by Chaim Weber

Halacha is not always bound by the limitations of human logic.

Case in point: Parah adumah, the red heifer – where the kohen sprinkling water to purify a contaminated person becomes impure, despite having just purified another person.

But the Gemara in Kesubos (22a) makes clear that certain halachos can be derived through logic and that these halachos have the power of a de’oraisa – a Torah obligation.

One halacha derived from logic is the principle of hamotzi mechaveiro alav ha’raayah – that one seeking to take away from his friend must bring proof (see Bava Kamma 46b). Based on this, the Mishnah in Bava Metzia says that one who is in possession of a garment is presumed to be the owner until proven otherwise.

But What About Brachos?

This leads the Pnei Yehoshua to a tremendous question.

The Gemara in Brachos (35a) says that there’s no source in the Torah commanding us to make brachos before eating. However, the obligation to make a beracha can be deducted from logic – since Hashem created the world, it’s forbidden to benefit from the world without first making a beracha.

The Pnei Yehoshua asks: the consensus of the poskim is that the obligation to make a beracha is a Rabbinic obligation. Not a Torah obligation. However, if the obligation is learned through logic, shouldn’t it have the power of a Torah obligation?

This leads the Pnei Yehoshua to suggest that a huge innovation – that making brachos before eating may not be just a Rabbinic obligation. It’s a Torah obligation.

But What About the Consensus? The Approach of the Nodeh Biyehuda

The consensus of the poskim remains that brachos are not a Torah obligation. If so, how would the poskim answer the question of the Pnei Yehoshua?

The Nodeh Biyehuda (Tzlach on Brachos, 35a) answers that logic can never be used to create a new mitzvah. Logic can only be used to apply the halacha in matters of dinim – matters adjudicated by courts. Only then could the chachamim use logic to determine what the halacha should be.

However, logic can never be used to create a new mitzvah. (In fact, doing so would seemingly be a violation of bal tosif – not to add to the mitzvos in the Torah.)

This is why logic alone couldn’t mandate us to make brachos on a Torah level. Only on a Rabbinic level.

The Approach of the Ritva

The Ritva (Hilchos Brachos 1:2) seems to go with a different approach.

He says that making brachos is so intuitive “to any people of truth” that the Torah didn’t give a specific commandment for it.

This is similar to what baalei mussar say as to why there’s no specific mitzvah to work on one’s middos – it’s so intuitive and such a prerequisite to the rest of the Torah that assigning a specific mitzvah to it takes away from its overarching value.

Another Potential Answer

Another potential answer to the Pnei Yehoshua’s question is based on a Tosfos in Shevuos (22b).

Tosfos there raises the following question.

Oftentimes, when presenting the source of a halacha, the Gemara will say: “Iba’is aima kra, iba’is aima sevara – its source can be based on a verse or alternatively, its source can be based on logic.” At first glance, this sounds like there are two sources for such a halacha: the verse and the logic.

But if halachos learned through logic have the power of a de’oraisa, why is the verse needed? The halacha could be learned through logic alone!

Tosfos answers that there are two categories of logic.

Certain cases of logic that are so self-evident that a verse isn’t required. However, there are cases where the logic is not absolutely foolproof. In these cases, we need a verse in the Torah to tell us the halacha – which in turn tells us that the presumed logic is indeed correct. However, without the verse, we couldn’t ascertain the halacha based on logic alone.

When it comes to brachos, logic may dictate that we should thank Hashem for eating. However, that logic may not be self-evident to the point where a verse isn’t needed. After all, logic doesn’t dictate the specific manner in which we should thank Hashem. Should we thank Him before eating? After eating? Both before and after?

And say we establish that brachos should be made prior to eating; should we invoke the name of Hashem, which if said in vain, could be a potential Torah violation! Logic alone won’t tell us that we have to make a beracha using the name of Hashem prior to eating.

This is why logic alone can’t compel us to make brachos without a source in the Torah. And since there’s no source in the Torah, the obligation will not be a Torah level obligation – rather, a Rabbinic obligation.

The Power of Making a Beracha – L’chaim!

It’s a well-established custom to try to find merits for deceased relatives on the anniversary of their passing – their yahrtzeit.

One common way is to recite kaddish. We also say the prayer in shul of kel maleh rachamim.

But among the most common ways to commemorate a yahrtzeit is to make a l’chaim or kiddush– thereby enabling others to make brachos.

Making a beracha is one of the purest expressions of hakaras hatov. When trying to do mitzvos to be of merit for ancestors, it’s only fitting that we do so by creating mitzvos of hakaras hatov.