by Rabbi Yair Hoffman for 5tjt.com

l’refuah shleimah for Reb Binyonim Zev ben Charna

Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer zt”l was a Rosh Yeshiva in the Slabodka Yeshiva (along with Rav Moshe Mordechai Epstein zt”l) before he became the Rosh Yeshiva of Slutzk.  He was not paid by the Yeshiiva, and supported himself through his wife had a dry goods store where she sold cloth, among other things.  The problem was that the location was in the basement of a makom Avodah Zarah, and she paid them rent.

What was the cheshbon wherein Rav Isser Zalman reasoned that it would be permitted.  Based on a later psak given by Rav Moshe Feinstein cited in the fascinating work called “Kuntrus Ma Nomar” by Rav Nosson Yoseph Miller (p, 95), this author would like to suggest the following:

There is a concept called “Breirah” which means the assignment of which specific portion is allocated to whom.  For Torah prohibitions, the ruling is that if a part of it comes from something forbidden – then one may not assume that “your allocation” stems from the permitted section.  However, when dealing with a Rabbinic prohibition, we rule that there is Breirah [See Rambam Hilchos Trumah 1:21 and Hilchos Maaser (7:1)].

Rav Moshe ruled that since they would be able to rent it otherwise to someone else and that the amount of rental income would not be enough to maintain teh actual Avodah Zarah worship – it would be permitted because we can assume that teh breirah goes to permitted items.

Another possible answer can be found in a conversation his author had with Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, some 18 years ago.

In the Talmudic texts that deal with the concept of lifnei iver, there is an apparent contradiction. Depending upon how we resolve the apparent contradiction, we will gain new insight into the parameters and guidelines of lifnei iver even beyond the cases under discussion themselves. It is this author’s view that the guidelines of Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, differ substantially from the guidelines of Rav Zilberstein, shlita.

There is a concept known in halachah as teliyah — that whenever it is possible to assume a permitted purpose, even if that possibility is statistically or factually dubious, we do so.

The Gemara in Nedarim 62a tells us that Rav Ashi had an avah, a forest, that he sold to an avodah zara fire temple. When asked about lifnei iver, he responded that most of the wood would be for ordinary heating and not avodah zara. The Ran explains that it is permitted because of teliyah. The Ran’s view is cited by the Taz in Y.D. 151. The Chasam Sofer in a responsum (Y.D. #9) fully explains this idea.

However, there are other passages in the Gemara that indicate that there is a prohibition of lifnei iver whenever a strong likelihood of a violation exists. In Bava Metzia 75b, we see that it is a violation of lifnei iver to loan money when there are no witnesses. There is also such an indication from Bava Metzia 5b.

Three Approaches to Resolution

One approach to resolving the contradiction is that whenever there is a greater probability of a violation than a non-violation, then we do not assume a permitted purpose, and there is no lifnei iver. This is the approach of the HaGaos Tosfos Anshei Shem in Mishnayos Shviis 5:7 and the TaZ in Y.D. 151. This is also the approach of Rav Zilberstein in the above case of the suspecting mother-in-law.

Another approach is that the Talmudic cases that forbid it when the likelihood of a violation is stronger are only a rabbinic lifnei iver (see Tzitz Eliezer Vol. IV 5:3). [This would create an additional leniency, in case of a doubt, as we are more lenient on rabbinic lifnei iver than biblical lifnei iver.]

Rav Dovid’s Approach

Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, related his approach to resolving the contradiction. He explained that if the action being performed will directly lead to a violation on the part of the recipient, and without it the recipient would not have had the desire to violate halachah, then it is a violation of lifnei iver. Rav Feinstein’s view is recorded in this author’s sefer on lifnei iver titled “Misguiding the Perplexed” on page 97. [It is also a possibility offered by the Tzitz Eliezer as well.]

But is it Really Avodah Zarah?

Most poskim are of the opinion that a belief in the Trinity as a three part deity and prayer to the trinity means that they are not praying to Hashem per se,

Christian theologians who are fully knowledgeable of their faith have a slightly different conception of G-d than Jews and non-Trinitarian Christians do.* But this only applies to knowledgeable theologians. Most gentiles DO have a proper concept of Hashem. These members of mainstream denominations of Christianity do not truly share the theology of their denomination. Their conceptualization of the nature of G-d is, what Rav Elchonon Wasserman describes as intuitive. A good percentage of the United States likely falls under this category and many in England as well.  As far as fin de siecle, Slabodka – well that is hard to tell.

Some poskim believe that modern day practitioners of the religion are just following the ways of their parents (Maaseh avosaihem b’yadeihem), and do not truly believe in the theological underpinnings (See Shulchan Aruch, YD 148:12; Bach ibid; Responsa Yehudah Yaaleh YD #170).

Gentiles Have More Latitude in Belief

The Ramah in Orach Chaim 156 cites the view of the Ran (end of first chapter of tractate AZ). He writes that in his time, when a gentile mentions idol-worship, he is really intending the Creator of Heaven and Earth to be the recipient — it is just that he is looking at it as if it was shituf: i.e. both G-d and (l’havdil) the avodah zarah entity who created things.

The Ramah continues, that “gentiles are not commanded against shituf — a belief in both G-d and (l’havdil) the avodah zarah entity.”

The reading of this Ramah is the subject of great controversy. Does he really mean that a gentile is not commanded against a belief in G-d plus avodah zarah? The Ran asserts there is no special prohibition of a gentile swearing to avodah zarah, but not that there is no prohibition in believing that avodah zarah can co-exist with G-d.

Dissenting Views

One might, therefore, be tempted then to read the Ramah as only referring to a gentile taking a business oath. Yet the Ramah elsewhere (Darchei Moshe YD 151) clearly refers to more than just permission to cause them to swear in the name of the Creator. Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in a letter to his son Rav Shlomo (new responsa, end), writes that one may not rely on the lenient view of this Ramah.

Yet, we find that the Chasam Sofer, Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s own son-in-law, writes in his Toras Moshe (parshas VaYishlach) that, in fact, gentiles are not commanded on shituf. There is also a fascinating Rashi on Tehillim 6:11 that finds fault with the gentile nations for making idol-worship central and minimizing the Holy One Blessed be He. Rashi is highlighting that it isn’t “sharing” that is faulty, rather it is removing the Creator as the principal. The Maharatz Chajes (Horios 5) also writes clearly that a gentile is not commanded in shituf.

*(The more “kosher” denominations are (1) Christadelphians, (2)Christian Scientists, (3)Dawn Bible Students, (4) Friends General Conference, (5) Iglesia ni Criso, (6) J’s Witnesses, (7) Living Church of G-d, (8) Oneness Pentecostals, (9) Members Church of G-d International, (10) Unitarian Universalist Christians, (11) The Way International, (12) The Church of G-d International and (13) the United Church of G-d.)

The author can be reached at [email protected]