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[between Halachah and Agada]
[1]
But besides the Ikarim there are many non-halachic disputes the Rambam paskens. As but one example of many, the Gemora in Brachos (34b) brings a dispute between R. Yochanan and R. Avohu whether a Baal Teshuva is on a higher level than someone who never needs Teshuva in the first place, or someone who never sinned is higher than the Baal Teshuva. The Rambam (Hilchos Teshuva 7:4) rules that a Baal Teshuva is on a higher level than someone who never sinned. There is no practical instruction here; just a Hashkafa.
Another example is the Gemora in Sanhedrin (91a) regarding what will be when Moshiach comes.
??? ???? ??? ???? ????? ????? ????? ???? ?? ??? ?’ ????? ????? ???? ??? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ????? ????? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ??? ????? ??? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ????? ?????
The Rambam in Hilchos Melachem only cites the opinion of Shmuel, not R. Yochanan. The Abarbanel (Yeshuos Meshicho end of ch. 7) asks on the Rambam that the Halachah is like R. Yochanan when disagreeing with Shmuel. Clearly, the Abarbanel understood the Rambam to be paskening this Agada like one side, and he voices his disapproval, as based on the principles of Halachah he should have rules like the other side.
The Abarbanel does not think to explain that because this is Agada, with not practical Halachic difference, the Rambam is entitled to follow whichever opinion he chooses.
Takeaways:
1. We do pasken Hashkofo, even with no difference in Halachah, if we have academic reason to do so
2. We do not pasken Hashkofo if the posek cannot find any academic advantage in one side over the other
3. Academic advantage includes sufficient evidence or authoritative power on one side of the dispute, or a sufficient level of understanding of one opinion over the other.
4. Where we do not pasken the issue, one may profess any side of the dispute that he chooses but under no circumstances can he believe in the correctness or superiority of one opinion over the other.
Very good point. It bothers me, too, to see the free for all attitude that prevails these days in this matter.
Having said that, let’s remember that we have a rule that Eilu Va’eilu Divrei Elokim Chayim. In practical Halacha it is impossible to follow both. Therefore there are rules of who to follow. In Hashkafa, the different aspects of all Shitos can be recognized. There are times when Chazal knocked out a certain Shita. In that case, as you mentioned, it is Assur to hold that way, since Chazal tell up it is actually wrong. But on an issue such as how old Avraham Avinu was who he recognized Hashem, we don’t Pasken like any particular Medrash. We understand that there are different aspects to recognizing Hashem, and Eilu Va’eilu.
Chovos Halevavos are not really just Aggaditta. It is a practical matter, whether you should believe in a certain matter or not.
I see now that you covered my point well enough in your “takeaway”.
The author neglects to mention the most important rishon on aggadata: Rabbi Avraham Ben HaRambam. His essay on how to interpret and understand midrash/aggadata is the introduction to every copy of the Ein Yaakov aggadata compilation. He points out that there are many ways to interpret aggadata that are consistent with respect for our rabbinic tradition, giving examples. He also points out that a subset of aggadata are for paskening, and warns both against excessive literalism in interpretation against disrespect for our sages.
“Hashkafa” as many people see it nowadays shouldn’t exist. It’s all Halacha. Some types of Halacha are just different than others. We should never have a “Haskafa” that overrides Halachic obligations. One the saddest moments for me, when talking with someone about a certain topic, was when he responded, “My Hashkafa doesn’t Pasken like that Mechaber.”
Yes, very nice, ad hatzi hamalchus veseyas, but when the modern edifice is threatened by some long lost paskened hashkofo, then you get the well worn resposne, ” Well we don’t pasken like
THAT _ _ _ _ _”!
Chein: Forgive my density, but I don’t understand how it follows from the fact that there are hilchos deios, or as you put it “paskening hashkafa” that I quote “aggadita is also halacha.” What does one have to do with the other? Or are you saying that some people think all the gemaros about deios are “just” aggadita?
I stumbled onto this thread while looking for something else, and even though it is from three years ago, I cannot in good faith let the claims here stand without a response.
There are three lines of reasoning employed here to demonstrate that there is psak in hashkafa/aggadita:
1) The Gemara in Eiruvin paskened such an issue.
2) The Rambam routinely paskens such issues, and even codified the 13 ikkarim.
3) The Chasam Sofer’s explanation as to why R’ Hillel wasn’t a heretic.
I think the first two points can be addressed together, by pointing out that a conclusion is not the same thing as a psak. I concluded that I typed this but I did not pasken that I typed this. The fact that Beis Shammai/Beis Hillel or the Rambam reached a conclusion on a given matter does not make it a psak. It means that they think it to be true or even that they are sure that it is true. The Rambam in fact in at least five places writes explicitly that he doesn’t pasken these types of issues (which I have already quoted in two other threads). See Peirush Hamishnayos Sotah 3:5, Sanhedrin 10:3, Shavuos 1:4, Sefer Hamitzvos Lo Saaseh 133, and Maamar Techias Hameisim. Also, the Abarbanel notwithstanding, the very fact that the Rambam went against the rules of psak demonstrates that he was not paskening, but simply telling us what he holds. See also the Tosafos Yom Tov on the aforementioned mishnah in Sotah who is bothered by the fact that the Rambam in Mishneh Torah “paskens” like Rebbe and not the Rabbanan. After first suggesting that the Rambam holds that they are not arguing he says: ??? ?? ????? ??? ?? ???? ??? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?”? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ??? ?????? ?????. And see also the Tzlach in Berachos 7b where he writes: ??? ??’ ???? ??? ????? ????”? ??? ??? ??? ?’ ?????? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ?? ????”? ????? ?????? ??????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ?? ??? ??? ??? ???? ?? ????? ????
?? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????
??? ?????? ?? ????? ????? ??? and R’ Akiva Eiger cites this and brings another proof to it.
Furthermore, it doesn’t even make sense that you can pasken something such as whether or not it is better to have been created or not or whether a ba’al teshuva is better than a tzaddik etc. because those things are metzius. A psak tells you what to do in a given situation. You can’t pasken what the truth is. If you say that they are paskenable then it will come out that certain things can change over time, such as whether H’ can have a corporeal manifestation or even whether H’ exists. This (certainly according to the Rambam) is untenable and would have grave ramifications for the existence of the religion.
Now the Chassam Sofer did in fact say this. But it must be pointed out that the Rishonim did not seem to agree with his understanding as evidenced from how they responded to the Rambam (see Raavad Hilchos Teshuvah 3:6, Kuntres Hara’ayos L’Riaz Sanhedrin Perek Chelek, Sefer Haikkarim 1:1).
And finally, see the last line in R’ Shmuel Hanaggid’s Mavo Hatalmud: ?? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ??? ?? ????? ?? ???? ??????
“The Mishna Brura rules (his source is Sefer Hachinuch almost word for word, but without attribution) that apikursos includes any opinion that is contrary to Daas Torah. Meaning, even if you follow all Halachos, if you have an opinion that conflicts with that of the Torah, you violate this laav.”
Problem with this paragraph:
The Sefer Hachinuch writes in mitzvah 387: ???? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ???? ????????? ????? ????? ??? ????
???? ?????? ????? ????
??? ????? ???? ???? ?? ??????
The Mishnah Berurah in the second Beiur Halacha quotes this and contrary to what you said, he does attribute it to the Sefer Hachinuch. The problem is that he doesn’t quote it accurately. He is listing the six constant mitzvos and the sixth one is this one. He changes the words though and writes: ????? ????????? ??? ?? ?????? ???? ??? ????
??? ?????
And even with the Beiur Halacha’s version, it still has nothing to do with whether you can pasken agadda/hashkafa.
“and the fact that he codifies 13 Ikarim in Mishna Torah is the simplest example of that”
Actually the 13 ikkarim are from the Perush HaMishnayot, not the Mishnah Torah.
See also Rashi Sanhedrin 51b:
??? ?????? ???? ??? ?? ????? ?????? ???? ????. ????? ?? ???? ????? ???? ??? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ??? ????? ???? ???????? ????? ????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????? ???? ??????? ????? ?? ???? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ???? ????? ????? ????? ????? ???? ?? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????
Chida, Chaim Sha’al chelek 2 4:3:
??? ??? ???”? ???????? ???? ???? ??”? ???? ??? ?? ???? ??? ???’ ??? ???? ????? ??? ??? ?? ??? ????? ??”? ???? ???? ?”? ????”? ???’ ?????
??? ????’ ??”? ???? ????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ?????? ???? ??’ ??”? ??”? ????? ?? ?? ???? ??? ???? ??? ????’ ??? ?????”? ????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ???? ??????
Interesting…
I had a hunch that Chein’s comments were copied and pasted from somewhere so I did some research and although I did not find a source where he was quoting from, I did find a commenter on a different site, who posted both of Chein’s posts, word for word, a few months ago (Chein’s posts are from three years ago).
While I was checking that out, I saw that someone there linked an article which quoted R’ Shteinman (though I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the report):
PAA, it all comes from frumteens (my hunch as soon as I saw that Chein is Joseph, and confirmed by Google).
That’s what I suspected, but when I googled it it did’t show up.
PAA you find many times machlokes in Metzius and the din one way or the other (how long is Bein Hashmashos, was the Beis Hamikdash mekudash latid and many health machlokes which are paskened) also the Chofetz Chaim is notorious for quoting the Zohar and many Midrashim in the Shmiras Halashon, Machne Yisrael and his other works and paskening from this (its interesting that in the MB he only quotes a Zohar when it was previously quoted by the Nose Kellim but then again that is how the MB differs from his other Sefarim).
Sof Davar I think this is a root difference between Chasidim and Mitnagdim in how important a role does Hashkafa plays and you see this also in the way they live and write their Teshuvos. For example in the Divrey Yoel he argues on Rav moshe regarding the Mechitzah and one of his main arguments is that the Divrey Chaim said that this is that way Klal Yisrael are Noheg (I don’t think Rav Moshe was phased by this), he was also Cholek on the Kneses Hagdolah that the MB brings in Hilchos Tefilin regarding the Zohar including with it the Kisvey Ari not like Rav Moshe. This is also why the Chsam Sofer held like that (he way Hungarian and very close to Chasidim, Rav adler and the Haflah were his Rebbeim). The Chofetz Chaim was his own personality.
This Chein fellow is clearly a Talmid from either Pachad Yitzchak or Chaim Berlin going back a bit.
Based on what I believe “to pasken” means I don’t understand this whole concept. If by “hashkafa” you mean values and non scientific beliefs then of course Judaism “paskens” on them. Religion is a value system and a system of beliefs, that is what it’s “made out of” (for lack of a better term) without specific values and beliefs the whole construct simply doesn’t exist.
If by Hashkafa you mean Scientific things those are not things that can be “paskened” they simply are what they are, (you can’t “Pasken” that a frog is a bird).
shulchanhashemelm:
I don’t think you understood my point. You can pasken for instance, what order the parshiyos should be in Tefillin. You can’t pasken what order they were in in Moshe Rabbeinu’s tefillin. That’s because the first question is a halachic question and the second question is a metzius question. The metzius can affect the halacha, but the halacha is not bound by the metzius; the halachic system is simply a means of determining what to do in a given situation – not what happened in a given situation. So what happens when the question under discussion is a question about what happened or what will happen? e.g. will the 10 shevatim return? will there be a Mashiach? Was Pharaoh a new king? etc.
Yes the Torah can have an opinion on the matter and, people can attempt to determine the answer, but it can’t be paskened. If the Gemara unanimously says a certain thing, then fine. But once there is a machlokes Amoraim or Rishonim, how do you determine who is right? Now generally, it doesn’t matter who is right because we can just pasken which position to follow. But when it comes to beliefs, it gets quite dicey because essentially, we would be required to believe (potential) falsehoods. This has been debated at length at http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/coffeeroom/topic/shmuly-yanklowitz-novominsker-and-oo-theology
See also the Maharshal in Sanhedrin 52b where he essentially argues with an Amora as to what a different Amora’s rationale was, and justifies it by saying that he’s not arguing about any din – he is arguing about something that has no halacgic nafka minah.
“pointing out that a conclusion is not the same thing as a psak. I concluded that I typed this but I did not pasken that I typed this. The fact that Beis Shammai/Beis Hillel or the Rambam reached a conclusion on a given matter does not make it a psak. It means that they think it to be true or even that they are sure that it is true.”
Without addressing the larger disagreement but only addressing the terminology, I don’t see why pasken cannot colloquially be used in the sense of concluding.
‘you mean Scientific things those are not things that can be “paskened” they simply are what they are, (you can’t “Pasken” that a frog is a bird).’
Years ago in this coffee room we had a discussion over whether one should eat pig if the gedol hador ruled that pig is kosher. I would not. There are some things that even the greatest rabbi can’t pasken.
Lior:
Because if it just a conclusion, and there is a machlokes as to what the conclusion is, how do you decide which position is correct?
Charlie:
Here is a secondhand link:
http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/coffeeroom/topic/daas-torah-2/page/5#post-525981
I don’t see why the aforementioned Gemara in Eiruvin or the 13 ikarim cannot colloquially be described as a psak rather than your preferred conclusion.
Lior:
How can you pasken whether it is better to have been created or not? It either is or it isn’t? The fact that someone paskened one way or the other doesn’t make it so.
” the 13 ikarim cannot colloquially be described as a psak”
One could describe the 13 ikkarim as a psak for mandatory beliefs. One should note that they were not universally accepted, even today. See Prof. Marc Shapiro’s book and the Machnise Rachamim prayer in the Selichot service, for example. Albo of course had a shorter list.
One could describe the 13 ikkarim as a psak for mandatory beliefs.
I agree.
One should note that they were not universally accepted, even today. See… the Machnise Rachamim prayer in the Selichot service
That is an egregious error, which I’ve pointed out in the past (with sources). I don’t have time now, but after Shabbos I’ll bl”n post a link to a teshuvah in the Igros Moshe on it (which I don’t think I’ve posted yet).
I think DaasYochid is referring to this:
http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14679&st=&pgnum=190
According to R’ Moshe, it would come out that some hold that Machnisei Rahamim is not a problem (and presumably that it is not included in the Rambam’s ikkar). However, those who were against Machnisei Rachamim, presumably are saying that it is against the Rambam’s ikkar. If so, then the only way that the forbidders could not consider the permitters as heretics would be if they say that the Rambam’s position is not necessarily binding. Which according to my arguments above, wouldn’t even make sense – if it’s heretical then it’s heretical. Maybe they think it’s a safek? I don’t know.
Yes, that’s the one I’m referring to. My point in bringing it up was to show Charlie that he is mistaken, and the machlokes isn’t necessarily whether we pasken according to the Rambam, as the mattirim are claiming to be going according to the Rambam.
As to whether this disproves your theory, although I disagree with you, I don’t think it does. At least some of the osrim use the term “k’ilu”, meaning even they may not hold it’s actually the type of request to malachim which is prohibited, but is assur because it appears that way.
Here is the S’dei Chemed I linked earlier:
http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=43519&st=&pgnum=6&hilite=
Well it could either disprove my theory, or it could prove that the Rambam was not universally accepted. Or it could be against my theory without disproving it.
or it could prove that the Rambam was not universally accepted
No, because they all offer an explanation consistent with the Rambam.
“No, because they all offer an explanation consistent with the Rambam.”
Except none of them authored Machnisei Rachamim, nor did any of them author the Yesod Hachamishi, so it is conjecture (which doesn’t necessarily make it wrong) or perhaps reverse engineering.
Note:
My previous comment was not meant cynically.
The Beis Mordechai (Mechkarim B’halacha siman 40) says it nicely:
?????? ?? ??? ??? ????”? ?????? ???? ?”? ?”? ???? ?????? ????”? ??? ????? ????”? ??????? ??????? ?”? ?”? ??? ???? ?? ????? ?? ????? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ?’ ????? ?’ ????? ???? ????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ???? ??? ?? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ????? ???? ?? ???? ?????”? ??????? ?? ???? ???????
?? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ?? ??? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ????? ?????? ???????? ??? ?? ???? ????? ????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ???? ???? ?? ?????? ????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ??????
The word Hashkafa means looking down (Rashi in B’raisheet), i.e. condescension . Being that a person doesn’t make himself into a rasha, he creates a philosophical construct to justify beliefs and actions. Often that sheds a bad light on others. For example, pro/anti Medina. Each side sees the other as morally off base.
Are there core beliefs and tenants of out faith? Of course, but we should realize where they end and other ideals start. BTW, I’m still working on it.
I find it interesting that Abba Shaul in Yevamot (just read about him the Daf Yomi) holds that not being lishma for the mitsvah of Yibum philosophically negates the mitsvah, and one is left with an ervah. This philosophical idea makes a difference in halacha, at least for Ashkenazim, who follow Abba Shaul and do Halitsa and not Yibum nowadays.
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