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gavra_at_work,
I’m bringing up a Fedora because of the claim that it is the “Mesorah” to wear one, over other types of hats that Jews wore over the ages (yes, including those that the Goyim made us wear).
Maybe hakohen53’s post was edited before I read it, but I did not see where he claimed that there was a mesora for wearing a fedora, or any specific style or color. He just said a hat. The first mention of a fedora in this thread that I read was DaMoshe’s, and the second was yours.
old man,
If a black hat and dark jacket are respectful, and possibly the only respectful clothing for men, is it also necessary to any extent that these garments be clean?
Absolutely. I don’t think anyone here is arguing that there is no requirement to dress nicely for davening, which would obviously mean dressing cleanly. The argument is a halachic/cultural one over what specific clothing fulfills the requirement.
Some seem to interpret the halacha to dress nicely as meaning whatever the surrounding culture deems formal and nice. Therefore, since hats are largely out of style in the U.S., and a jacket and tie are considered formal (and in some places, it’s ok to even go without the jacket, or the tie!), they believe a hat is not required for davening.
Others seem to interpret the halacha to dress nicely as meaning whatever the surrounding Jewish community deems formal and nice. Therefore, since some communities consider hats and jackets to be formal attire, they believe a hat and jacket are required for davening in that community.
If the parents say they will give it back to the child, then they must do so. I don’t understand why there is any uncertainty about this.
zahavasdad,
The issue isnt bussing, its seperate busing which costs extra because many times the same buses have to do almost the same route at least twice one for the boys and one for the girls.
I would imagine that the impacts of separate busing could be mostly ameliorated by combining grades/schools on routes.
A loosely related question:
Is it possible for an action to be potentially defensible on halachic grounds, yet still immoral?
Sam2 and ubiquitin,
Ok. Thanks again for the discussion.
gavra_at_work,
Just like there is “no taxation without representation”, there should be “no representation without taxation “.
I know you wrote this 3+ years ago, but you do know that property and income taxes are not the only taxes that exist, right? Even poor people pay sales and utility taxes.
Sam2,
Avram: I’m sorry that the Shittah of many Rishonim and Achronim “bothers” you.
I will admit that I do not fully understand the shittos you are referring to or the reasoning that underpins them, but that’s not what bothers me. What bothers me is the use of these shittos to defend the cultural environment in which we find ourselves. I highly doubt that those shittos were intended to kasher the fact that almost 75% of abortions in the U.S. are done because of financial concerns or concerns about disruptions to life/career/etc.
Sam2,
Hence, it’s just Nezek to abort.
What really bothers me in this sentence is the word “just.”
ubiquitin,
IT is like her foot
I am saying that abortion in society’s view (which is not immoral or unreasonable)
These words are saddening to me.
Everyone,
I really appreciate this discussion, but have to confess that it’s rapidly going beyond my realm of knowledge (if it hasn’t already since the beginning of the thread). I would also like to mention at this point that I didn’t articulate what bothered me in my original story very well.
No, I do not think it is ok to perform tests that wouldn’t change the prenatal care or actions at birth, but are intended solely to determine whether the baby was wanted or not. But upon reflection, we’ve had other care providers offer the same testing, with no mention of abortion whatsoever. And we’ve just said no thank you, and I didn’t feel bothered. More so, it was the ease and quickness in which abortion was mentioned, like it was no big deal, and what any “sane” person would surely want to do. It was, as I mentioned above, the cultural mindset that bothered me.
So the point is taken that I can probably be more open minded about the morality of abortion for potential problems (though I’m extremely uncomfortable with the idea on an intellectual and emotional level), but I still think the doctor’s benevolent intentions were coming from a very wrong place.
ubiquitin,
But I was always under the impression that purposly being chovel oneself for no reason is against Halacha . I dont see where Sam2 said any different, all I see is that it is not immoral. but may still be against halacha (As to whether the 2 are synonyms, is the discussion on another thread).
Halacha informing the morality of an event – regardless of the intentions of the event’s initiator – is the linchpin of his debate with me. E.g.,
[Sam2:] And the Halachic Tzdadim are important. Again, they might not prove the doctor’s intentions, but they should have strong bearing on the relative morality of the case.
gavra_at_work,
Can you define a “shor” rodef vs. an “adam” rodef?
Thanks!
ubiquitin,
Please note you havent answered my question Here it is again:
“why only after head comes out do we say “ain dochin nefesh” why wasnt the fetus a nefesh before head coming out?
What changed? “
Sorry, I thought that you had assumed in your question that since we don’t say ain dochin nefesh before the head emerges, then the infant is not a nefesh. I challenged that assumption as an answer to your question. To directly answer it, what changed is the baby’s viability. Once the head emerges, the infant can breathe on his/her own, whereas before that time, if the mother died, the infant most likely would too.
Yes because we are note allowed to dammage a body just for nothing. If a person is inconvenieced by his leg, he cant remove it.
Well, I’ll let you debate that with Sam2, because he does not hold that way. If I wanted to chop off one of my arms because I preferred having one instead of two, according to him I’m stupid but doing nothing immoral (i.e., against halacha).
Based on his argument thus far, I don’t think there can be any abortion whatsoever that can be challenged on halachic grounds, even up to full term (except perhaps for dina malchusa dina in states where late term abortion is prohibited).
there are many such shitas! For example say the mother’s life is endangered because of cancer nothing to do with the fetus. Delaying treatment would endager her life, but innitiating treatment would abort the fetus. Can the fetus be aborted, when it isnt being “rodef” the mother?
There are shitas (not all) that say yes.
Do the allowing opinions state explicity that the fetus is not a rodef in this case? It would seem to me that it could be, and perhaps that’s the reason for permitting the abortion.
bottom line is many shitas hold life begins at birth. Consider the fact that killing a fetus only results in finacial compensation to father, A pregnant woman is killed if chayiv misah even if her fetus is due today.
This argument does not convince me. If someone kills a neonate who is less than a day old (born at full term), or a premature baby younger than 30 days, the killer is not executed either (Rambam, Rotzeach u’Shimiras Nefesh 2:6). The reason is the viability of the newborn, not his/her personhood.
THis doe snot mean abortion on demand is halachicly sanctioned much as amputation on demand isnt halachicly sanctioned.
Our reasoning is quite different, but the conclusions perhaps not so much. Can we agree that the secular pro-choice “Abortion on Demand!” position is immoral?
Sam2,
Pshat in the Rambam is the exact opposite. The whole point is that a baby can never be a Rodef during labor because that’s Tivo Shel Olam and Ain Dochin Nefesh Bifnei Nefesh. Thus, before Hotzi Rosho, the fetus isn’t a Nefesh.
That is not necessarily so. The Rambam does not state that a partially born baby is no longer a rodef. How could it not be, the mother is still in danger! It makes even more sense to me that when the baby is partially born, the mother herself can attain the status of rodef with respect to the baby – and in this case where they are pursuing each other, we cannot choose one over the other.
Also, I am enjoying the discussion of these points, but I don’t feel that they are fundamentally relevant to my point, unless you can tell me that there is a valid halachic opinion today that holds we can abort a fetus when the fetus is not at all a rodef (and yes, I understand that there are opinions that set the bar for rodef with respect to a fetus lower than others). Because that’s what the pro-choice camp holds.
ubiquitin,
why only after head comes out do we say “ain dochin nefesh” why wasnt the fetus a nefesh before head coming out?
What changed?
The halacha does not state that the reason we can kill a fetus when the mother is endangered is because it is not a nefesh. Rather, it is a rodef. Once partial birth has commenced, perhaps we say ain dochin nefesh because the mother and infant are now both considered to be pursuing the other, and thus we cannot put more value on one than the other.
gavra_at_work,
Interesting theory and not implausible. I would expect there to be a source in Rishonim or Achronim as such (Rodef = person), and invite the Olam to help out with finding such a source.
I think in this case context is a better guide than a concordance. These halachos don’t happen in a vacuum, and all of the surrounding halachos are talking about human rodfim. If the fetus did not have at least some aspect of personhood, why would we need it to have the status of rodef at all?
gavra_at_work and Sam2,
As gavra_at_work mentioned earlier, here is the Rambam in Hilchos Rotzeach u’Shmiras Nefesh (1:9):
?? ?? ???? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?? ??? ?????. ????? ???? ????? ??????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????? ????? ??????. ??? ??? ??? ??? ???? ???? ????? ????? ??????. ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ???? ?? ????
1. The fact that the fetus can have the status of a rodef at all implies that it does have an aspect of personhood, if not perchance full status (e.g., in cases such as the halachos gavra_at_work quoted from Chovel u’Mazik, although perhaps it’s possible that the reason is that we’re not sure whether the baby will have been born viable at all?).
2. It would also seem to follow that if the fetus did not have the status of a rodef, it would be forbidden to kill it. I don’t think this point is disputed by any opinion.
3. As noted above in halacha 7, if it is possible to not kill the rodef to save the pursued, one should employ those means. Current medical technology makes this much more feasible than in previous centuries.
Sam2,
But I would never call it immoral to believe one can self-inflict pain. Stupid, but not immoral.
What would you call someone who stands aside while another hurts him/herself and does nothing?
Sam2,
Because we have other concerns like Chavalah.
What is Chavalah?
gavra_at_work,
I thought the argument against person-hood of a fetus was from the Din of Rodef, that we don’t say “Mai Chaziz” about the fetus and it’s mother at any stage, even though we would say it once “Hotze Rosho”.
That was my understanding as well.
The point I’m trying to make is that the secular threshold for abortion (if there is a threshold at all) is not a din of rodef. Therefore, I don’t think we should be using the halachic argument regarding fetal status with respect to the mother as a cover for the secular/pro-choice position. There may be overlap in some instances of real-world application, I grant that, but they are originating from two entirely different moral frameworks, so from that perspective I believe the overlap is coincidental.
It’s only bitul Torah if you’re the one in the accelerating spaceship, because when you return the ones learning on Earth would have had much more time to learn than you did since you left…
Sam2,
Avram in MD: As far as I know, very few states allow late-term abortion. It’s second trimester or earlier.
And the pro-choice lobby hates that to pieces.
Up until now you have been trying to get me to accept the validity of the pro-choice position via a halachic shitta that defines “personhood” at birth. So what is the purpose of the above statement in your argument?
And there are Poskim who are pretty Meikil about terminating a pregnancy. Not carte blanche, no. But there are Poskim who will allow it for relatively minor reasons.
I have a strong feeling that there are some important details omitted from that statement.
And the Halachic Tzdadim are important. Again, they might not prove the doctor’s intentions, but they should have strong bearing on the relative morality of the case.
Using the traffic light example from above again, if a person who believes they can run a red light whenever happens to run a red light on his way to the ER, the fact that his action is consistent with the shitta of Rav B is coincidental. It doesn’t magically turn his overall position on traffic lights into a defensible one.
popa_bar_abba,
I think it can be evil without being capital M “Murder”.
Exactly! Thank you.
Sam2,
Avram: There’s a reason I couched it in Halachic terms.
This doctor is not Jewish, and was not basing anything on halacha. I repeat my question from above: Is there any halachic shitta that states that we have carte blanche to do with a fetus whatever we want? If not, then what are you trying to prove to me through this discussion?
Post-birth abortion is murder.
But you wrote above: Just because we think we are right does not make someone with another opinion on it a murderer nor is there action evil. ?
But saying that Ubbar Yerech Imo Hu and that there might be situations where one can harm himself for his own good isn’t beyond the pale.
I’m not disputing that. If you read through my previous posts carefully, I do not believe that I used the term “murder”, nor have I stated what “my shitta” is.
And secular people who hold that the difference between personhood and not is birth certainly have a leg to stand on.
No they do not, because of key phrases of this “leg” that you are trying to give them: “situations” and “for his own good.” The secular world’s “shitta” does not contain these key conditions. Not at least the ones that exist in halacha. And that makes a world of difference!
Let me explain with a less emotionally charged issue. Suppose traffic lights were brought down in halachic discussions. Now, Rav A paskens that one may never run a red light. Rav B paskens that one may run a red light if rushing to the hospital during an emergency. The secular world, on the other hand, holds that one may run a red light whenever, for pretty much any reason. You cannot come and say that the secular world has a leg to stand on because of Rav B!
ubiquitin,
Interesting OP. These are some of my thoughts in no particular order.
1. Halacha seems to me to be a system of applied morality. Hashem created a universe with moral principles, some of which we understand, some we do not, and gave us the Torah as a means to apply those principles in our lives.
2. I disagree that “much of Yahdus has machlokisism involved”; I think that for the vast majority of halacha there is broad agreement, and the disagreements come over a small subset of finer points.
3. Even when given a machlokes, I see a big difference between machlokes and moral relativity. Ashenazim and Separdim wrap their tefillin differently, but both sides agree that tefillin should be worn, and that it consists of black boxes with pesukim inside, leather straps, etc. Nobody (frum at least) is coming along and saying, “we need new tefillin for the 21st Century!”
For context, the moderators closed a different thread (thank you coffee addict for providing the link) but implied that Sam2 and I could continue a tangential discussion that began towards the end of that thread.
I wrote,
How does the way the doctor characterizes the unborn baby change anything [i.e., my contention that abortion due to a potential problem detected by optional screening is wrong]?
Ubiquitin responded:
Um becasue this entire conversation is about the doctor’s intentions
No, I do not believe this entire conversation is about the doctor’s intentions. As I had already stated, I had no question that the doctor’s intentions were noble, intended to be helpful, and came from a good place. I had no quarrel with the doctor! Nor did my respect for the doctor diminish at all. My problem is with the cultural environment in which those actions can be defined as good things.
Sam2,
Do you not see any Tzad to be Mechalek between a fetus and a person.
So if we say that a fetus is not a “person”, does that give us carte blanche to do whatever we want with the fetus? Does any shitta hold that way? I think it is highly incorrect to map halachic concepts of a fetus onto the distinctions that the secular world draws. They are extremely different, and have different intents.
I find the whole secular distinction to be silly to begin with. Pick up any copy of What To Expect When You Are Expecting or Your Pregnancy Week By Week or the literature given out at an OB’s office and see what they call the fetus: your baby! This focus on exclusively calling the fetus a fetus (e.g., not a baby, not a person!) only crops up when discussing abortion. So when you peel away all of the disingenuous layers, the bald truth of the secular position is this: a fetus becomes a baby when the parents decide that they want it.
There are those who think that as long as it’s in the mother, it’s still Yerech Imo and can be excised if necessary like any other limb.
Define necessary in this case. I imagine it is quite different than what the secular culture holds.
Just because we think we are right does not make someone with another opinion on it a murderer nor is there action evil. We think it’s murder (maybe).
So it seems that you are arguing that there is no absolute good or absolute evil. It is all relative and based on cultural norms?
So if, G-d forbid, in 100 years people exclusively call a newborn younger than 1 month a neonate (don’t call it a baby or a person! Science has proven that there is no sentience by our futuristic definition of sentience!), and it was legal to kill a neonate if it wasn’t wanted or it was sick or deformed, would you then say that just because someone believes that they are not wrong because they have good intentions? They don’t have the Torah to guide them after all?
But do you really think that the Shittah that the determining factor between personhood and not is birth has no moral weight whatsoever?
It has weight, but it has not one iota of anything to do with the story I told.
Uh oh, I don’t want to be the one caught holding the bag when the thread closes. Quick! Someone else post something!
Sam2,
Avram: Only because you characterize terminating the pregnancy as “killing an unborn baby”. He clearly doesn’t.
How does the way the doctor characterizes the unborn baby change anything?
ubiquitin,
Regarding feivel’s strong language, I cannot speak for him, but I think his intention was this:
We are living in a world where secular ethics is increasingly diverging from Jewish values. In many circles, circumcision is already regarded as evil mutilation, and within a decade or two that position could be mainstream. As the Earth’s population continues growing, having large families may soon be regarded as selfish and wrong. Kosher slaughter is termed barbaric already throughout much of Europe. This is nothing new, but now these positions come armed with the chain-mail of “science” and the arrows of “research studies”, whether or not that is truly the case. And there is considerable pressure to conform to these secular “ethical values”, particularly among Jews, who have an innate spiritual desire to be perceived as morally good. I think feivel’s strong language is an attempt to counter this type pressure. It is not intended to demean doctors or medical professionals, but to strengthen our conviction that our beliefs are correct, even when faced with a doctor’s facepalm at our choices.
ubiquitin,
Yes
I cannot see how that can be so in a monotheistic framework.
Of course! Though that isnt what we are discussing
It may not be what you are discussing, but it is what feivel et al. are discussing. That’s my entire point.
Fair enough, but Good intentions are deffinitly not relaterd to evil intentions
Never said they were.
A personal example: when my wife and I were expecting our first, we went to a doctor for our prenatal appointments. At one very early appointment, the doctor offered some screening that would potentially detect issues, so we could (in the doctor’s words) “decide whether we wanted to continue with the pregnancy.” Now, I fully 100% believe that the doctor is a good person, and had the purely good intentions of giving us the ability to avoid potential anguish and suffering. We didn’t switch doctors, and the doctor was amazing throughout the pregnancy, birth, and even beyond. But I also believe that the concept of killing an unborn baby because of a potential problem is 100% wrong and evil. So it’s a good person, with good intentions, but a dangerously wrong application.
ubiquitin,
while they may be wrong it is not generally coming from a bad place
[feivel’s response]: It is in fact coming from a hideous place of darkness and evil.
I did read this exchange. This question might sound silly, but I think it is not. What are you defining as “it” in your statement above? My guess is that your “it” is slightly different from feivel’s. Your “it” is probably the intentions of the medical professionals. Feivel’s “it” is the position that you described as “wrong”.
ubiquitin,
Yes! Strongly.
Oh, really?
Wanting to alleviate suffering is not (neccesarily) evil
And I absolutely 100% agree with you. However, can you not agree that the virtue of wanting to alleviate suffering can be led down bad paths by wrong beliefs?
Beleiving that limited resources are better spent in one way than another is not (neccessarily) evil
And I absolutely 100% agree with you. However, this is irrelevant to my point. Good intentions are not necessarily related to goodness.
This entire thread seems like a brouhaha to me. A tempest in a teapot.
ubiquitin,
If I understand you correctly, you are vehemently arguing for points that you actually claim to disagree with (since they are against the Torah), because feivel stated that those points were coming from a place of darkness and evil. Which you are interpreting to mean that feivel holds that the medical professionals who do agree with those points are dark and evil. I do not think that is what feivel meant at all.
Transpose these points from medical issues to religious ones, say an avoda zara faith. Now, I think we can all agree that avoda zara comes from a dark, evil place. But we all probably have neighbors or acquaintances who hold of this avoda zara, yet are extremely nice, upstanding, good people! Only mean well. On religion, however, they are simply very misinformed – and the source of their faith is darkness. That’s all I think feivel was asserting. He can correct me if I’m wrong.
If something is against the Torah, then ultimately its source is darkness and evil. Those who hold of those things may themselves not be dark and evil, but the source of their position is. Do you really disagree with that?
newbee,
The fact is, there are many MO, OO or whatever you want to call them who have attempted to use Rov Yoseph Ber to push liberal agendas that are detrimental to authentic Jewish practice i.e the masorah.
While the dinner in question may have been pushing something (what that was seems to be the debate in this thread), given that veal and fois gras were on the menu, it certainly wasn’t a liberal agenda!
Joseph,
When someone does an aveira.
[Addressed to WolfishMusings] Obviously this is discussing where you’re sure the action(s) was an aveira. And you’re doing it for the right reasons, i.e. to correct the wrongdoer out of your love for your fellow Jew. In the absence of those conditions and intentions, one shouldn’t be giving tochacha.
I agree with all of these points.
In this case it is talking about where you already gave the tochacha. (So you are already past point 1.)
To clarify the question I have: suppose you know (somehow) that if you give Shimon tochacha privately and compassionately, there is a 70% chance that he will listen to you, but a 0% chance he would listen to you if done embarrassingly in public. So you give him tochacha privately, and this happens to be one of those 3 times in 10 where he doesn’t listen. Do you then go for the public embarrassment, even though you know that it won’t help anything?
Joseph,
when necessary
a reasonable possibility of the person listening to you
Please define necessary and reasonable?
but if they don’t listen to you, then you should embarrass them in public so that they will do teshuvah
Does point 1) still apply in this case?
I’m confused by the bracha reasoing. How is wishing someone a “good” (or “gut”) Shabbos any less of a bracha than wishing someone a peaceful Shabbos?
Why doesn’t anyone say “Shabbos Shalom”? 🙂
RebYidd23,
Refuah Shleima! Toothaches are horrible.
DaasYochid,
Yes I do.
DaasYochid,
Thanks for the responses. I hope you and everyone else reading this have a wonderful Shabbos and Yom Tov.
oomis,
There are plenty of inexpensive TY notes or buy a pack of pretty paper(100 to the pack) and make your own. It does not have to cost much.
It really is NOT enough to say an obligatory thank you at the wedding especially when you have no idea what the gift is, until you open it.
Its not too much to ask them to show that they are makir tov.
I agree 100% with these points. The question is, however, if the giver did not receive a thank you card, should s/he dan l’kaf zechus/be mochel the recipient? Or should s/he consider it pure rudeness or unappreciative?
My point was that I don’t think the most likely reason in the majority of cases is rudeness or unappreciative feelings, but rather a lack of organization or carelessness. These are also faults, but perhaps less infuriating to the giver than straight up lack of appreciation.
DaasYochid,
I agree that it’s wrong because it involves melachah; I was still addressing your chilluk between the KosherSwitch and the Kosher Lamp.
So essentially your point (in contrast to mine) is that the only problems with the Shabbos switch are:
1. The act (flipping the switch and the resulting chain of events) itself is forbidden.
2. It could lead to other melachos being performed on Shabbos (e.g., flipping a Shabbos switch to turn on a teapot), whereas a Shabbos lamp has no such issues.
The issues of how it was marketed, or what intentions were behind its development, are irrelevant. Do I understand your position correctly?
DaasYochid,
I disagree. You wouldn’t have a lamp on if you couldn’t cover it, so the net gain is having light when you need it.
Yes, that is correct, and the way I said it incorrect. In my case, the light usually starts out uncovered (e.g., for reading) and is then closed for sleep, which is why I perceived that as the benefit. But if there were no Shabbos lamp, I’d have no light on in the room at all, so the true benefit is the light.
You may perceive the marketing as treating Shabbos as an inconvenience, and maybe that’s indeed the (very distasteful) marketing strategy,
Just out of curiosity, if you are familiar with the marketing that has been used, do you disagree that it treated Shabbos as an inconvenience?
but the product itself can just as easily be used “to bring us additional delight and comfort on Shabbos”.
In what way can that be so, other than providing the “delight and comfort” that only a melacha would accomplish?
Git Mishige,
DaasYochid, if you help someone switch their flat tire and the guy drives off without saying thank you, would it bother you?
Apples and oranges. There are many potential reasons that a thank you card didn’t come in the mail, but very few reasons someone wouldn’t verbally say “thank you” if you helped them change their flat tire. Also, the flat tire is one person doing an extended kindness, whereas thank you cards are a situation where many people are doing a kindness all at once.
It seems that in todays day and age things are taken for granted and sheer manners is lacking, starting with yourself
That comment lacked manners as well.
Being dan l’kaf zechus does not mean that if you fail to receive a thank you note, you have to pretend that the person sent it, but it got lost in the mail or abducted by aliens. It means realizing that people are human beings and make mistakes, and there could be a myriad of reasons that you don’t know about.
For example, the recipient may have a great sense of hakaras hatov, but poor organizational skills, and lost his or her list of gifts and givers. Or they accidentally checked your name off the “note sent” list. Or didn’t keep good enough track of who sent what from the get go. Or mis-attributed your gift to someone else (FYI – I once received a thank you note for a gift that I did not give, which means someone else didn’t receive a thank you note for that gift!).
Are these things mistakes and wrong for someone to do? Yes! But perhaps they are more forgivable faults than an assumption of straight-up rudeness. Should the recipient(s) keep better track of gifts and work harder to show their appreciation? Yes! But can you stand up and say that you are superhuman and have never, ever let anyone down? Being dan l’kaf zechus in this case perhaps isn’t about absolving someone of guilt, but of realizing that they are human, made a mistake, and weren’t out to get you. And that they would have sent you a card had they not been encumbered by their human faults.
Note carefully in all of this that I am not advocating for neglecting thank you notes.
oot for life,
In light of the hubub surrounding the “shabbos switch,” all halachic musings aside, the hashkafas that would allow such a thing to even be thought of should be concerning.
I agree, the notion in the advertisements for the switch that Shabbos was an inconvenience was disturbing to me.
For example, I just received an advertisement for the latest and greatest Shabbos Lamp. As far as I know most people use them, maybe I’m wrong, but maybe we’ve made Shabbos so convenient and so accepted that its not such a stretch that someone would develop something like the shabbos switch.
Then again I don’t know were to draw the line, crockpot, hotplate? Timers in general.
I think there is a distinction between the notion of enhancing Shabbos or making Shabbos activities convenient, which is not problematic at all, and viewing Shabbos itself as inconvenient because we cannot do melachos, and trying to find ways around that to do melacha-like things.
Crockpots/hotplates/blechs enhance Shabbos because they allow us to have hot food.
The Shabbos lamp enhances Shabbos because it allows us to block out light to help us sleep.
These things have nothing to do with the fact that we are forbidden to do melachos on Shabbos. They are simply 100% permissible ways to bring us additional delight and comfort on Shabbos.
The Shabbos switch, on the other hand, is an attempt to “kasher” a melacha on Shabbos, because it’s so “difficult” to have to go without flipping lights on and off on Shabbos.
It’s a subtle difference, but a big one.
apushatayid,
“its only baalei teshuva who text on shabbos.”
Huh?
I suspect that was a sarcasm fail on the part of oot for life.
WolfishMusings,
How would you have recognized me?
Given what happened when a coyote was spotted near Battery Park, I guess she’d know you were at the park by the tremendous police response.
DaMoshe,
I also doubt that tzius was taught/enforced the way it is today.
In my mind, there is a sharp distinction between a school environment and the rest of the world. Everything that you are describing below is apparently happening within a school environment, and it is not unique to Jewish schools, but any school with uniforms or a dress code policy (which includes public schools). Perhaps the only unique aspect to it is that it is being labeled tznius.
There weren’t teachers with rulers measuring how far below the knee a girl’s skirt was reaching.
This was done in my public school when I was young. The standards weren’t the same, of course, but there was a code and it was enforced.
They probably didn’t have rules about how a girl should tie back her hair.
I’m sure many schools did. My public school certainly did for certain circumstances.
No rules on what color clothes girls should wear.
At the public school I attended, clothing with words or logos were not permitted. Other schools require uniforms. I don’t see why this is a knock.
The chumros just keep piling up, and it turns people off to the whole concept.
I don’t see these as chumros, just school standards. Perhaps the schools should describe their standards as relating to the school environment itself (e.g., this is what we require girls who attend our school to wear, and by the way it is a good example of dressing b’tznius).