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Please, no one attack me, but I was wondering: Is it okay for people in this day and age to resort to physical attacks for the sake of others, when there is no such thing as giving “Malkos” anymore as used to be prescribed by Bais Din? I’m not talking about halachakly, rather is it morally considered okay?
Sadly there are certain situations that it might be necessary! but I am curious which person today has the wide shoulders to decide at what level and situation this is aloud.
I think this thread should be closed since it will lead to names and specific situations. I dont think the appearance of this thread today is by chance.
They were not doing it benevolatly. They were doing it as parnassah and charging alot for it.
Aloud, yes. Allowed, no. Or is it vice versa? Lol. I think that if one charges a hefty sum for doing it, they lose all moral credibility. Similarly, going to extremes based on the testimony of only one party is wrong and foolish, particularly when one has no prior knowledge of said party. Lastly, the risk of chillul hashem and jail time (which now seems inevitable on both counts) should stop even those who wrongly believe that the actions are objectively correct in this country.
the gemarah says “kofin oso ad sheomer, rozeh ani” thats what he did
It doesnt matter what the Gemorah says, its illegal in the US to do that and this is one of those things where “freedom of religon” would never fly.
showjow: Yes, but this was not a case in which that Gemara applies.
zahavasdad: in american law yes, in halacha no
Sam2:why not?
showjoe: Because there wasn’t an actual Beis Din that had declared him a M’sareiv or obligated to give him a Get. And certainly not this group. They never even saw him. Makin Oso… is an extension of Beis Din Makin V’onshin Shelo Min HaDin. It has to be a legitimate Beis Din and for legitimate reasons. They weren’t in this case.
I’ve encountered highly reliable accounts that during the mid-20th century a Beis Din would authorize someone to kill (as in put to death) people. There are situations where force would be allowed and where a Beis Din could use force.
Considering the accounts in the newspapers are of individuals offering their services for a fee, rather than of a Beis Din encouraging or directing people to act, the issue isn’t raised by the case that is causing the discussion. Three frum “hit men” do not make a Beis Din.
Whether a woman would be allowed by halacha to hire “hit men” to deal with a husband who has abandonned the marriage but refuses to write a “get” is a totally different question, and the validity of a “get” written by a husband out of fear his wife would use force against him is still another issue.
I’m opening a “cattle prod bais din”.
Achosid,
You need a Beis din to get you moving?
We don’t really know the whole story. But if a female FBI agent made a sting operation, setting up a fake personality, it is highly unlikely that the bais din went through the process of hazmanah and siruv properly. If it was all a setup, and there was no husband, then who and how were they mazmin to din, and how were they able to determine siruv? Unless maybe the FBI created a fake husband too?
I don’t know that anyone was making serious money here. (Except the paid thugs.) Hiring people to do these nasty deeds, and be willing to risk arrest, is not cheap. Some of these cases also have some hefty travel expenses involved. I’ve known the rosh yeshiva involved, and of these activities, for many years. He has traveled the world tracking down some of these recalcitrant husbands. He is independently wealthy. He started doing this, at least in the beginning, to help people that had no where to turn, and frequently at great personal expense. Now that some things have happened to his family wealth (thank you again, Bernie Madoff) maybe that has changed. But I tend to think that the sums charged were to offset some huge expenses involved in working these delicate matters.
As an aside, I think it is ironic that for years, the left wing aguna activist crowd would complain about the inflexibility of the chareidi community to their issue. “When is someone gonna do something about this issue?!?” Now they find out that someone actually HAS been doing something, those same people are some of the loudest complainers. As the old cliche goes, be careful what you wish for, you just might get it!!
Midwesterner: I don’t think the left-wing is so upset about this. Someone showed me an ORA post on Facebook basically saying, “For all those asking why we don’t just beat people up, it’s because this could happen.” Hevei Mashma that they would if they could. I think, once the media firestorm is over, the left-wing will be happy to see this and that the Chareidi community supports Agunot too. Because, for the most part, the only press that Chareidim get in regards to Agunot is not good.
Yes, it is a mitzva.
I agree. It’s a mitzvah to use a cattle prod.
Mitzvah min hamuvchar to have a gold-plated cattle prod with “harei she gitech” engraved on it.
No-one can ever attack a fellow Jew, be it by hand or cattle prod or any other means.
There is only 1 exception to this rule: haBo leHorgo >>> then Hashkem laHarog Osso.
There are exactly zero other exceptions to this dictum.
streekgeek – if you subscribe to orthodox judaism, then halacha = morality. Any distinctions between the two is saying either 1. torah is not misinai or 2. you know better than god. Neither of those statement allows one to remain within “the klal.”
streekgeek – if you subscribe to orthodox judaism, then halacha = morality. Any distinctions between the two is saying either 1. torah is not misinai or 2. you know better than god. Neither of those statement allows one to remain within “the klal.”
Then how do you account for the concept of a Naval B’Rushus haTorah?
The Wolf
For an observant Jew, morality isn’t relative. Right and wrong are what Toras HaShem says is right and wrong. But even though halacha is brought down from Ksav, though Shas, Rishonim, Achronim down to present day, the bottom line is the individual psak for the individual case. Psak is not necessarily black and white as learned it the beis medrash . Competent poskim understand the subtleties of the case, the character and disposition of the principals, and shape the psak of fit. One of the reasons that R’Moshe, ZTKL, held that the Aruch Hashulchan was more authoritative than the Mishna Berurah was that, although the Chafetz Chaim was certainly a tzadik and a baki. he was basically a Rosh HaYeshiva and a mechanich while R’Epstein was a Rav and a Posek who he felt had a better understanding of the application and dynamics of halacha in the every day world.
The Beis HaLeivi has a relatively famous piece on the difference between “Yashrus” and “Din” that would seem to not fit well with this idea that Torah=morality. Then again, it doesn’t make sense to say otherwise. So I don’t know what the P’shat is with this.
Wolf, The admonition not to be a Naval B’Rushus haTorah is found in the Torah.
Wolf, The admonition not to be a Naval B’Rushus haTorah is found in the Torah.
Where is this admonition? And how can you possibly have such a commandment when, by definition, it is self-negating (since, if you’re commanding people not to act as a NbRhT, then, by definition, they are no longer B’rshus HaTorah)?
The Wolf
streekgeek – if you subscribe to orthodox judaism, then halacha = morality. Any distinctions between the two is saying either 1. torah is not misinai or 2. you know better than god. Neither of those statement allows one to remain within “the klal.”
Where do you believe Perkei Avos fits?
Also see here:
http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/coffeeroom/topic/why-i-am-also-still-frum/page/4#post-484051
Wolf – I believe the NBH”T idea is the ramban on kedoshim tihyu, and my understanding is that he’s referring to what otherwise would be birshus hatorah. Either way, if the idea is applied torah, it is halacha, which would be included in my definition of morality.
GAW – much of pirkei avos is halacha. And the almighty would be my definition and definer of objective morality.
The gemara in many places cites “lo bashamayim he” to refer to our capabilities of defining the torah generally and particularly halacha (which is the torah applied to the real world). This means that whatever our great authorities interpret the halacha to be is the application of the word of god from sinai, and is the epitome of what I would call morality.
I’m not saying that there can be no other sources to learn morality from (like nature etc.), but the torah is the beginning of the conversation and the only absolute authority on the subject. So believes orthodox judaism. In the opinion of this orthodox jew.
frumnotyeshivish: Some of Perkei Avos is Halacha because it is in Perkei Avos, not because it is Halacha L’Moshe MiSinai. Other things (such as (I would think) “Sonei Es HaRabbanus” or “Lephum Tzara Agrah”) are not “Halacha”.
The concept (which you probably mean “Nitnu Reshus L’Chachamim”, not “Lo Bashomayim He”) puposely has very narrow application (perhaps Chol Hamoed, maybe others). Lo Bashomayim He is a completely different idea, in which bais din is given the right to Pasken within the framework of existing Halacha. It has nothing to do with making new Halacha, Chas V’Shalom, and certainly has nothing to do with “morality”. Tanur shel Achnai (the classic example) is a Halachic, not moral, issue.
If you define Halacha as “morality”, that is perfectly understood. Just realize that you are not using the word in the way other people would understand it. It is like calling an object with four walls, a roof and a door a “cat” because that is what you think a “cat” should look like.
Wolf, frumnotyeshivish is correct.
http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=40235&st=&pgnum=29
The Ramba”n is using the term “birshus haTorah” to refer to what would have been permitted had the Torah not commanded us to be kedoshim.
Wolf, FNY, DY: I believe the idea of “Naval” is that all of these things are inherantly muttar (in moderation), and the Torah does not Asser them. However, there is an Mitzva not to be a “Glutton”, either in food, drink, women, etc. Reshus means that the action individually is muttar, but in context it is a mitzva not to do it.
“Morality” might come from “Yashar V’Tov”, but that once again is very subjective.
The gemara in gittin 88b is clear that force in only allowed by a get in a case where one is required to divorce his wife not any time the wife wants a get and the husband doesn’t want to give it.
GAW, those, and some things which are frowned upon even in moderation, such as tum’ah. Ayin shom.
I don’t think yashar v’tov is subjective; it still works according to halachic (the Torah’s) guidelines.
DY: Tumah is not Nogaiyh today anyway (unless you are a Brisker Machmir and separate your own Terumah U’Maaser after the Rabbanut, Badatz, and your spouse all did so previously) 😉 B’Zman HaMikdash even in moderation it was a problem, due to Terumah, Kodshim, etc.
I look forward to your Marr’e Mekomos on the Halachic guidelines of “Yasher V’Tov”.
GAW, it’s not nogeia whether it’s nogeia today, my point is the p’shat in NBH.
IIRC, ani ham’hapeich is based on v’asisa hayashar.
DY: I believe that R’ Schachter explains that the Torah was given to human beings with an inborn (and imperfect) sense of right and wrong. We have to learn the Torah to hone that sense. But the fact is that some things that work Al Pi Din Torah don’t work in an imperfect society. If human beings were all perfect then we could follow the letter of the Dinei HaTorah with no problem. But we aren’t. So we have concepts like Lifnim MiShuras HaDin and G’zeiros D’rabannan in general. So while Halachah might be the ultimate morality for a perfect society, the fact is that there are some cases where the Halachah does not accurately represent the morality of an imperfect world.
DY – tumah is an exception, as i pointed out.
Bar metzra is also ‘yashar v’tov’. That i forgot before. Thanx.
Sam, it’s not that Galahad isn’t the ultimate morality, it’s that halacha also tells us how to act in an imperfect world.
Gavra, nivul peh is another example given by the Ramba”n.
DY: Well sure. But that doesn’t change the fact that Dinei HaTorah might not equate to perfect morality in an imperfect world.
Sam2, gaw – I suppose this whole conversation about morality turns on what the definition of morality is.
Webster online defines it as: “beliefs about what is right behavior and what is wrong behavior.”
If Halacha is the word of God (the Torah) applied to our lives (which btw is how I define halachah — not as the “rules” but as the “application” — the translation of the word after all is “the path”), then saying that it is imperfect is saying c”v that God is imperfect.
Saying that we are imperfect and therefore the word of God doesn’t apply is absolute and utter kfira. The world is full of kofrim, true, but the objectively true words of God preempt other opinions.
GAW – do you recall the story in which the rabbis were arguing and one Rabbi tried to bring proofs from the wall, the river, and the heavenly voice, and the other rabbis responded “lo bashamayaim hi” and won? It is to that idea which I was referring. Because there can be an absolute definition as what the torah means as practically applied, that means that halachah is the absolute word of God. Applying that one step further means that when halachah requires or speaks to something, it preempts the field in terms of opinions on its morality.
To summarize: 1. God objectively defines morality; 2. God gave us his true Torah; 3. Halachah is the practical manifestation of the Torah; THEREFORE Halachah(when it speaks)=Morality.
And streekgeek: MORALITY IS OBJECTIVE. IT IS DEFINED BY GOD. At the very least, that is my understanding of orthodox jewish beliefs.
GAW – do you recall the story in which the rabbis were arguing and one Rabbi tried to bring proofs from the wall, the river, and the heavenly voice, and the other rabbis responded “lo bashamayaim hi” and won?
You mean Tanur shel Achnai? Why didn’t you just say so?
;-p
If Halacha is the word of God (the Torah) applied to our lives (which btw is how I define halachah — not as the “rules” but as the “application
Better, but not there yet. How do you decide application of Halachic principles, especially when they conflict? See Bava Basra 5a Rashbam for some more insight.
DY: Going back to that Rashbam, it is exactly his point there that make “Yashar V’Tov” and morality subjective. By the rules in place, Runia has no right to the land. Subjectively based on Runia’s wealth (or lack thereof) it was decided that it would be more “Yashar” to waive Bar Metzra.
The same would be true in the other example that you mentioned. Another example is Tosfos by Issur Giurah, where the needs of Rava’s Yeshiva overrode the Mitzva L’Kayem Diveri HaMes (brought in many places, including BB 149a IIRC). That is a subjective application of morality.
frumnotyeshivish: How do you explain the Rambam Paskening against HaKadosh Baruch Hu in Yevamos 63? You need to figure out a little more about Lo BaShamayim Hi.
It’s a complicated issue, for sure. And I don’t claim to have any good all-encompassing P’shat (which I usually think I have on these Hashkafic type of Inyanim). But I think you are being a little too simplistic here, not that it matters. There’s nothing wrong with your opinion. I just think it needs a little more nuance to be entirely accurate.
gaw – i happened to have learned that gemara (bb5a) yesterday. I love when that happens. Do you mean rashi? Whether yashar v’tov was a chiyuv for ravina in that case seemed unclear to me (in my admittedly superficial learning of the sugya). regardless, it’d fall into my broad definition of halacha above. My point wasn’t how halachah is made or its internal rules and procedures, my point was that it can be made, definitively. Once something is definitively halacha, either you believe it is moral or you are a kofer. I see no logical third choice. Do you?
Sam2 – you said: “the Rambam Paskening against HaKadosh Baruch Hu in Yevamos 63…”
I’ve never learned Yevamos, but I’ve never come across a machlokes between the rambam and HKBH and certainly not one cited in a gemara. lol. care to elaborate?
GAW, that’s “subjective” to the situation, not to society’s whims. Huge difference.
Of course halacha applies differently to various cases, but it’s still the Torah’s “morality”, with specific (though adaptable to the individual scenario) guidelines, even for lifnim mishuras hadin.
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