AZ
I will explain this once. On the off chance that you actually read it and comprehend what I am saying, it might help explain some things that are clearly bothering you.
Fact: The current accepted structure for compensating a shadchan is similar to a broker. The shadchan, like a broker, receives a ‘commission’ upon completion of the ‘transaction’ (i.e. the engagement/marriage). If the transaction falls apart, no commission.
This is a form of incentive compensation, i.e. compensation that is tied to performance. This form of compensation works extremely well – as evidenced by the number of people who choose to make a living as a broker. The hope of achieving a commission motivates the third-party to help out. Many shadchanim have altruistic motives in addition to the hope of receiving incentive compensation, which is wonderful too.
Fact: There is another form of compensation. It is called fee-for-service. This is a popular form of compensation in relationships between financial advisors and their wealthy clients.
The logic is that rather than have the advisor be swayed by the oodles of money the client has and figuring out what advice will return the highest commissions, the advisor knows eaxctly how much money he/she will get regardless of outcome and will provide the best advice for the client.
Both forms are valid incentives. The current system works under the former method. You have every right to suggest UPROOTING the entire system in favor of the latter method, but you’re going to have to come up with a good reason why. What you are saying (that it is not a valid method of incentive) is simply na’arishkeit.