to be mixing up two of the Supreme Court cases decided yesterday (not that this is the only problem with what you have written).
The DOMA case was about a federal law that defines marriage for all federal purposes as being between one man and one woman. The Court held this unconstitutional as a deprivation of the rights of those who want to marry someone of the same gender. This was a substantive ruling.
The Prop 8 cases was about the California referendum that outlawed same-gender marriage that was deemed unconsitutional by the District Court. The Supreme Court held that the party appealing the decision (people who organized to get Prop 8 passed) did not have standing to appeal because they were not personally injured by the District Court’s ruling. This was a procedural ruling.
rebdoniel,
When poskim “bend over backwards” there still has to be a rational basis in halacha. A posek can’t just make a up something to be matir a mamzer. For Rabbi Goren to have done what he did, at the very least he must have held that a later Bais Din is capable of declaring that a previous Bais Din had not properly performed the conversion and therefore the person was never megayer.
Now it is possible that a later B”D is capable of “passuling” an earlier B”D, but that this power is only used in rare and extreme ciumstances, and Rabbi Goren held that the Langer case was such a circumstance. But at the very least that power must exist.
rationalfrummie,
Racial segregration and gender segregration are different. the Supreme Court has recognized that there are valid reasons to segregrate the genders (otherwise we would have to have unisex bathrooms!). Furthermore there is a difference between laws requiring the segregation and private businesses doing it voluntarily because their clientele, from both genders, prefer it that way.
That some communities have stricter mores on interactions between genders is hardly surprising. There is a very good chance that a Clinic in New Square that had separate entrances and separate hours for men and women would be held legal.
kfb,
While children is one purpose of marriage it is not the sole purpose of marriage. We allow, and encourage, marriage for people incapable of having children.
cherrybim,
I don’t know what language you are referring to, but if you learn those sugyos in Nidda with an Artscroll gemara you will see that it uses the proper, precise and technical terms that if used in ordinary conversation would be considered “prost.”
There are some parts of Nidda that simply can’t be understood without getting into the nitty-gritty of female anatomy.
writersoul,
I wrote that not Sam2 (unless he wrote it too).
It is a common, when one is trying to convince someone else to take a particular course of conduct, to speak in exaggerated or absolute terms even though it is not literally true as such. Maybe you don’t do this (although watch what you say for a week and see) but the vast, vast majority of the population does. Chazal did it too.
Rabbi Altusky wasn’t lying. He truly believed that for this young man, at his stage in life, college would be bad. Rabbi Altusky presumably believed that he was guiding this young man rightly.
Rabbis, Chazal and people in general speak in absolutes all the time without meaning it literally. The problem is that a small subset of the population is overly literal and misses it.
ROB,
Either a later Bais Din can passul an earlier Bais Din that performed a conversion or it cannot. If, as a rule, a later Bais Din cannot passul the earlier Bais Din, then what Rabbi Goren did was invalid, regardless of his sympathetic motives.
If one agrees that a later Bais Din can passul an earlier Bais that performed a conversion, then whether Rabbi Sherman is right depends on the facts regarding the conduct of the earlier Bais Din, not on a halachic rule.
Reb Moshe, as were many other poskim throughout the ages, was often maikil to be declare that someone was not a mamzer. But being maikel does not mean being “outlandish” or foregoing halacha, chas v’shalom. Being maikel means relying on a shita or a svara, that is valid but that one would not rely on under ordinary circumstances.
writersoul,
I didn’t ask that specific question. It seems obvious to me that every Kohen would have the Levi gene, but a Levi would not have the Kohen gene because it is a later occuring mutation. The mutation started with Aharon HaKohen. Leviim are not patrilineal descendants of Aharon.
rabbiofberlin,
The issue of disqualifying another Bais Din and thereby disqualifying that other Bais Din’s psak, is not a sugya I have ever looked into. I would have to take substantial time to learn up the sugya to have an opinion. I just don’t know.
writersoul,
I once asked a geneticist I know about this (who is himself a Levi). The Kohen gene is a unique marker that is theorized to have began with Aharon HaKohen (some 80% of Kohanim have it). The geneticist told me that that there is a Levi gene as well, however only about 50% of Leviim have it (which is why it is trumpeted like the kohen gene is). The geneticist refuses to get tested himself because he wants to be able to rely on his chazaka.
The geneticist speculated that more people falsely claimed to be Leviim because there weren’t any ramifications beyond getting aliyos.
Sam2,
I wasn’t saying the study didn’t make sense. I was saying that the article that hypothesized that the “four women” in the study were the Imahos, doesn’t make sense because the “four women” in the study lived in the times of the Mishna not the times of the Avos.
Summa and PBA,
I went through Rav Sherman’s opinion quickly in between mincha and maariv. I will re-read it later but it seems to me that he is not disagreeing with what I wrote above.
Rav Sherman writes quite clearly that if a Ger is properly mekabel mitzvos before a competetent Bais Din he is Jewish and later conduct against Torah and mitzvos in no way invalidates his geirus, even if he says he never really meant the kabala.
Rav Sherman is arguing, however, that there was no kabalas mitzvos before a competent Bais Din, because the Bais Din that oversaw the geirus didn’t do its job trying to determine whether there was proper kabalos mitzvos. It was kabalos mitzvos before an improper, incompetent Bais Din. Rav Sherman is discounting the geirus on the same sort of grounds we discount Conservative geirus.
PBA,
That isn’t proper usage of the “present sense impression” exception (or maybe I am missing the joke).
Thanks, I found it.
Yes. I did. Did Rabbi Sherman write up a teshuva with sources?
Yekke2,
It is a substantial leap to the say the same thing by arayos. Kiddushin is not something that occurs naturally. It is a chiddush in the form of a chalos created by people. Before ??? ???? there was no musag of such a chalos and therefore someone trying to be mekadesh a woman would be like someone today trying to be mekadesh a chair.
Ma shein kein by arayos, where we are dealing with mitzius. Furthermore, today there is still no arayos for non-Jews to their half-sisters from their father, but the Torah still refers to a relationship between non-Jewish fathers and their children (e.g., Balak ben Tzipor, Bladdan ben Bladdan).
Summa,
Outside of the scenarios I outlined in my previous post, correct.
Summa,
I think we have had this conversation before. If it was clear (to someone who knew all the facts) AT THE TIME of the geirus that the priest was insincere, or if the priest had told someone what he was planning on doing, then maybe the kabbala would be invalid. Otherwise it would be a good geirus that the “priest” would have to “live” with in the next world.
Simply saying I am incorrect without providing a source, is close to pointless.
HakunaMatada,
I have been through various secondary sources (i.e. Shailos V’Teshuvos) on this sugya. I will freely admit that I did not learn up the mekoros in Shas. I have not seen any posek (other than R’Shlomo Goren, who did so to be mattir mamzeirim) that was mevatel geirus (in theory or in practice) performed on the auspices of a competent Talmud Chacham on the basis of after-the-fact conduct.
Yekke2,
That the arayos before the Torah were only maternal is because the arayos of the Sheva Mitzvos (which certainly applied before Mattan Torah) are only maternal. It doesn’t answer the kasha of the Shevatim keeping the Torah before Matan Torah.
As an aside what is the mekor in Chazal that the shevatim kept the Torah. The mekor that I know of says that Avraham Avinu kept the Torah, it doesn’t say anything about the Shevatim.
I once heard a pshat that before Matan Torah Avraham Avinu and his descendants kept the Mitzvo Essai but not the Mitzvos Lo Sassei. Before Matan Torah the Ivrim had the status of ayno metzuveh v’oseh and we don’t find the concept of an ayno metzuveh v’oseh for a lo sassei.
Sam2,
The umdana has to have been evident at the time of the kabbola. It doesn’t work retroactively. Anything after the person comes out of the mikva is irrelevant, even if it is only 3 days.
If he had told his friends, before the kabala, that they were going to go out that night to Chipotle, that would be an umdina d’muchach.
Yekke2,
It’s not that Daas is not important, it is that we recognize the Daas he speaks out loud, not the purported Daas he has in his heart. The concept of dvarim sh’blev aynam dvarim always comes up with things that require Daas (like a kinyan), and af al pi ken, dvarim sh’blev aynam dvarim.
Those that claim you can retoractively annul geirus (not that I think this is correct) would probably argue that it is gilui milsa b’alma. What the Rambam is talking about is when the person has a genuine change of heart, not where he is suspecting of never being sincere in the first place.