Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the issue of Europe’s energy dependence on Russian energy carriers has gained particular relevance. Gas, oil, uranium, and coal from Russia constituted a significant part of the European Union’s energy balance. For Ukraine, this issue remains painful as well, as the energy security of Ukraine and the EU is a connected issue – one cannot exist without the other.
In 2022 and 2023, European politicians, businesses, and the public have done much to rid themselves of this dangerous dependency. Last winter, almost all of Europe (except Hungary) went without Russian gas, and this year the situation remains the same. Central Europe started acting earlier. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, it depended more on Russian gas than Western Europe, but because the threat was seen earlier there, they managed to get rid of this full dependence in 2022 within a few months. Lithuania and Poland were the most successful in shedding Russian dependence.
There is also a positive trend with oil: Russian oil remains critically important only for Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria; however, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria are already taking steps to completely abandon Russian energy carriers by 2024.
But the Russians not only maintain some critical physical segments of the market under their control but also continue to wage an aggressive political and information war against European energy independence.
The first challenge posed by the aggressor country is in nuclear energy. Russia still controls over 40% of the world’s fuel for nuclear reactors. Not only Europe but also the United States significantly depends on Russian nuclear fuel. Our partners plan to get rid of dependence on Russia within the next 3-5 years.
But Russia continues to work in the nuclear energy market and takes advantage of Hungary’s hybrid position, which has not yet abandoned the idea of building a nuclear power plant together with the Russians. Russia invests in the “environmental” lobby that attacks any initiatives for building new nuclear power capacities. Poland faced this challenge, where the construction of 6 nuclear reactors is planned by 2030: the Russians actively invest in a discrediting campaign.
The solution to this problem can be exclusively the establishment of own fuel production for NPPs and the spread of own, American, and Japanese nuclear technologies in the European market. Primarily, the use of advanced small modular reactors (SMR), which have become one of the safe and accessible options for nuclear energy.
The second challenge is that Russia actively disrupts plans to replace its own oil and gas with other types of fossil fuels. As mentioned earlier, Europe managed to replace Russian gas and almost completely abandon oil, but besides supplies from Africa, the Middle East, and America, this happened thanks to a return to traditional fuels, including coal. And here the same “environmental lobby” is actively working. The European Union, especially Germany, has been moving away from coal in favor of renewable energy and… Russian gas for the last 20 years.
This approach turned out to be an economic, energy, and political mistake because it allowed the Russian dictatorship to occupy the market and work on discrediting all other energy sources except their own. And now, when returning to coal and the “rehabilitation” of nuclear energy becomes a matter of survival for Europe, time, effort, and money must be spent on debunking myths inspired by Russia.
The third challenge is the presence in Europe of lobbyists who wish to “return everything as it was before 2022.” Despite the European Union and individual countries investing in abandoning Russian energy resources, proponents of the concept of “reconciling with Putin and buying gas and oil from him again” continue to work. Viktor Orban is not alone. Marine Le Pen in France, the Alternative for Germany party, Austrian, Dutch, Slovak right-wing radicals actively defend this position.
These ideas are not yet mainstream, but they, being voiced to a wide circle, weaken not only the positions of supporters of aid to Ukraine but also those who understand the Russian energy threat and advocate for European energy independence.
The fourth challenge is that Russia is accustomed to acting like a terrorist state. From constant attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure with missiles and drones, we already know that Putin will not stop at any crime to try to demoralize Ukrainians. He does the same with Europe.
In October, under mysterious circumstances, a gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland exploded. Before that, there were attempts to attack the energy infrastructure of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Germany. We know for sure: as long as Putin’s regime exists in Russia, terrorist attacks in Ukraine, Europe, and the world are inevitable. This includes against the energy infrastructure.
Overall, we can state: even before the attack on Ukraine, Russia used energy carriers as a weapon, Putin himself openly said that they are an “energy superpower” and that energy is a mechanism of influence for Russia, but Europeans and the world in general did not notice the full scale of the Russian energy threat. They also underestimated the aggressiveness of the regime built by Putin and his associates.
The full-scale invasion demonstrated the vulnerability of resource dependence on dictatorships, leading to tectonic shifts in the energy market. This war showed the necessity of global energy policy reforms in the world, especially in Europe, proving that the promotion of renewable energy sources and the development of local production are the only ways to ensure energy independence for our continent.
Alexander Katsuba is a Ukrainian entrepreneur, expert in the field of energy, owner of the company “ALFA GAZ.”